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wunderbare Betreuung und seine Unterstützung insbesondere in den schwierigen
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Abstract
This thesis proposes a novel way to describe habit learning and the resulting balancing of
goal-directed and habitual behavior using cognitive computational modeling. This approach
builds on experimental evidence that habits may be understood as context-dependent
automated sequences of behavior embedded in a hierarchical model. These assumptions
were implemented in a Bayesian model, where goal-directed action sequences are encoded
using a Markov decision process, and habits are interpreted to arise from a Bayesian prior
over such sequences. Simulations show that this modeling approach yields key properties of
habit learning, such as increased habit strength with increased training duration. This novel
mechanistic description may lead to an improved understanding of habit learning mechanisms
and individual learning trajectories, which may have implications for mental disorders which
are believed to be accompanied by a maladapted balance between goal-directed an habitual
control.
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1 Introduction
Behavior in animals and humans is not only based on the current state of the environment
and immediate outcomes of actions. Instead, living agents have developed the remarkable
ability to inhibit actions that would currently lead to favorable outcomes in lieu of actions
that will yield an even greater outcome in the future. A squirrel collecting and hiding nuts
for winter is just as much an impressive example as humans staying at home to study for a
degree instead of going out with their friends. To be able to execute such behavioral control,
living agents must predict the consequences of their actions over multiple time scales and
use this representation of the future to select actions.
This behavior, which is based on internal motivation and future goals instead of being based
on current stimuli, impulses, and habits, is often referred to as volitional behavior (Haggard,
2019). Volition itself is viewed to be comprised of a set of executive function or cognitive
control processes which guide cognitive processes to adhere to super-ordinate, long-term
goals. As a consequence, an agent is enabled to choose behavior reaching goals, even in
the presence of conflict from impulses and habits (Goschke, 2014; “The Unity and Diversity
of Executive Functions and Their Contributions to Complex “Frontal Lobe” Tasks: A Latent
Variable Analysis”, 2000). The exact processing mode of a cognitive process can be described
by meta-control parameters, which define the modus operandi of the process at hand and
the respective large-scale brain network. Neurobiologically, meta-control parameters have
been linked to neuromodulatory systems and a dysfunctional setting of these parameters has
been suggested in several mental disorders, such as obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD),
addiction, depression, and anorexia nervosa (Goschke, 2014).
Importantly, how meta-control parameters should be configured for healthy and optimal
processing is not a trivial question. In such a meta-control problem, an agent has to strike a
balance between, for example, an automatic and habitual tendency to execute behavior which
was successful in the past, and explicitly evaluating behavior with respect to its consequences
in a goal-directed manner. Carefully evaluating actions and planning ahead means an agent
can adaptively react to its environment but uses computational resources and time, meaning
it carries opportunity costs. Conversely, choosing automatic behavior means faster action
and frees mental processing resources for potentially more pressing demands, but behavior
may not be adapted to a changing environment. At any time, an agent has to decide whether
it can rely on its resource and time efficient habits, or whether it should rather use more
costly and slower explicit forward planning.
Consequently, a maladapted balancing between habitual and goal-directed behavior may
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be implicated in several mental disorders (Goschke, 2014), and can manifest as an increased
learning rate of habits, or an excessive reliance on either habitual or goal-directed behavioral
control. OCD for example has been described to be accompanied by an over-reliance on
the habit system (Gillan et al., 2011). Another striking example is addiction, where addictive
behavior is thought to result from a shift from goal-directed towards habitual control (Volkow
& Morales, 2015; Everitt & Robbins, 2005, 2016). Therefore, research into the balancing of
habitual and goal-directed behavior may have a sizeable impact on the understanding of how
these disorders emerge and how they may be treated.
It has been recently argued that neuroscience cannot solely rely on the bottom-up approach
of inferring brain (mal-)function from neuronal architecture, as the analysis and interpretation
of neurophysiological data can become rather complex. Instead, it it has been proposed
that the neuronal architecture should be viewed to follow function, so that it is imperative
to understand behavior and the respective computational necessities in order to be able
to understand neuronal architecture (Krakauer, Ghazanfar, Gomez-Marin, MacIver, & Poep-
pel, 2017; Gomez-Marin, Paton, Kampff, Costa, & Mainen, 2014; Cooper & Peebles, 2015;
B. W. Balleine, 2019). By following this approach to gain a more mechanistic and theoretical
understanding of habit learning and balancing of control modes, this thesis proposes a novel,
hierarchical Bayesian habit learning model, describing habit learning on sequences of actions,
which captures key characteristics of habit learning known from the animal literature.
To lay the ground for this new model of habit learning, Chapter 1 will first introduce habit
learning in more detail and outlines the behavioral experiments in animals and humans which
probe the characteristics of goal-directed and habitual behavior, from which an operational
definition of habitual behavior has been derived. This is followed by a short overview over
what is known about the neural underpinnings of habitual and goal-directed behavior. Subse-
quently, models of habit learning will be discussed: Starting with Markov decision processes
as a model for goal-directed behavior, followed by an introduction to important advances in
modeling of habit learning and the resulting balancing of control. Then approximate Bayesian
methods will be discussed which will be used for the model proposed in this thesis. Lastly
follows a short overview of the proposed model and which findings from the animal literature
it should be able to replicate. Chapter 2 proposes a novel approach to improve sequential
inference in Bayesian Markov decision processes based on the belief propagation algorithm.
Chapter 3 will present the habit learning model in more detail and show, using simulations,
that the model can indeed replicate key behavioral findings from the literature. Finally, Chap-
ter 4 will summarize the findings and integrate them into the larger context of the literature,
and discuss implications and limitations should the model predictions hold.
1.1 Operational definition of habitual and goal-directed
behavior
The first description of how agents learn and select actions based on reinforcement was
Thorndike’s “Law of effect” (Thorndike, 1898; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Translated into current
psychological concepts, this kind of learning is nowadays described as operant conditioning
or instrumental learning (Mazur, 2015; Gluck, Mercado, & Myers, 2016). Here, it is assumed
that an agent, upon encountering a new environment, learns about its structure and what
rewards may be achieved and uses this knowledge to navigate to the rewarding goal states in
a goal-directed manner. Such goal-directed behavior is typically described as being voluntary
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and is operationally defined as being based on learned action-outcome contingencies, where
action evaluation and choices are based on the expected reward of an action (Dickinson &
Balleine, 1994; Dolan & Dayan, 2013). In the case of a more complex environment, the agent
may have to deliberately plan several steps into the future, and use its knowledge about
the structure of the environment and action-outcome contingencies to search through a
decision tree and evaluate which sequence of actions will lead to a goal (Keeney & Raiffa,
1993). As this process is akin to a mental simulation of the future, it is inherently prospective
and future-oriented (Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Yin & Knowlton, 2006; Adams, 1982). The main
advantage of such a deliberate planning process is that it is based on the structure of the
environment and can therewith be flexibly adapted to changes in the environment, meaning
that an agent employing goal-directed behavior is able to flexibly adapt to new action-outcome
contingencies (Yin & Knowlton, 2006; Dickinson, Nicholas, & Adams, 1983; Dickinson, 1985).
Nonetheless, this comes with a disadvantage: The search through the decision tree can be
arbitrarily complex for large state spaces and long planning horizons so that this kind of
behavioral evaluation is slow and costly to use (Dayan, 2009; Dolan & Dayan, 2013).
Once action-outcome contingencies have been sufficiently learned for an environment, and
an agent has determined which behavior is rewarding, it is more resource efficient to switch to
habitual behavioral control (Yin & Knowlton, 2006; Dayan, 2009). Habitual behavior is typically
operationally defined as automatic stimulus-response associations, which are based on past
behavior and experiences (Dickinson et al., 1983; Graybiel, 2008; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Smith
& Graybiel, 2016). It is inherently retrospective and promotes a repetition of behavior which
has been successful in the past (Dayan, 2009; Dolan & Dayan, 2013). With increased training
duration in a specific environment, habits become more and more pronounced until the
agent is over-trained and habits completely dominate the action selection process (Yin &
Knowlton, 2006; Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; Adams, 1982),see Figure 1.1a. This comes with the
advantage that habits, due to their automatic nature, are fast and resource efficient (Dayan,
2009; Dolan & Dayan, 2013), but on the other hand, behavior may be rendered inflexible to
changes in the action-outcome associations and reward values of the environment, especially
in over-trained agents (Yin & Knowlton, 2006; Adams, 1982). These operational definitions
have been derived from animal experiments which are outlined below.
Animal experiments
The way in which animal experiments usually probe for goal-directed and habitual behavior
goes back to Skinner and his operant conditioning chamber (Skinner, 1948; Yin & Knowlton,
2006). This so-called Skinner box provides a confined environment in which animals can
be isolated from the rest of the laboratory setting so that stimuli can be controlled by the
experimenter. Animals usually have one or two simple and repeatable actions, like lever
presses, from which they can choose, see Figure 1.1b, further reducing the complexity of the
experimental environment and increasing control by the experimenter. One of the actions is
typically rewarded according to some reinforcement schedule, which may distribute food or
aversive stimuli as reward or punishment, respectively, inducing instrumental learning (Yin &
Knowlton, 2006). Additionally, the rate with which animals choose a specific action is recorded
and provides a behavioral measure, see e.g. (Adams, 1982).
When put into the Skinner box, the animal first learns about its environment and uses this
knowledge instrumentally and in a goal-directed manner. With prolonged training, the animal’s
response rate increases as behavior becomes more and more habitual and automatic (Yin &
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Figure 1.1: Acquisition of and probing for habitual behavior in animal experiments
aQualitative control strengths of goal-directed (blue) and habitual (orange) control on behavior
as a function of training duration, adapted from Figure 1B in (B. W. Balleine, 2019). The axes
are in arbitrary units (au). Upon encountering a new environment, an agent typically learns
about its structure and which behavior is rewarding. After having learned the action-outcome
contingencies, the agent uses those to navigate to a goal in a goal-directed manner. As a
result, the contributions of goal-directed control (blue) are thought to increase rapidly for
short training durations (in typical experiments ≈10 trials). Once the agent has sufficiently
learned appropriate behavior for its environment, goal-directed control strength peaks and
continues to decline, as the agent can now rely on past rewards in order to control behavior,
and does not need to engage in costly and slow explicit forward planning. Habitual control
(orange) is thought to be low in the beginning and increases slowly with time, while the agent
accumulates a tendency to repeat previously successful behavior. For moderate training
durations (e.g. 50-100 trials), both control modes influence behavior. For extended training
periods (e.g. 500 trials), the agent becomes over-trained, and typically almost solely relies on
habitual control for action selection. Trial numbers were taken from (Colwill & Rescorla, 1988;
Adams, 1982).
b A typical experimental setup to test for the strength of habitual control, adapted from Figure
1A in (B. W. Balleine, 2019). The agent, here a mouse, is put into a Skinner box (black box)
with, for example, two levers. In the training phase (left box), usually one specific action, here
pressing the left lever, is rewarded, while other behavior is not. After training, an experimental
manipulation is applied (middle boxes), so that either the action-outcome contingencies
change (contingency degradation, bottom box), or reward is devalued (outcome devaluation,
top box). Afterwards, the continuation of previously learned behavior is tested in extinction
(right box). If the agent is able to adapt its behavior to the changed environment, this is
interpreted as evidence that the agent applies goal-directed control. If the agent is not able
to adapt its behavior and continues to use previously learned behavior, it is interpreted as
the agent applying mainly habitual control.
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Knowlton, 2006; B. W. Balleine, 2019; Adams, 1982). In order to test if behavior has become
habitual, the environment is then altered in a way that makes the previously reinforced
action undesirable (Yin & Knowlton, 2006; B. W. Balleine, 2019). This is typically done using
(i) contingency degradation or (ii) outcome devaluation (Figure 1.1b). Under contingency
degradation, the action-outcome contingencies of the environment are changed by the
experimenter, so that either abstaining from the action or a different action is rewarded.
Under outcome devaluation, the reward magnitude is altered by the experimenter, by either
satiating the animals so that food becomes less desirable, or even by causing an adverse
reaction by, for example, taste aversion as a consequence of inducing a gastric illness. The
response rate after this change is recorded to determine if and how long the animal continues
to choose the previous action, which provides a measure of habit strength, for a review of
these procedures see (Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Typically, the response rate and the time in
which the old behavior is repeated increases with the duration of the training phase, while
the reaction time decreases (Adams, 1982; Dickinson et al., 1983; Seger & Spiering, 2011).
The habit strength is furthermore dependent on the specific action-outcome contingencies
used and the reinforcement schedule which is chosen to deliver the rewards (Yin & Knowlton,
2006).
These results from the animal habit learning literature are often interpreted such that
goal-directed behavior rests on action-outcome contingencies, while habits are cued stimulus-
response associations (Smith & Graybiel, 2016; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). In this view, the cue
can be implicit, such as the lever in the Skinner box, or more explicit, e.g. a light or tone is
played to signal reward availability. Additionally, and as a generalization of the cued stimulus-
response habits, some studies showed that habits are profoundly influenced by experimental
context, e.g. (Bouton & Bolles, 1979; Thrailkill & Bouton, 2015) and can be quickly recalled
when encountering a previously experienced context. Consequently, it has been argued that
contexts may play an important role in instrumental learning (Bouton, 2019). In a similar vein,
habit learning studies of humans in every-day behavior showed that habits are learned in
a context-dependent manner (Lally, Van Jaarsveld, Potts, & Wardle, 2010; Wood & Rünger,
2016). Here, the context is often more implicitly cued, and equates to specific everyday-life
situations such as “after breakfast”. It has been found that habits are more easily learned when
the behavior is repeated in the same context, e.g. always after breakfast (Lally et al., 2010;
Danner, Aarts, & de Vries, 2008; D. T. Neal, Wood, Labrecque, & Lally, 2012), while breaking of
habits is facilitated after a context switch, e.g. after a move to a new city (Verplanken & Roy,
2016).
To summarize, in experiments behavior is classified as habitual when it is insensitive to
outcome devaluation and/or contingency degradation. Habit strength increases with training
duration, and depends critically on action-outcome contingencies and reinforcement sched-
ules used during training. Habitual behavior may be cued, and habit learning trajectories are
context dependent, so that known behavior can be recalled quickly in a known environment.
There have been several attempts to translate this operational definition into paradigms
which induce habitual behavior in humans which will be discussed in the following.
Human experiments
One class of paradigms tried to directly translate outcome devaluation tests from animal
experiments, see e.g. (Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007; E. Tricomi, Balleine, & O’Doherty,
2009; Watson, Wiers, Hommel, & De Wit, 2014). In such tasks, participants are trained to
10
perform an action to obtain a reward, e.g. sweets, and are subsequently offered rewards
until they are satiated. Afterwards, participants continue the task and it is measured whether
they continue to perform the action despite the reward having lost its appetitive value. Using
this kind of outcome devaluation paradigm, some studies were able to find inter-individual
differences in sensitivity to outcome devaluation for different mental disorders compared to
neurotypical participants, e.g. (Gillan et al., 2011; Everitt & Robbins, 2016). Nonetheless, de Wit
et al. (2018) found that different variants of such outcome devaluation tasks failed to produce
the effect that habit strength increases with increased training duration. These findings call
into question whether such a simple single trial paradigm indeed induces habitual behavior
in humans. Consequently, it may not be possible to map animal habit learning experiments
to humans one to one, because humans may be too adaptive, or less easily trained (Watson
& de Wit, 2018).
Another class of paradigms made use of more complex sequential decision making tasks,
commonly using a sequence of two decisions to reach a goal (Daw, Gershman, Seymour,
Dayan, & Dolan, 2011). This two-step task was set up such that two actions can be chosen and
probabilistically lead to one of two states, where one transition is more likely than the other.
Then, a second action could be chosen as one of two options, where a reward is given to the
participant according to a probability which is evolving over time. The authors hypothesized
that under goal-directed control, participants maintain a mental map of the task which they
update based on the states visited and actions chosen. Contrarily, under habitual control,
the authors proposed that participants may only update their representation of how good an
action was, independent of the state they subsequently visited. If a rare transition occurred,
and a state was visited which was unlikely given the action chosen, goal-directed and habitual
control signals would be in contrast. This kind of task indeed induces stable and replicable
effects, e.g. (Deserno et al., 2015; Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013; Eppinger, Walter,
Heekeren, & Li, 2013; Smittenaar, FitzGerald, Romei, Wright, & Dolan, 2013; Otto, Skatova,
Madlon-Kay, & Daw, 2014), and the authors found evidence of neural correlates for both
hypothesized control modes in fMRI experiments.
To investigate whether these hypothesized control modes can be mapped to the operational
definition of habitual and goal-directed behavior, two studies combined instrumental learning
in the two step task with a subsequent outcome devaluation (Friedel et al., 2014; Gillan, Otto,
Phelps, & Daw, 2015). Interestingly, both studies found that the degree to which participants
use the hypothesized habitual control mode in the two-step task did not correlate with the
insensitivity participants showed under outcome devaluation. Both studies have limitations,
namely low number of participants or being run on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, so they
only present preliminary evidence that the constructs measured with the two-step task and
outcome devaluation may not equate. Consequently, it is currently unclear whether the
two-step task indeed measures habitual behavior as defined in the operational sense above,
or another heuristic behavioral strategy. Further studies will need to investigate if the two-step
task is a suitable paradigm to measure habit learning, or if other sequential decision making
tasks better induce and measure habitual behavior.
1.2 Neural correlates of habit learning
Ideally, a mechanistic definition, as the one proposed in this thesis, must not only be congruent
with the operational definitions of habits and their properties found in behavioral experiments,
but should also allow for an interpretation in terms of brain function. Having discussed
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operational and behavioral definitions of habits above, in this Section provides an overview
about what is currently known about the neurobiological underpinnings of habitual and
goal-directed behavior in rodents and humans.
In order to illustrate neurophysiological findings I present a simplified parcellation of cortico-
basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops which have been found to be involved in implementing
habitual as well as goal-directed behavior, see Figure 1.2. In accordance with the literature
(B. W. Balleine, 2019; B. W. Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; Yin & Knowlton, 2006), these loops
can be divided into three sub-loops which are implicated in different stages of instrumental
learning. Evidence suggests a strong interaction between the loops, which is not shown in
this simplified overview.
It has been found that the loop centered on the dorsomedial striatum, the caudate nucleus
in humans, is necessary for goal-directed behavior in the the early phases of instrumental
learning (B. W. Balleine, 2019) when the agent learns action-outcome associations (middle loop
in Figure 1.2). The prelimbic cortex in rodents, has been shown to recruit and coordinate the
necessary components of goal-directed behavior: Working memory, synaptic plasticity (Tsutsui,
Oyama, Nakamura, & Iijima, 2016); and sensory, affective, and motor areas (B. W. Balleine,
2019). Evidence suggests that it enables the dorsomedial striatum to hold learned action-
outcome contingencies through its projections (Yin, Ostlund, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2005;
E. M. Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 2004). The medial prefrontal cortex has been suggested as a
human homologue to the prelimbic cortex, where fMRI studies showed that its BOLD signal
correlates with the expected reward of actions (Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan,
2006; B. W. Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010) and aides action value comparisons (Morris, Dezfouli,
Griffiths, & Balleine, 2014). The dorsomedial striatum has been found to integrate inputs
from prefrontal regions and the thalamus (Reep, Cheatwood, & Corwin, 2003; B. W. Balleine &
O’Doherty, 2010) to encode action-outcome contingencies in a context- or state-dependent
manner (Fino, Vandecasteele, Perez, Saudou, & Venance, 2018). The dorsomedial striatum is
known to project its representation of learned behavior to the substantia nigra pars reticulata,
an output nucleus of the basal ganglia, which in turn projects to the mediodorsal thalamus,
whose disinhibition facilitates the initiation of movement in the motor areas (Pollack, 2001;
B. W. Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010).
For habitual action on the other hand, evidence suggests much of its neural implementation
to be based on a loop centering on the dorsolateral striatum (Reep et al., 2003; Yin, Knowlton,
& Balleine, 2004), corresponding to the putamen in humans (right loop in Figure 1.2). It
receives input from sensorimotor cortices, which have been shown to encode cues relevant
for behavior (McGeorge & Faull, 1989) and thalamic regions (Alloway, Smith, Mowery, &
Watson, 2017) which are thought to encode learned skills and unconditioned behavior such
as orienting or whisking (B. W. Balleine, 2019). The dorsolateral striatum projects to the
globus pallidus pars interna, another output nucleus of the basal ganglia, which projects
to the ventral anterior and ventrolateral parts of the thalamus, again aiding the initiation of
movement (Pollack, 2001). Compuatational studies furthermore suggested that habits are
formed by chunking single actions into automatic sequences (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012, 2013).
This is supported by observed task bracketing activity in the dorsolateral striatum, where
neurons are active at the beginning and end of an action sequence, and the magnitude of
the activity is correlated with behavioral automaticity (Smith & Graybiel, 2013, 2014).
Additionally, there is thought to be a third loop in strong interaction with the two loops
discussed above (left loop in Figure 1.2). It is centered on the ventral striatum (nucleus accum-
bens) and supports the two dorsal loops with retrieval of stored memory, and by providing
incentive and subjective valuation (Yin & Knowlton, 2006; B. W. Balleine, 2019). For example,
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Figure 1.2: Cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops
This figure shows an approximate parcellation of the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical
loop into three sub-loops, adapted from Figure 3A in (B. W. Balleine, 2019), Figure 3 in (Yin
& Knowlton, 2006). The left loop, centered on the ventral striatum, is has been found to
be responsible for retrieval and valuation of action-outcome contingencies, and therewith
is thought to mediate the incentives for different actions. The middle loop is centered on
the dorsomedial striatum and has been shown to implement learning and on-line usage of
action-outcome contingencies, which are necessary for goal-directed behavior. The right loop,
centered on the dorsolateral striatum, has been found to process automatic, unconditioned,
and habitual actions. All loops receive sensorimotor inputs through the thalamus, which
allows for contextual retrieval, processing, and evaluation. As their output, they project back to
the thalamus, where they aide motor preparation through disinhibition. Not shown are many
cross connections between the three loops which also play a major role in action evaluation
(see main text).
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evidence suggests that the orbitofrontal cortex is involved with the retrieval, but not learning,
of context-dependent action-outcome associations (Gremel & Costa, 2013; Parkes et al.,
2018) which it supplies to the dorsomedial striatum for goal-directed evaluation. The relative
predicted value of actions, which is needed in order to compare and decide between the
outcomes associated with different actions, has been suggested to be evaluated in the ventral
striatum, i.e. the nucleus accumbens in humans (Corbit & Balleine, 2015; Parkinson, Cardinal,
& Everitt, 2000) and corresponds to the prospective evaluation needed for goal-directed
action. Additionally, the nucleus accumbens has been found to also encode retrospective
experienced value (B. W. Balleine, 2019) together with the amygdala (B. W. Balleine & Killcross,
2006). The ventral striatum projects to the ventral pallidum, which encodes subjective liking of
a stimulus (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015) which in turn projects to the mediodorsal thalamus.
As this description suggests, the habitual and goal-directed systems most likely are not
competing as two opposing systems, but are rather intertwined and cooperate on the task
of action evaluation (B. W. Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; B. W. Balleine, 2019). During habit
learning, a shift from the processing loop centering on the dorsomedial striatum to the loop
centering on the dorsolateral striatum can be observed (Yin & Knowlton, 2006; B. W. Balleine,
2019). Additionally, human studies on addiction hint at a general shift from processing in the
ventral striatum to processing in the dorsal striatum as addictive behavior is acquired (Everitt
& Robbins, 2013), which is also understood as the behavior becoming more automatic and
habitual.
1.3 Models of habit learning
Neither the psychological nor the animal literature have converged on a mechanistic definition
of habit learning. To achieve a more mechanistic understanding and definition of habit learning,
and to be able to understand brain function in more depth, behavioral and computational
causes and requirements need to be formalized (Krakauer et al., 2017; Gomez-Marin et al.,
2014; Cooper & Peebles, 2015; B. W. Balleine, 2019). One way to to formalize mechanistic and
causal models, which has been proven as useful tool in disciplines like physics, is mathematical
modeling. A mathematical model allows to specify causal relationships with high precision,
and predictions of the mathematical model can be used to design new experiments to test the
hypotheses planted into the model. Vice versa, new experimental results need to be fed into
the model, so that it is able to describe a wider range of phenomena. In cognitive neuroscience
and psychology, this approach has been termed “the combined computational-experimental
approach”.
In the past, influential computational habit learning models have been proposed, which
allow to formalize concrete hypotheses for habit learning mechanisms, and to compare the
hypotheses by fitting the models to experimental data. In this section I want to introduce
some of these models and the hypotheses they are based on, some of which I will incorporate
or extend in the model proposed in this thesis. Typically, a habit learning model must describe
how action-outcome contingencies are learned and evaluated to produce a goal-directed
control signal, and how habits are learned based on past experience. Importantly, a model
has to furthermore propose a way in which relative control strengths of the two modes of
operation are balanced when selecting an action. It should furthermore exhibit many if not
most typical features of habitual behavior, such as increased habit strength with increased
training duration.
Much evidence suggests that goal-directed behavior can be mathematically described using
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a Markov decision process, while the picture for habitual action control is much less clear,
for a review see (Wood & Rünger, 2016). First, I will introduce Markov decision processes
in general and why they are thought to describe goal-directed behavior, and then go on to
present different concrete implementations in computational cognitive models. Finally I will
discuss different proposals to date on how to integrate habit learning into these models, and
how they implement balancing of control contributions.
1.3.1 Goal-directed behavior as a Markov decision process
In a Markov decision process, it is assumed that an agent has to navigate through a state
space, where different actions may lead to different states with an ascribed probability (Sutton
& Barto, 1998a). Rewards may then be awarded when visiting a certain state, or by executing
a certain action in a certain state. For the present work, I will focus on the former without loss
of generality. From this description it is already clear, why a Markov decision process and goal-
direct behavior, which rests on predictions based on learned action-outcome contingencies,
share important features. If an agent knows its state, it can use a state transition matrix
to predict future states and future rewards given any action it may choose, providing the
ability to perform explicit forward planning. Furthermore, this section will specifically focus
on sequences of actions, as found in sequential decision making, as it is the more general
case on one hand, and on the other hand, experimental evidence suggests that habits are
learned as sequences, see the discussion above and (Smith & Graybiel, 2013, 2014; Dezfouli
& Balleine, 2012, 2013).
This Subsection aims to introduce the basic ideas and components of a Markov decision
process, as well as the typical notation which will be used in Chapters 2 and 3. A Markov
decision process rests on a state and reward space space, which encode possible states an
agent may visit and rewards it may achieve. If the state and reward spaces are known, state
transition and reward generation matrices can be specified, which form the mathematical
basis of the time evolution of the process. If the spaces are unknown, the matrices can be
learned by an agent from interacting with its environment (Sutton & Barto, 1998a). Figure 1.3a
shows an example which will serve to introduce the spaces and matrices more concretely:
Opening a door with a key. Here, behavior consists of several steps to reach the goal of
opening the door, and this process may be automatized into a habit in everyday life. For this
example, let us assume that opening the door is comprised of the following steps: You stand
in front of the door, take out your key ring, look for the correct key, insert it into the lock, turn
it, and open the door. The state space S is then defined by the set of five states
s1 = being in front of the door
s2 = having the keys in your hand
s3 = having a specific key in your hand
s4 = having inserted the key into the lock
s5 = door is open
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where four potential actions can be performed
a1 = take keys out
a2 = look for key
a3 = insert key into lock
a4 = turn key.
Not all actions can be executed in all states. Lastly, the reward space R is defined by the set
of two rewards
r1 = no reward (door is closed)
r2 = reward (door is open)
see also Figure 1.3a for a graphical representation. State transitions can now be specified by
defining which state can be reached from what state with a certain probability by taking a
specific action, e.g. action a1
p
(
s′|s, a = a1
)
=

0.1 0 0 0 0
0.9 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
 (1.1)
Note that not all actions will reliably lead to a new state, for example, you may grab into your
pocket for the keys, but if the keys are actually in a different pocket, you will not transition
from the state of standing in front of the door to having the key ring in your hand (first column
of the matrix). Furthermore, not all actions make sense to take in specific states, so they do
not lead to a state transition (other columns).
Similarly, the reward generation matrix can be defined as
p
(
r|s
)
=
(
1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
)
(1.2)
so that only the last state, when the door is open, is rewarded. This way, the problem of
unlocking the door was defined as a sequential decision problem, and this process can also
be unrolled in time, see Figure 1.3b. In this view, time-dependent states and rewards can be
defined, and using the transition matrices can answer the question, in what state st is the
agent at some arbitrary time step t, given it chose action at−1, and will it receive a reward rt?
In each time step, it can be in one of the 6 states defined above, so that st ∈ {s1, . . . , s6}, it
can receive one of the possible rewards (rt ∈ {r1, r2}), and take one of the possible actions
(at ∈ {a1, . . . , a5}). In the rest of this work, I will focus on finite horizon Markov decision
processes, which have a distinct start step at t = 1, and a last time step at t = T . This way, the
agent can look T time steps into the future. The notation for the state transition and reward
generation probabilities changes slightly, but still contain the same matrices defined above
p
(
st+1|st, at
)
= p
(
s′|s, a
)
p
(
rt|st
)
= p
(
r|s
)
.
(1.3)
Note that an episode of length T only entails T − 1 actions, see also Figure 1.3. Due to the
sequential nature of the Markov decision process, it is common to not evaluate single actions
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Figure 1.3: Markov decision process
Structural (a) and temporal (b) representation of a finite horizon Markov decision process for
an exemplary planning process of opening a door with a key. a A graphical representation
of the matrices defined in the main text showing states (boxes), actions (text), and state
transitions (arrows) with their respective probabilities (numbers). b The Markov decision
process unrolled in time. Circles indicate random variables in the decision process, arrows
indicate statistical dependencies. The agent starts in the first time step t = 1 in state s1.
Depending on the state, a reward r1 is generated. Note, that in this representation, a no-
reward also is a possible outcome for rt. Depending on the state the agent is in, it chooses
an action a1. In the next time step t = 2, the agent transitioned to a potentially new state s2,
in accordance with the previous action it took. Again, a reward r2 is generated, and the agent
chooses a new action a2. This process repeats until the last time step t = T is reached.
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one by one, but to look at whole sequences of actions (Sutton & Barto, 1998a), which are
typically called policies
π = (a1, . . . , aT−1) (1.4)
and span all T − 1 actions within the planning horizon.
Having defined the Markov decision process and the matrices, the agent now has to ask
the question, given my knowledge about the structure of the world, which action or policy
should I choose to gain maximum reward? Computationally, this question can be answered in
multiple ways, which rest on differing assumptions. One prominent way to solve such a Markov
decision process is model-based reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998a). Here, a
value function containing the expected rewards for a policy is calculated. Usually, a decision
rule is defined which transforms the values of policies into probabilities for actually following
them. Another, emerging way to deal with Markov decision processes is planning as inference
(Attias, 2003a; Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012a). Here, the matrices are treated as conditional
probability distributions of a Bayesian generative model, where the (posterior) probability
of choosing a specific policy is calculated using Bayesian inversion, see Section 1.4.2 for a
more detailed description of this approach. A specific instance of planning as inference is the
so-called active inference framework (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty,
& Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston et al., 2015; Da Costa et al., 2020), where the Bayesian inversion is
approximated using variational inference based on the minimization of the variational free
energy. To summarize, model-based reinforcement learning, planning as inference, and active
inference, all model goal-directed behavior based on a Markov decision process, despite their
differences in how actions are being evaluated, which I will discuss below in more detail for
Bayesian models of goal-directed behavior.
1.3.2 Approaches to modeling habit learning
For a computational description of habit learning, the evidence is much less clear what
modeling approach should be used, and there have been many proposals which capture
some properties of habit learning as discussed in Section 1.1. This section will introduce some
of the most influential habit learning models, as well as models that rest on hypotheses which
will be used in the proposed model, see Chapter 3. The discussion starts with one of the most
published class of models, the model-free/model-based reinforcement learning models (Daw,
Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Daw et al., 2011). It will go on to alternative modeling approaches based
on reinforcement learning: A hierarchical approach to habit learning (Dezfouli & Balleine,
2012, 2013), as well as the value-free/value-based model (Miller, Shenhav, & Ludvig, 2019)
where habits are learned based on repetition alone. This is followed by an introduction of
three Bayesian approaches to modeling habit learning (Maisto, Friston, & Pezzulo, 2019;
FitzGerald, Dolan, & Friston, 2014a; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, &
Pezzulo, 2016), and lastly follow two context learning models (Gershman, Blei, & Niv, 2010;
Redish, Jensen, Johnson, & Kurth-Nelson, 2007).
Model-free/model-based reinforcement learning approaches
To recapitulate, habits are formed slowly and are mainly viewed as retrospective, as they arise
from repetition of behavior which has been successful in the past. Furthermore, they are fast
to compute, but inflexible to changes in action-outcome contingencies. It has therefore long
been assumed that habits can be viewed as a form of cached, i.e. experienced, action values.
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An obvious choice to mathematically model cached action values is model-free reinforcement
learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998a) which rests on a Pavlovian conditioning theory proposed
by Rescorla and Wagner (1972). In its simplest form of temporal difference (TD) learning, a
value of an action Q (a) is being maintained and, depending on the reward received, updated
after each trial. Interestingly, the action values in model-free reinforcement learning are
an approximation to the value function of a Markov decision process under model-based
reinforcement learning (Barto, Sutton, & Watkins, 1989). There are other, more advanced,
model-free reinforcement learning algorithms, which learn state-action values Qt (s, a) such
as the state–action–reward–state–action algorithm (SARSA) (Rummery & Niranjan, 1994) and
Q-learning (Watkins, 1989).
Because of these properties, (Daw et al., 2005) proposed to view habitual behavior as
model-free reinforcement learning, and goal-directed behavior as model-based reinforce-
ment learning. Typically, in this kind of model, both systems are evaluated in parallel and
an additional arbitration unit is used, which governs how goal-directed and habitual control
contributions are balanced. Here, the authors suggested a Bayesian way to evaluate uncer-
tainties on the two action evaluation systems and proposed that their contributions to action
control may be weighted in accordance with the respective uncertainties of the two systems.
To test this hypothesis in a human experiment, Daw et al. (2011) introduced the two-step
sequential decision task, as described above, where they viewed model-free reinforcement
learning as habitual control, and model-based reinforcement learning as goal-directed control.
The control contributions are weighted according to some “model-based-ness” parameter,
which the authors inferred from participant behavior. The authors studied the task in an fMRI
experiment and could find model-free and model-based correlates in BOLD brain activation
signals. This task and modeling approach has since found many applications, e.g. (Deserno et
al., 2015; Otto et al., 2013; Eppinger et al., 2013; Smittenaar et al., 2013; Otto et al., 2014).
Another related approach for habit learning using model-free and model-based reinforce-
ment learning is the “plan until habit” model by Keramati, Smittenaar, Dolan, and Dayan (2016).
The authors assumed a different kind of balancing between model-free and model-based
contributions: Given limited resources like time and working memory, agents may only employ
a finite horizon Markov decision process with a planning depth T , for which they evaluate the
decision tree. At the leave nodes of this cropped decision tree, the authors proposed agents
should use model-free action values to estimate the remaining parts of the task which they
do not explicitly evaluate. This proposal is particularly elegant as it does not need to rely on
an additional arbitration unit. In a three-step sequential decision making task, the authors
were able to show that human participants use a decreased planning horizon under time
pressure.
Despite these theoretical and experimental advances into modeling habitual and goal-
directed control, it is unclear whether model-free reinforcement learning sufficiently describes
habit learning processes (Gillan et al., 2015; Friedel et al., 2014; Watson & de Wit, 2018).
Using the same two-step task as (Daw et al., 2011), Friedel et al. (2014) and Gillan et al.
(2015) subjected participants to an additional outcome devaluation test to explicitly probe
for habitual control contributions. The model-free/model-based habit learning model was
then fitted to participant data in the sequential decision task to determine model-based and
model-free control contributions in participants. Both studies found that increased model-
based contributions during the sequential decision task were correlated with an decreased
failure to adapt to outcome devaluation, meaning, the more goal-directed someone was, the
more they were able to adapt their behavior under outcome devaluation. However, they did
not find a correlation between model-free control contributions and failure to adapt under
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outcome devaluation, questioning the interpretation of model-free reinforcement learning as
a model of habit learning. On a more technical note, Akam, Costa, and Dayan (2015) showed
that small modifications to the task structure can lead to correlations of action values, which
can bias model comparison so that model-free strategies could be classified as model-based
in the data analysis. Additionally, model-free learning does not exhibit all properties of habit
learning described above (Miller et al., 2019). Furthermore, having two systems evaluate the
same situations in parallel but in a different manner would defy the purpose of quick and
resource efficient habit learning and habitual action evaluation.
Alternative reinforcement learning modeling approaches
Dezfouli and Balleine (2012, 2013) for example showed that a hierarchical reinforcement
learning model fits behavior from the same two-step task used by Daw et al. (2011) better
than the original model. Here, the authors proposed to view habits not as model-free
reinforcement learning, but as a chunking of actions into sequences in a hierarchical model-
based reinforcement learning model, where an agent can then choose to either execute
single actions or sequences. This choice is based on a cost function which evaluates the
speed-accuracy trade-off between a fast sequence and more accurate but slower single
action evaluations. Since sequences as well as single actions are integrated into the same
model, this approach does not have to rely on an additional arbitration unit. The proposed
model and the interpretation of habits as sequences fits well with the neurobiological findings
of so-called task-bracketing activity, as found in e.g. (Smith & Graybiel, 2013).
Along a different line of reasoning, Miller et al. (2019) proposed to view habit learning as
based on a simple and “value-free” repetition of previous behavior, analogous to skill learning.
Conversely, they view goal-directed action evaluation as any evaluation based on reward
value, meaning model-free as well as model-based reinforcement learning would constitute
two different modes of this “value-based” learning. Here, the arbitration was again based
on a separate arbitration unit, which evaluated the strengths of goal-directed and habitual
control based on the variance of the predictions of the two systems. The authors were able
to show in simulations that they can replicate many classical habit learning findings with their
value-based/value-free habit learning model.
Bayesian approaches
Bayesian approaches to modeling habitual behavior differ from the reinforcement learning
based approaches in three important ways: (i) the Markov decision process is solved using
Bayesian inference (for details see Section 1.4), (ii) a posterior probability distribution over
policies is calculated, which describes how likely it is that an agent will choose to follow specific
policies, and (iii) due to Bayes’ theorem, arbitration is usually automatically included in the
inference process, without the need for modeling an additional arbitration unit.
As discussed above, behavioral action evaluation and selection can also be cast as a
Bayesian inference problem. Given the success of some of the reinforcement learning
based approaches, there have been attempts to integrate similar concepts into Bayesian
frameworks, particularly active inference. Maisto et al. (2019) proposed a model where habits
are understood as cached action values in the context of active inference. Here, instead of
reevaluating the posterior probability of choosing an action at each repetition of the same
task, an agent would cache previously calculated values of the posterior. Using simulations,
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the authors showed that when behavior is tested in extinction, an agent cannot adapt its
behavior until it infers that the environment changed sufficiently to warrant a reevaluation
of the posterior, which produces habit-like effects of repeating previous behavior in the
extinction phase.
Using a different interpretation of habit learning, FitzGerald et al. (2014a) investigated the
model comparison aspect of the posterior over policies in a Bayesian framework, which takes
over the role of balancing different control contributions. The authors show that a behavioral
policy may be interpreted as a “model of behavior”, and that any simpler policy based on
a simpler model of behavior or of the environment, will be preferred in Bayesian model
comparison when evaluating the posterior over actions. They stipulate that this may be a way
in which habits emerge as a simpler model of behavior compared to the full evaluation of the
Markov decision process. Using this approach, and combining it with the idea that habits can
be understood as cached state-action values as in model-free reinforcement learning, e.g.
SARSA, K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, and Pezzulo (2016) proposed
to view habits as a simpler state-action policy mapping states to actions which they added to
an active inference model. The posterior over actions will then prefer the state-action policy
due to its simplicity over the more complex evaluation of the Markov decision process, if
the habit provides sufficiently desirable results. The authors showed in simulations that this
approach yields habit-like effects under outcome devaluation.
Context models
Albeit being more focused on conditioning, extinction, and renewal than on habit learning
per se, relevant models have been proposed which describe acquisition of behavior in the
training phase, suppression in the extinction phase, as well as renewal when an agent is
re-exposed to a known environment. Here, the training, extinction, and renewal phases of an
experiment are interpreted as different contexts, where habit-like behavior in the extinction
phase is due to context inference, see (Bouton, 2019) for a review. An influential model of
this kind was proposed by Redish et al. (2007), who described the conditioning in the training
phase using model-free temporal difference reinforcement learning. Additionally, the authors
introduced context classification using a radial basis function network to identify the different
phases of an experiment, which was able to guide state inference and learning. Along the
same line of thought, Gershman et al. (2010) proposed a context model which used a particle
filtering model instead of radial basis functions. Both proposals capture properties of habit
learning by modeling the extinction and renewal phases of a conditioning experiment, but
did not explicitly incorporate goal-directed behavioral control as e.g. in the form of a Markov
decision process, therefore making them only partial habit learning models. Nonetheless,
these are interesting proposals, as they incorporate key aspects of habit learning, which other
models above are not able to describe, such as the context sensitivity and reinstatement of
behavior.
1.4 Methods and modeling
Bayesian models are a compelling type of computational cognitive models, which will be used
for the modeling approach proposed in this work. This Section will provide a short overview
over the main ideas in Bayesian cognitive modeling, as well as planning as inference and
active inference.
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1.4.1 Bayesian cognitive models
The Bayesian brain hypothesis proposes a way to formalize the general information processing
scheme in the brain using Bayesian probabilities and information theory (Knill & Pouget, 2004;
Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao, 2007; Clark, 2013). The basis for this information processing is the
so-called generative model, a probabilistic model which encodes causality relationships and
the time evolution of external variables and quantities of interest (Bishop, 2006a). Specifically,
out of the many properties our environment may have, and states it could be in, only some
are directly observable for an organism, like e.g. light reflections which can be detected by the
retina. Other variables, like for example the identity of the object which caused the observed
light reflections, are not directly observable by an agent, or are inherently unobservable, like
future states and the time evolution of the environment. The generative model provides a
way to formalize the rules according to which a hidden state, e.g. object identity, causes an
observation, e.g. the corresponding light patterns falling on the retina, and how this hidden
state might evolve with time. For exemplary purposes we can specify a simple generative
model as
p (s, o) = p
(
o|s
)
p (s) (1.5)
where the prior p (s) defines an a priori knowledge about how often a specific hidden state
s occurs, i.e. how often one would encounter a specific object, and the likelihood p
(
o|s
)
encodes the rules according to which observations o, the light patterns, are generated from
the hidden state. When an organism that encodes such a generative model now makes a
certain observation, it needs to ask the inverse question in order to form beliefs about hidden
states in the environment: What is the probability that a specific hidden state caused the
observation that was just made? Formally, this equates to inverting the generative model
according to Bayes’ rule
p
(
s|o
)
=
p (s, o)
p (o)
=
p
(
o|s
)
p (s)
p (o)
(1.6)
where the posterior p
(
s|o
)
describes the inferred probability of a hidden state s given some
observation o. Note that not only the likelihood, i.e. the rules, are used for this inference,
but also the prior. This means that the inferred estimate will be biased towards states that
were encountered more often in the past. While not yet generally accepted as a theory of
brain function (for a critique see e.g. (Marcus & Davis, 2013; Kwisthout, Wareham, & van Rooij,
2011)), there is a growing body of evidence that human perception indeed works according
to the principle of Bayesian inference (Clark, 2013). For example, Körding and Wolpert (2004)
showed that participants learn a prior statistical distribution of a sensorimotor task and
combine it with their sensory uncertainty in a Bayesian manner.
On the behavioral side, Attias (2003a) and Botvinick and Toussaint (2012a) proposed that
planning can be cast as an inference process as well. Under this planning as inference idea, it
is assumed that an agent not only uses Bayes’ rule to infer the state of its surroundings, but
also infers a probability distribution over actions or policies π, from which the current action
that will be executed is sampled. Formally, this can be again described using Bayes’ rule
p
(
π|r
)
=
p (π) p
(
r|π
)
p (r)
(1.7)
where the agent now infers the posterior p
(
π|r
)
which policy π it should take given it wants
to receive rewards r. This is calculated from the prior over policies p (π), and the likelihood
p
(
r|π
)
of getting getting rewards when a policy is chosen. Thus, the likelihood encodes the
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action-outcome contingencies and may be defined as a Markov decision process, as outlined
in Section 1.3.1. This way, planning as inference offers a way to solve a Markov decision
process in a Bayesian manner.
1.4.2 The free energy principle and active inference
One of the main challenges of the Bayesian brain hypothesis is that the Bayesian inversion can
become computationally extremely costly, if not analytically intractable, for larger generative
models (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2008; Kwisthout & van Rooij, 2013), thus making it unlikely for
the brain to analytically solve Bayesian inversion on the fly. As a remedy it has been proposed
that the brain may use approximate Bayesian methods. One specific instance of such a
proposal is the so-called free energy principle (K. Friston, 2009, 2010), which posits that the
brain may use variational inference (Bishop, 2006a) to perform online inference efficiently.
Here, an approximate posterior
q (s) ≈ p
(
s|o
)
q (π) ≈ p
(
π|r
) (1.8)
is used to approximate the true posteriors p
(
s|o
)
and p
(
π|r
)
. The approximate posterior is
typically assumed to be of a simpler form than the true posterior. Often, the so-called mean-
field approximation is applied, which assumes statistical independence of hidden variables in
the approximate posterior. Instead of using Bayes’ theorem to calculate the true posterior,
the variational free energy
F [q] = DKL
[
q|p
]
(1.9)
is used to calculate the approximate posterior, which is found at the minimum of this free
energy (Bishop, 2006a). Hence, the free energy principle (K. Friston, 2009, 2010) offers a less
costly way to calculate beliefs about hidden states and actions.
When calculating the beliefs over policies at the minimum of the free energy, the approxi-
mate posterior
q (π) ∝ p (π) e−F (π) (1.10)
is calculated from a prior over policies p (π) and the likelihood e−F (π), where F (π) is the
policy-specific free energy (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo,
2016; K. Friston et al., 2015; Da Costa et al., 2020). This free energy encodes the goal-directed
value of a policy, as it contains a prediction error from predicted to the desired outcomes,
which is lower the more desirable the outcomes are. It is calculated from the underlying
Markov decision process implemented into the generative model, which in turn contains
action-outcome associations. In order to select an action, an agent samples a policy from the
approximate posterior from which it executes the respective action in the sequence.
This way of solving a Markov decision process using approximate Bayesian methods as
proposed in the free energy principle is also called active inference (K. Friston, FitzGerald,
Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston et al., 2015; Da Costa et al.,
2020). Note that in most formulations of the active inference framework, the policy-specific
free energy is called “expected free energy” and not only contains values from the Markov
decision process, but also an epistemic value term, which gives additional value to actions
which will yield new information, making them more likely to be chosen.
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1.5 Open questions and hypotheses
As outlined in Section 1.3, there have been several attempts to propose computational and
mechanistic accounts which were successful to varying degrees, where success may be
measured by the model’s ability to describe the key characteristics of habit learning
• habitual behavior under both contingency degradation and outcome devaluation,
• increased habit strength with increased training duration,
• why habits are more resource efficient than explicit forward planning,
• increased habit strength with decreased action-outcome contingency,
• context-sensitivity of habits and quick reinstatement of behavior in a familiar context,
and, importantly, by offering a sensible way to achieve a balancing of control, where the
goal-directed evaluation does not have to run in parallel to the habitual evaluation. Most of
the models did not attempt to emulate all properties, but often focused on one property in
particular. For example, the model-free/model-based habit learning model set out to describe
insensitivity to contingency degradation and outcome devaluation, but does not include an
explicit description of contexts, and also lacks the resource efficiency for habitual behavior.
Specifically, the model-based goal-directed evaluation has to be applied at every time step
in order to find goal-directed control contributions, which is contrary to the very reason an
agent should switch to habitual action control. Similar arguments can be made of all the of
the models in Section 1.3, and none incorporates all these properties of habit learning, see
Discussion for a detailed discussion.
Therefore, in this thesis, I want to propose a novel approach to mathematically model habit
learning which exhibits all these properties in a unified framework. I want to build on the
physiological and computational evidence that habits are context-dependent and expressed
as sequences in a hierarchical model, and combine this proposal with that of value-free habit
learning based on repetition of behavior. Therefore I hypothesize that
• habits are learned solely based on repetition of past behavior,
• habits can be viewed as action sequences embedded in a hierarchical model,
• habits are contextual and different habits are learned different contexts, along with the
respective action-outcome contingencies,
• control contributions are based on the uncertainties of goal-directed and habitual
evaluation.
To formalize these hypotheses, I will build a hierarchical Bayesian model where
• goal-directed evaluation is based on a Bayesian treatment of a Markov decision process,
• habits are learned as a prior over action sequences, which is updated each time a
sequence has been chosen,
• control contributions are computed according to Bayes’ rule in the posterior over actions
from which an agent samples its action,
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• context constitutes the upper level of the hierarchy,
• inference is based on approximate Bayesian computations.
Action selection, by sampling from the posterior, offers a simple and efficient way to balance
respective control contributions. The posterior
p
(
π|r
)
∝ p (π) p
(
r|π
)
(1.11)
describes the probability of choosing an action, given an agent wants to receive a reward.
It is calculated from the prior p (π), which corresponds to habits, and the likelihood p
(
r|π
)
which evaluates the probability of attaining a reward based on the underlying Markov de-
cision process. According to Bayes’ rule, the two are weighted by a simple multiplication,
which automatically achieves a balancing by the respective uncertainties of the two control
contributions.
Additionally, since the prior has the capacity to exclude certain policies a priori, it also limits
the amount of policies which will need to be evaluated in the goal-directed likelihood. This
means, in this model, the two modes do not have to evaluate in parallel, but prior distribution
over policies already constrains the evaluation the goal-directed system will undertake. In the
case of a prior which only favors one specific policy, all other policies will be neglected and
will not have to be evaluated. This fits well to the literature, where a habitual response can
be executed quicker, and the process of a habit being interrupted by goal-directed values is
slower.
In order to build such a model, I will use the active inference approach of using a Bayesian
representation of the Markov decision process which I will solve using variational inference. I
will start on a more technical note, and improve the policy inference process so that it works
well with sequences. The most widely used mean-field approximation can yield erroneous
inference when used on sequences of states, which I will show in Chapter 2 (Schwöbel, Kiebel, &
Markovíc, 2018). To remedy this issue, the second order Bethe approximation can be applied,
which allows for pairwise statistical dependencies in the approximate posterior, yielding
improved inference on sequences and therewith improved goal-reaching performance of
a simulated agent in a sequential decision task. In Chapter 3 I will go on to present the full
hierarchical Bayesian habit learning model (Schwöbel, Markovic, Smolka, & Kiebel, 2019). I
will show that an artificial agent based on that model exhibits the same behavioral patterns
as animals in all classical habit learning settings. Lastly, in the Discussion I will summarize
my findings, compare the proposed model to previous modeling approaches, and discuss
implications of the proposed mechanistic definition of habits as well as limitations of the
model in its current form.
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2 Active inference, belief
propagation, and the Bethe
approximation
2.1 Abstract
When modelling goal-directed behavior in the presence of various sources of uncertainty,
planning can be described as an inference process. A solution to the problem of planning as
inference was previously proposed in the active inference framework in the form of an ap-
proximate inference scheme based on the variational free energy. However, this approximate
scheme was based on the mean-field approximation, which assumes statistical independence
of hidden variables and is known to show overconfidence and may converge to local minima
of the free energy. To better capture spatio-temporal properties of an environment, we
reformulated the approximate inference process using the so-called Bethe approximation.
Importantly, the Bethe approximation allows for representation of pairwise statistical depen-
dencies. Under these assumptions, the minimizer of the variational free energy corresponds
to the belief propagation algorithm, commonly used in machine learning. To illustrate the
differences between the mean-field approximation and the Bethe approximation, we have
simulated agent behavior in a simple goal-reaching task with different types of uncertainties.
Overall, the Bethe agent achieves higher success rates in reaching goal states. We relate the
better performance of the Bethe agent to more accurate predictions about the consequences
of its own actions. Consequently, active inference based on Bethe approximation extends
the application range of active inference to more complex behavioral tasks.
2.2 Introduction
When trying to achieve goals, an acting agent typically lacks complete knowledge about its
environment and is exposed to several sources of uncertainty in its environment. This makes
the pursuit of goals a non-trivial task (Arthur, 1994; Simon, 1990).
Computational models for goal-directed behavior are typically based on the widely used
computational framework of reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998b) with a large
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number of applications (Doll, Simon, & Daw, 2012; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Dayan & Niv, 2008;
O’doherty et al., 2004; Montague, Hyman, & Cohen, 2004). However, a strong limitation of
classical reinforcement learning models is that they do not take into account the influence of
various sources of uncertainty on human behavior (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Doya, 2008;
Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; A. J. Yu & Dayan, 2005). Over the past years
an increasing number of empirical findings have provided evidence that belief updating in
humans closely follows that of a rational Bayesian agent (FitzGerald, Hämmerer, Friston, Li, &
Dolan, 2017; Meyniel, Schlunegger, & Dehaene, 2015; Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum,
2015; Vossel et al., 2013; Payzan-LeNestour, Dunne, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2013; Behrens,
Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Daw et al., 2005). This suggests that humans actively use
a representation of uncertainty when inferring the current and past states of the world, and
when making decisions (K. Friston & Kiebel, 2009; T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003a; Knill & Pouget,
2004; Dayan, Hinton, Neal, & Zemel, 1995).
In complex everyday environments decision making is affected by various sources of
uncertainty hence in such settings it is useful to treat planning and action selection as an
inference problem (Pearl, 1988; Attias, 2003b; Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012b; K. Friston et al.,
2013). Under the planning as inference formulation, it is assumed that agents form beliefs
(in a Bayes optimal manner) over possible future behaviors to decide upon the sequence of
actions that allows them to reach their goals.
When modelling human decision making one typically postulates that the human brain
uses an approximate inference scheme to update beliefs and generate plans (Mathys, Dau-
nizeau, Friston, & Stephan, 2011; Nassar, Wilson, Heasly, & Gold, 2010; Daunizeau et al.,
2010; Yuille & Kersten, 2006; Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2006). Such an approximation is
required to achieve computationally tractable and fast adjustments to behaviour in a dynamic
environments (Nassar et al., 2010).
One approximate inference approach that is generically used in a wide range of applications
is variational inference (Blei, Kucukelbir, & McAuliffe, 2017; Wainwright & Jordan, 2008; Beal,
2003; Bishop, 2006b). Variational inference also forms the formal basis of the f ree energy
principle (K. Friston, 2010), which states that both action and perception underlie the mini-
mization of the variational free energy of the past, current and the expected future sensations.
As the variational free energy defines an upper bound on surprise (Bishop, 2006b; K. Friston,
2010), minimizing the free energy minimizes an agent’s surprise about its sensations. In
turn minimizing surprise improves an agent’s representation of the environment and drives
an agent to visit states from which the future is more predictable. This formulation was
subsequently extended to model goal-directed behavior under uncertainty and is referred
to as active inference (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo,
2016). In recent studies, active inference was successfully applied in the analysis of behavioral
(K. Friston et al., 2014; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015) and neuroimaging data (Schwartenbeck,
FitzGerald, & Dolan, 2016; Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, & Friston, 2014).
Here we will revisit the variational treatment of planning as inference—motivated by core
concepts of active inference—and provide step by step derivations of an active inference agent
starting from basic definitions of planning as inference (Attias, 2003b; Botvinick & Toussaint,
2012b). Importantly, we will base the derivations on the so-called Bethe approximation
(H. Bethe, 1931; H. A. Bethe, 1935), which will allow us to establish a formal link between the
free energy principle and the set of update equations known as belief propagation (K. J. Friston,
Parr, & de Vries, 2017; Yedidia, Freeman, & Weiss, 2005; Pearl, 1988).
The standard approach for deriving an active inference agent is to base approximate infer-
ence on the so-called mean-field approximation (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck,
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O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016). The key difference between the Bethe and the mean-field approx-
imation lies in the way how approximate beliefs about trajectories are encoded. Technically,
the mean-field approximation assumes that posterior beliefs about a sequence of states
are approximated by a distribution in which beliefs over states are independent between
time points. Crucially, this ignores the statistical dependencies inherent in state transitions,
meaning that the approximate posterior estimates might converge to local optima of the free
energy and exhibit over-confident belief representations throughout the decision making
process (Weiss, 2001; Murphy, 2012).
For example, if I know that being in the state 1 will always result in a transition to state 2,
then the surprise on moving from state 1 to state 3 can only be evaluated if I have a joint
distribution over both states. This is precluded in the mean-field approximation but is retained
in the Bethe approximation. This follows because the approximate posterior beliefs about
any particular state are conditioned upon the previous state. Often, these pairwise statistical
dependencies under the Bethe approximation even correspond to the true spatio-temporal
dependencies of hidden states in a dynamic environment, so that the approximate posterior
provides a tighter bound on the surprise, and hence exhibits less deviation from the exact
posterior (Weiss, 2001). In principle, this means that any approximate Bayesian inference
about trajectories in the past - or in the future - should be more accurate under a Bethe
approximation, leading to more optimal behavior. For this reason the belief propagation
algorithm is often applied in the machine learning field to sequential inference problems
(Bishop, 2006b; Yedidia et al., 2005; S.-Z. Yu & Kobayashi, 2003; Fan, 2001; Rabiner, 1989;
Gelb, 1974; Kalman, 1960).
In what follows we will provide a detailed, and rather didactic, technical overview of the basic
elements needed to define planning as an inference problem, and relate its exact Bayesian
solution to an approximate solution obtained using the variational approximation either
under the mean-field or the Bethe approximation. To illustrate the approximation-dependent
differences in goal-directed behavior in presence of uncertainty, we will introduce mean-field
and Bethe based agents to a simple navigation task in a noisy grid world. Finally, using this
proof-of-principle task we will show that an agent based on the Bethe approximation exhibits
enhanced performance as compared to a mean-field based agent.
2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Generative process
In this paper we consider a sequential decision-making task, in which an agent executes a
finite number of actions (choices) in order to reach a goal in a specific environment. Each
choice is associated with a discrete time step t ∈ [1, T ], where T denotes the total number of
time steps. Here we will model this decision process as a partially observable Markov decision
process (Drake, 1962; Martin, 1967; Astrom, 1965; Monahan, 1982).
The task is defined as a 5-tuple (H,A,Θ,O,Ω) (see Figure 2.1) where:
• H denotes a finite sized set of hidden states.
• A denotes a finite sized set of actions.
• Θ denotes action dependent conditional transition probabilities between states.
• O denotes a set of observations.
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Figure 2.1: The environment and the active inference agent
The time evolution of the environment is defined via a generative process, which is conditionally
dependent on the agent’s actions. The agent can only indirectly access the hidden state of the
environment via observations. The observations modulate the agent’s beliefs about hidden
states (perception), which in turn influence planning. Finally actions are selected to minimize
surprise, that is, to fulfill the agent’s prior beliefs about future observations, which encode
the agent’s goals. Importantly, the selected actions modulate the state transition process,
hence influence the future state of the environment.
• Ω denotes state dependent conditional observation probability.
Each time step t of the generative process consists of the following components: Depending
on the current state ht ∈ H , an observation ot ∈ O is sampled from the generative probability
Ω
(
ot|ht
)
. Given an agents’ choice of action at ∈ A the environment will transit to a new state
ht+1 sampled from the transition probability Θ
(
ht+1|ht, at
)
. This process is repeated until
the final time step T is reached.
2.3.2 Generative model
To efficiently solve the task, the agent needs an accurate representation of the generative
process: The so-called generative model is a formal description of an agent’s model of the
hidden states of the environment and the rules that define their evolution. We will formally
define the generative model as a joint probability distribution over observations ot, hidden
states ht, and behavioral policies π, which define a sequence of control states ut. Note that
the control states denote a subjective abstraction of an action, e.g. a neuronal command
to execute a specific action in the environment. For simplicity we will assume a one to one
mapping between a selected control state ut and executed action at in each time step t.
In line with previous definitions of a generative model used in behavioral models based on
active inference (K. Friston et al., 2015; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty,
& Pezzulo, 2016), here we consider a special case in which each policy deterministically
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Expression Specification Explanation
h1:T (h1, . . . ,hT ) hidden states
ht
{
h1, . . . , hnh
}
current hidden state
h (h1, . . . ,ht) past (visited) hidden states, include current hidden
state ht
h̃ (ht+1, . . . ,hT ) future hidden states
o1:T (o1, . . . ,oT ) observations
ot {o1, . . . , ono} current observation
o (o1, . . . ,ot) past (fixed) observations, include current observation
ot
õ (ot+1, . . . ,oT ) future observations (unknown)
u1:T−1 (u1, . . . , uT−1) control states
ut {u1, . . . , unu} current control state
π u1:T−1 policy, a sequence of control states
p (o1:T ,h1:T , π) generative model, the agent’s model of the rules of
the environment
p̄ (õ) prior beliefs over future outcomes. These encode the
agent’s preference, or the utility of certain observa-
tions.
f
(
õ,h1:T , π|o
)
true posterior, to be maximized
q (õ,h1:T , π) q
(
õ,h1:T |π
)
q (π) approximate posterior
q
(
õ,h1:T |π
)
agent’s estimate of states and observations
q (π) 1Z p (π) e
−Vπ−Gπ probability of following policy π
F [q] V [q] +G[q] Full variational free energy. Minimized by approximate
posterior.
V [q] observed free energy
Vπ conditional observed free energy under policy π
G[q] predicted free energy
Gπ conditional predicted free energy under policy π
Table 2.1: Overview of the notation used in this article.
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defines one possible sequence of control states. Conditioned on a behavioral policy π =
(u1, . . . , uT−1), we can express the full generative model over observations and hidden states
as
p
(
o1:T ,h1:T |π
)
= p
(
õ, h̃|ht, π
)
p
(
o,h|π
)
, (2.1)
where the first factor on the right hand side
p
(
õ, h̃|ht, π
)
=
T∏
τ=t+1
p
(
oτ |hτ
)
p
(
hτ+1|hτ , π
)
,
denotes the joint probability over future outcomes and hidden states, conditioned on a
behavioral policy π. The second factor
p
(
o,h|π
)
= p (h1)
t∏
k=2
p
(
ok|hk
)
p
(
hk|hk−1, π
)
,
denotes the joint probability over observed outcomes, and past hidden states. In practice we
will derive the relations that define agent behavior (see Figure 2.1) by inverting the generative
model. In what follows we describe in more detail the components of the full generative
model. For the visualization of statistical dependencies between the random variables see
Figure 2.2.
The agent’s model of how the hidden state of the environment changes given a selected
policy is formally expressed as
p
(
h1:T |π
)
= p (h1)
T∏
t=2
p
(
ht|ht−1, π
)
. (2.2)
where p (h1) denotes the prior beliefs about the initial state h1, and p
(
ht|ht−1, π
)
denotes an
agent’s beliefs about possible transitions between states, conditioned on the policy π. This
conditional dependency is illustrated by the right pointing arrows in Figure 2.2. Note that each
behavioral policy π defines a specific control state at each time step t, that is, π(t) = ut. Hence
the notation above is equivalent to replacing all π terms with the corresponding control states
ut at time step t.
Similarly, the agent requires a model of the relations between observations (outcomes)
and hidden states of the environment
p
(
o1:T |h1:T
)
=
T∏
t=1
p
(
ot|ht
)
. (2.3)
Here, p
(
ot|ht
)
denotes the conditional probability of making observation ot in state ht (this
dependency is depicted by the arrows pointing downwards in Figure 2.2).
Given that the space of all possible behavioral policies π ∈ {1, . . . , Nπ} is constrained by
some prior distribution p (π), we can write the simplified generative model as
p (o1:T ,h1:T , π) = p (π)
T∏
k=2
p
(
ok|hk
)
p
(
hk|hk−1, π
)
p (h1) . (2.4)
31
h1 h2 ht ht+1 hT
o1 o2 ot ot+1 oT
π
Figure 2.2: The full generative model as a Bayesian graph
Filled circles indicate observable (known/fixed) quantities, while the unfilled circles indicate
hidden (unknown) variables. Arrows indicate the direction of conditional dependency between
two variables. A policy π (brown circle) defines a specific sequence of control states which
modulate state transitions and thereby the hidden states and observations. Light blue circles
indicate past states h, dark blue the current state ht, and purple circles future states h̃.
Filled light and dark green circles depict past observations o, and the current observation ot
respectively. The green empty circles indicate future observations õ, which are also treated
as hidden variables.
2.3.3 Planning as inference
The core concept of planning as inference is that besides the hidden states and future
observations (see Figure 2.2), we treat the behavioral variables (control states, that is, policies)
as hidden variables to be inferred (Attias, 2003b; Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012b). This approach
has the advantage that these two different processes can be described within the same
mathematical framework of Bayesian inference (Doya et al., 2007; Botvinick & Toussaint,
2012b). For this reason, the concept of describing planning as an inference process has
found increasing interest within the cognitive neuroscience community (Botvinick & Toussaint,
2012b; Solway & Botvinick, 2012; K. J. Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 2010).
Hence, as planning corresponds to computing the posterior joint probability over hidden
states h1:T and behavioral policies π, using Bayes rule we can write that
p
(
h1:T , π|o1:T
)
=
p (π)
∏T
k=2 p
(
ok|hk
)
p
(
hk|hk−1, π
)
p (h1)
p (o1:T )
. (2.5)
The steps of the inference procedure can be illustrated as follows (see Figure 2.1): After
making an observation, the agent updates its current beliefs about current and past (hidden)
states h (perception); from the inferred current state, the agents form beliefs about future
states h̃ and observations õ for each policy π (planning).
Importantly the beliefs over policies (sequence of control states) are modulated by agent’s
preferences over unobserved future outcomes õ. We will represent these preferences as
prior beliefs p̄ (õ). Importantly, p̄ (õ) defines the agent’s goals, and thereby encodes the utility
of various future outcomes (observations).
For example, if the goal is to reach a specific location (e.g. a position in a maze), the prior
over future outcomes corresponds to assigning a high probability of observing an outcome
specific of the goal location and low probability for other observations. Note that the prior
beliefs over future outcomes are in general distinct from the marginal expectations over
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future outcomes, that is, p̄ (õ) 6= p (õ). The difference is that these prior beliefs encode which
observations the agent wants to make, while the marginal expectations represent where the
agent will be at a future time step, given the time evolution of the environment.
As outlined above, in addition to the hidden states and policies we treat future outcomes õ
as hidden variables. Thus, we can express the complete joint posterior distribution as
f
(
õ,h1:T , π|o
)
= p
(
h1:T , ũ, π|õ,o
)
p̄ (õ) (2.6)
=
p (o1:T ,h1:T , π) p̄ (õ)
p (o1:T )
(2.7)
Finally, we define the optimal policy, i.e. the optimal sequence of future actions as the mode
of the posterior beliefs (Attias, 2003b)
õ∗,h∗1:T , π
∗ = arg max
õ,h1:T ,π
f
(
õ,h1:T , π|o
)
(2.8)
Once the agent computed which policy is optimal, it can choose an action accordingly (action
selection).
In practice, as the generative model may represent an arbitrarily complex environment,
inferring posterior beliefs over hidden variables is typically not analytically tractable (Bishop,
2006b). Therefore, to perform inference and select a policy, an agent would have to approxi-
mate the posterior beliefs (K. Friston & Kiebel, 2009; K. J. Friston et al., 2010).
2.3.4 Active inference
The active inference solution to the problem of planning as inference rests on variational
inference. Typically, the variational free energy has been used under active inference for
finding an approximate posterior distribution for the true posterior (Equation (2.6)) (K. J. Friston
et al., 2010; K. Friston et al., 2013, 2015; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty,
& Pezzulo, 2016).
Variational free energy
Variational inference is a widely used approximate inference method (Blei et al., 2017; K. Fris-
ton, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston et al., 2015, 2013;
Wainwright & Jordan, 2008; Bishop, 2006b; Beal, 2003). For our particular problem of planning
as inference, it will allow us to approximate the true posterior distribution f
(
õ,h1:T , π|o
)
with
an approximate distribution q (õ,h1:T , π).
As a first step one has to define a set of potential candidate distributions for the approximate
posterior, e.g. by constraining the posterior to a specific family of distributions. The best
approximation to the true posterior is obtained as the distribution that minimizes the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence between the approximate and the true posterior, hence
q∗ = arg min
q
DKL
(
q||f
)
. (2.9)
However, as the true posterior is not known a priori, the KL divergence cannot be minimized
directly. However, if we substitute Equation (2.6) into Equation (2.9) we obtain the following
expression
DKL
(
q||f
)
= F [q] +
∑
õ
q (õ) ln p (o1:T ) , (2.10)
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where F [q] denotes variational free energy defined as
F [q] =
∑
õ,h1:T ,π
q (õ,h1:T , π) ln
q (õ,h1:T , π)
p (o1:T ,h1:T , π) p̄ (õ)
(2.11)
=−
∑
õ
q (õ) ln p̄ (õ)
−
∑
õ,h1:T ,π
q (õ,h1:T , π) ln p (o1:T ,h1:T , π)
+
∑
õ,h1:T ,π
q (õ,h1:T , π) ln q (õ,h1:T , π) .
Given that the KL divergence is a positive quantity which goes to zero only for q = f , and that
the variational free energy can be expressed as
F [q] = DKL
(
q||f
)
−
∑
õ
q (õ) ln p (o1:T ) , (2.12)
we get the following inequality
F [q] ≥ − ln p (o)−
∑
õ
q (õ) ln p
(
õ|o
)
. (2.13)
Hence, minimizing the variational free energy lowers the upper bound on the observed
surprise − ln p (o), the future expected surprise −
∑
õ q (õ) ln p
(
õ|o
)
, and minimizes the KL
divergence between the true and approximate posterior. Thus, we can rewrite Equation (2.9)
as
q∗ = arg min
q
F [q] . (2.14)
Importantly, in the limiting case of q = f the above inequality Equation (2.13) turns into an
equality, that is,
F [q] = − ln p (o)−
∑
õ
p̄ (õ) ln p
(
õ|o
)
.
In accordance with Equation (2.11), the free energy F [q] can be defined as a sum of two
terms
F [q] = V [q] +G[q], (2.15)
where we use V [q] to denote the observed free energy
V [q] =
∑
h,π
q (h, π) ln
q (h, π)
p (o,h, π)
,
and G[q] to denote the predicted free energy
G[q] = −
∑
õ
q (õ) ln p̄ (õ) +
∑
õ,h1:T ,π
q (õ,h1:T , π) ln
q
(
õ, h̃|h, π
)
p
(
õ, h̃|ht, π
) .
In general we can express the approximate posterior q as a product of two factors: The
marginal beliefs over policies q (π) and the conditional beliefs over the remaining hidden
variables q
(
õ,h1:T |π
)
, that is,
q (õ,h1:T , π) = q
(
õ,h1:T |π
)
q (π) . (2.16)
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This allows us to find the minimizer of the variational free energy with respect to the marginal
posterior over policies as
δF [q]
δq (π)
≡ 0,
which is obtained for
q (π) =
p (π) e−Vπ−Gπ∑
ρ p (ρ) e
−Vρ−Gρ , (2.17)
where
Vπ =
∑
h
q
(
h|π
)
ln
q
(
h|π
)
p
(
o,h|π
) , (2.18)
Gπ = −
∑
õ
q
(
õ|π
)
ln p̄ (õ) (2.19)
+
∑
õ,h1:T
q
(
õ,h1:T |π
)
ln
q
(
õ, h̃|h, π
)
p
(
õ, h̃|ht, π
) ,
denote the conditional free energy of the past and of the future, respectively.
Note that in previous definitions of active inference (K. Friston et al., 2015; K. Friston,
FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli,
Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2016), the approximate posterior over policies q (π) was not
defined as the minimizer of the full free energy. Instead, a prior over policies was defined as
ln p (π) = G
expected
π , with the so called expected free energy Gexpectedπ , from which the posterior
over policies was derived. In the present formulation, the free energy driving agent behavior is
not the expected free energy, but the conditional full free energy that allows us to express the
approximate posterior using the sum of the conditional free energy from past observations
plus the conditional free energy of the future. We call the conditional free energy of the past
Vπ observed free energy. It constrains the posterior beliefs over policies π to only those policies
that could have generated the observed sequence given the agent’s generative model. We
refer to the conditional free energy of the futureGπ as predicted free energy. The predicted free
energy will be the main factor influencing policy selection. Here, the first term corresponds to
pragmatic value or extrinsic value; namely the (negative), expected utility or log preferences
over outcomes
Eq
[
ln p̄ (õ)
]
= Eq
[
U (õ)
]
.
The second term can be regarded as a consistency term. When it is minimized it ensures that
the posterior beliefs about the future adhere to the generative model. The predicted free
energy, as used in the present work, lacks the epistemic or ambiguity reducing component
of the expected free energy. This component is usually associated with epistemic value or
intrinsic value (also known as information gain or expected Bayesian surprise). It gives rise to
altered agent behavior when compared to behavior chosen in accordance with the predicted
free energy, which we will discuss later. For a more detailed insight into the differences of the
two formulations and their relationship, we refer the reader to the appendix.
In what follows we will derive the update equations for the conditional posterior q
(
õ,h1:T |π
)
for two different approximations, the mean-field and the Bethe approximation.
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Mean-field approximation
The mean-field approximation is a widely used approximation because of its simplicity, as it is
based on the assumption of statistical independence of hidden variables (Bishop, 2006b). As
in previous formulations of active inference (K. Friston et al., 2013, 2015; K. Friston, FitzGerald,
Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016), we assume statistical independence of
the hidden states hk and write the approximate posterior as
q
(
õ,h1:T |π
)
=
T∏
τ=t+1
q
(
oτ |hτ
) T∏
k=1
q
(
hk|π
)
, (2.20)
Inserting the ansatz Equation (2.20) into Equation (2.18) and Equation (2.19) yields the
following relations for the conditional observed and predicted free energies
Vπ =
t∑
r=1
Vπ (r) (2.21)
Vπ (r) =
∑
hr,hr−1
q
(
hr|π
)
q
(
hr−1|π
)
ln
q
(
hr|π
)
p
(
or|hr
)
p
(
hr|hr−1, π
)
Gπ =
T∑
τ=t+1
Gπ (τ) (2.22)
Gπ (τ) =
∑
oτ ,hτ
q
(
oτ ,hτ |π
) [
− ln p̄ (oτ ) + ln
q
(
oτ |hτ
)
p
(
oτ |hτ
)]
+
∑
hτ ,hτ−1
q
(
hτ |π
)
q
(
hτ−1|π
)
ln
q
(
hτ |π
)
p
(
hτ |hτ−1, π
)
The update equations for the approximate conditional posterior are obtained as the mini-
mizer of the conditional free energy
Fπ = Vπ +Gπ
with respect to the factors of the approximate posterior q
(
hk|π
)
and q
(
oτ |hτ
)
. It is im-
portant to note that only the first term of the predicted free energy, namely the cross en-
tropy −
∑
oτ ,hτ
q
(
oτ |π
)
ln p̄ (oτ ), will have a substantial influence on q (π) and therewith goal-
directed behavior. In other words, it is this term that constitutes the extrinsic or pragmatic
value that maximizes the predicted log preferences. The remaining terms ensure that beliefs
about future states conform to the known rules that govern the dynamics of hidden states,
and known relations between the hidden states and sensory observations.
The resulting update equations are
q
(
oτ |hτ
)
=
p̄ (oτ ) p
(
oτ |hτ
)
Zτ (hτ )
q
(
hk|π
)
=
mk (hk)m
k−1
π (hk)m
k+1
π (hk)
Zk
q (π) =
p (π) e−Gπ−Vπ∑
ρ p (ρ) e
−Gρ−Vρ
(2.23)
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where withmwe denote various massages to yield comparability in notation with the following
section. The messages are defined as
mk (hk) =
{
Zτ (hτ ) , for k > t
p
(
ok|hk
)
, for k ≤ t
mk+1π (hk) = e
∑
hk+1
q(hk+1|π) ln p(hk+1|hk,π)
mk−1π (hk) = e
∑
hk−1
q(hk−1|π) ln p(hk|hk−1,π)
(2.24)
Note that the conditional posterior q
(
hk|π
)
depends on the posterior beliefs at the neigh-
boring time points q
(
hk+1|π
)
and q
(
hk−1|π
)
. The optimal solution for the approximate
posterior is obtained by iterating through Equation (2.23) and Equation (2.24) until conver-
gence is achieved, as using Equation (2.23) directly leads to several practical problems. To
ensure numerical stability and convergence of the update equations one typically resorts
to the following gradient descent procedure (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, &
Pezzulo, 2016)
xn+1,kπ = x
n,k
π + ε
(
ρn,kπ − xn,kπ
)
qn+1
(
hk|π
)
=
ex
n+1,k
π∑
j e
xn+1,jπ
ρn,kπ = lnm
k (hk) + lnm
n,k+1
π (hk) + lnm
n,k−1
π (hk)
(2.25)
where we set the following initial conditions for each time step k.
x0,kπ =
1
nh
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , T} , and ∀π ∈ {1, . . . , Nπ} . (2.26)
Bethe approximation
Under the mean-field approximation, statistical independence of hidden variables was as-
sumed. This has the advantage of simplicity, as it makes it possible to analytically calculate
the approximate posterior directly from the full free energy. When performing a sequential
decision-making task, however, hidden states of the environment are most likely not inde-
pendent of each other, but instead the current hidden state might depend on the previous
hidden state. In other words, if the environment has a sequential structure, the mean-field
approximation may not be able to capture this structure accurately. To address this issue of
representing a sequential structure within the approximate posterior, the Bethe approxima-
tion (Pearl, 1988; Yedidia, Freeman, & Weiss, 2001b) can be used, as it allows for pairwise
statistical dependencies between hidden variables in the approximate posterior. These de-
pendencies map closely to the true statistical dependencies present in the generative model
(see Figure 2.2).
For this reason, the Bethe approximation has found wide spread-usage in the machine
learning community (Felzenszwalb & Huttenlocher, 2006; Coughlan & Ferreira, 2002; Sudderth,
Mandel, Freeman, & Willsky, 2004; Hua, Yang, & Wu, 2005; Meltzer, Yanover, & Weiss, 2005).
Using this more complex approximate posterior, the variational free energy becomes more
complex to evaluate as well. In the past, it was shown that the estimation of the approximate
posterior under the Bethe approximation corresponds to the belief propagation update rules
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(Pearl, 1988; Yedidia et al., 2001b). Belief propagation provides a framework to calculate the
posterior beliefs using messages which are sent between nodes of the graph of the generative
model. This solution using message passing provides the exact solution on a graph without
loops, making the solution always converge to the global minimum of the variational free
energy. For a detailed overview of belief propagation, the Bethe approximation and their
relation to the variational free energy we point the reader to (Yedidia, Freeman, & Weiss,
2003a).
Under the Bethe approximation we express the functional form of the approximate condi-
tional posterior as
q
(
õ,h1:T |π
)
=
T∏
τ=t+1
q
(
oτ ,hτ |π
)
q
(
hτ |π
) T∏
k=1
q
(
hk,hk−1|π
)
q
(
hk−1|π
) , (2.27)
where q
(
h1,h0|π
)
= q
(
h1|π
)
, and q
(
h0|π
)
= 1. Inserting Equation (2.27) for the approximate
posterior in (2.18) and (2.19) we get the following form for the conditional observed and
predicted free energies
Vπ =
t∑
r=1
Vπ (r) (2.28)
Vπ (r) =
∑
hr,hr−1
q
(
hr,hr−1|π
)
ln
q
(
hr|hr−1, π
)
p
(
or|hr
)
p
(
hr|hr−1, π
)
Gπ =
T∑
τ=t+1
Gπ (τ) (2.29)
Gπ (τ) = −
∑
oτ
q
(
oτ |π
)
ln p̄ (oτ )
+
∑
oτ ,hτ
q
(
oτ ,hτ |π
)
ln
q
(
oτ |hτ , π
)
p
(
oτ |hτ
)
+
∑
hτ ,hτ−1
q
(
hτ ,hτ−1|π
)
ln
q
(
hτ |hτ−1, π
)
p
(
hτ |hτ−1, π
)
As under the mean-field approximation, here the main contributing term for goal-directed
behavior is the cross entropy −
∑
oτ
q
(
oτ |π
)
ln p̄ (oτ ) in the predicted free energy, while
the other terms ensure optimal posterior beliefs for the hidden states q
(
hk|π
)
and future
observations q
(
oτ |π
)
.
To find the minimizer of the conditional free energy Fπ = Vπ + Gπ under the Bethe
approximation we have to take into account the following equality constraints
q
(
hk|π
)
=
∑
hk+1
q
(
hk+1,hk|π
)
=
∑
hk−1
q
(
hk,hk−1|π
)
=
∑
ok
q
(
ok,hk|π
)
,
q
(
ok|π
)
=
∑
hk
q
(
ok,hk|π
)
.
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Therefore the conditional posterior is obtained as a zero gradient point of the following
Lagrangian
Lπ = Gπ + Vπ
+ αk (hk)
q (hk|π)−∑
hk+1
q
(
hk+1,hk|π
)
+ βk (hk)
q (hk|π)−∑
hk−1
q
(
hk,hk−1|π
)
+ γk (hk)
q (hk|π)−∑
ok
q
(
ok,hk|π
)
+ δk (ok)
q (ok|π)−∑
hk
q
(
ok,hk|π
) ,
where αk, βk, γk, and δk denote the Lagrange multipliers for the corresponding equality
constrain.
The update equations for the conditional posterior are obtained as the zero gradient points
of the Langrangian (Yedidia et al., 2001b, 2003a) defined above, therefore
q
(
ok,hk|π
)
=
p̄ (ok) p
(
ok|hk
)
mk+1π (hk)m
k−1
π (hk)
Zπk
(2.30)
q
(
ok|π
)
=
p̄ (ok)m
k
π (ok)
Zπk
(2.31)
q
(
hk,hk−1|π
)
=
p
(
hk|hk−1, π
)
Zπk,k−1
k∏
i=k−1
mi (hi)m
k+1
π (hk)m
k−2
π (hk−1)
(2.32)
q
(
hk|π
)
=
mk (hk)m
k+1
π (hk)m
k−1
π (hk)
Zπk
(2.33)
q (π) =
p (π) e−Gπ−Vπ∑
ρ p (ρ) e
−Gρ−Vρ (2.34)
where miπ
(
xj
)
denotes a message from the ith node that is a direct neighbor to the jth node,
for xj ∈ {hk,ok}. Also, to simplify the notation we have used the following relation for k ≤ t
p̄ (ok) =
{
1, if ok = ok,
0, otherwise
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The messages are computed iteratively as follows
mk (hk) =
∑
ok
p̄ (ok) p
(
ok|hk
)
,
mkπ (ok) =
∑
hk
p
(
ok|hτ
)
mk+1π (hk)m
k−1
π (hk) ,
mk+1π (hk) =
1
Z ′k,π
∑
hk+1
p
(
hk+1|hk
)
mk+1 (hk+1)m
k+2
π (hk+1) ,
mk−1π (hk) =
1
Z ′′k,π
∑
hk−1
p
(
hk|hk−1
)
mk−1 (hk−1)m
k−2
π (hk−1) ,
(2.35)
Figure 2.3 shows a graphical representation of the posterior beliefs and messages on the
graph of the generative model. Information from forward and backward inference processes
is integrated for perception and planning. We denote these distinct pathways as f orward
messages and backward messages, respectively. Forward messages carry information from
the past to the future, given the observations that were made and the states that were inferred.
Backward messages pass back information from the prior beliefs about future outcomes and
their corresponding states, and from observations already made to update the estimates of
earlier states. The messages will be different for different control states, which makes them
dependent on the policy π. For graphs without loops these update rules converge to a unique
solution at the global minimum of the free energy, for which approximate marginals equal
the marginals of the true posterior q
(
xj |π
)
= f
(
xj |o, π
)
(Pearl, 1988; Yedidia et al., 2001b;
Yedidia, Freeman, & Weiss, 2001a). Note, that the beliefs do not converge to the posterior
p(xj |o, π) according to the generative model, but to the true posterior f(xj |o, π). This means
that the beliefs do not correspond to optimal predictions, but are averaged over expected
(preferred) future outcomes.
Combining the backwards and forwards messages corresponds to an evaluation of the
variational free energy for each policy, so that an approximate posterior probability distribution
for following a policy can be inferred. Inserting the update Equations (2.30) and (2.33) into
the free energy Equation (2.28) yields the following relation for the conditional free energy
Fπ = Gπ + Vπ (2.36)
= − lnZπT −
T∑
k=1
lnZ ′′k,π
The posterior probability of following a policy π in accordance with the prior beliefs p̄ (õ) is
then obtained by inserting (2.36) into (2.34).
2.3.5 Action selection
To reach goals, the agent has to generate a sequence of actions, or in other words, the
agent has to select a behavioral model which is most likely to fulfill its goals. One possible
mechanism is to select the mode of the posterior over behavioral policies
π∗ = arg max q (π)
ut = π
∗(t) = u∗t
(2.37)
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Figure 2.3: Graphical presentation of the model inversion under active inference
The notation used here corresponds to the one in Figure 2.2. However, the arrows now
indicate the messages that are passed from one node to another. The arrows pointing
up are the messages mk (hk) from an observation to the respective state, which influence
the inference which state had been visited or should be visited in the future. The arrows
pointing right correspond to the forward messages mk−1π (hk). The arrows pointing to the left
represent the backward messages mk+1π (hk). The arrows pointing down are the messages
mkπ (ok) from an estimated future state to their corresponding observation. They shape the
estimate of what will be observed in the future. Note that the last three described messages
depend on the policy π, i.e. they will be different for each sequence of control states. In that
manner, they influence the estimate of the policy π, and thereby determine the probability of
following a policy (arrow pointing from the big box to the policy).
and select the respective action u∗t at time step t. We will call this type of action selection
maximum selection.
Another approach is model averaging in which the agent uses its posterior beliefs over
policies to build expectations over control states
q
(
ut|u
)
=
∑
π
p
(
ut|u, π
)
q (π) , (2.38)
where the chosen action is sampled from q
(
ut|u
)
. We refer to this mechanism of action
selection as averaged selection.
For simplicity we will consider action selection to these two limiting cases. Note that it
would be straightforward to introduce additional hidden variables which allow the agent to
balance its behavior between model selection and model averaging (FitzGerald, Dolan, &
Friston, 2014b), as previously proposed in (K. Friston et al., 2013).
2.3.6 Toy environment
To illustrate and compare the goal-directed behavior that results from the above derived
update equations based on the mean-field and Bethe approximation, we will use a navigation
task in a 4× 4 grid world. The agent’s task is to navigate from a starting position (red shaded
square) to a goal position (blue shaded square), see Figure 2.4. Although a simple task, it is
complex enough to illustrate the differences between the two approximations and providing
insights into the limitations of the mean-field approximation.
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a b c
0
1
Figure 2.4: Grid world
a The agent starts out in the red shaded location and has to navigate to the blue shaded
location on the grid world. b Prior beliefs over the starting state p (h1) (color coded). c Prior
beliefs over future outcomes p̄ (oτ ) (color coded).
At each time step the agent makes an observation ot that provides information about its
current hidden state. In each state (node of the grid world) the agent can choose between
nu = 4 control states: go up, go down, go left, and go right. The task for the agent is to reach
the goal state after making four choices. The number of time steps modelled in each run
is T = 5. Note that if the agent is at a boundary, the movement into the direction of the
boundary fails and the agent will not change its position.
After making an observation, the agent has to infer current and past states, and build
expectations about future states and observations. This process corresponds to calculating
the approximate posterior q
(
õ,h1:T |π
)
. Given the policy-dependent posterior, the agent
evaluates the total free energy Fπ over all nπ = 256 possible policies. The total free energy
defines the posterior beliefs over behavioral policies q (π). In this specific environment, only
six policies will lead to the goal state in the given time frame.
Before making any observations, the agent’s beliefs are defined by its prior beliefs about
his starting state p (h1). To make the agent rely on observations when planning behavior,
we let the agent be uncertain about its starting position by setting the prior beliefs to a
uniform distribution over the four states in the bottom left corner (Figure 2.4b). To induce
goal-directed behavior we have defined the prior beliefs over future outcomes p̄ (oτ ) as a
step function
p̄ (oτ ) =
{
ρ oτ = g
1− ρ oτ 6= g
(2.39)
with constant values ρ for the goal observation g and 1 − ρ for all other observations (Fig-
ure 2.4c). For simplicity we will consider the prior beliefs over future outcomes to be fixed
to the same step function in all future time steps t < τ ≤ T (effectively, our predicted free
energy then accommodates a path integral of prior preferences).
To illustrate the agent’s behavior, we will expose the agent to two different environments:
(i) a grid world with varying observation uncertainty (Figure 2.5a) and (ii) a grid world with
varying state transition uncertainty (Figure 2.5b). With increasing observation uncertainty the
probability of making an observation associated with a neighboring state increases, while
with increasing state transition uncertainty the probability of remaining in the current state
increases.
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a b
Figure 2.5: Experimental conditions
a The grid world with a varying observation uncertainty. The size of the circles scales with
increasing observation uncertainty and decreases with a horizontal gradient from left to right.
The agent starts out in a high uncertainty state, and it has to rely on inference about states to
navigate through the grid. b The grid world with a varying state transition uncertainty. The
size of the circles scales with increasing state transition uncertainty and decreases along a
diagonal gradient from the upper left to the bottom and to the right. The positions in the
bottom row and right-most column have no state transition uncertainty and state transitions
from these positions are deterministic.
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In the environment with varying observation uncertainty we have chosen a horizontal
gradient of uncertainty, thus we defined the state dependent observation likelihood as
p
(
ok = i|hk = j
)
=

aj i = j
1−aj
nj
i ∈ N(j)
0 otherwise
(2.40)
where aj ∈
{
1, 23 ,
1
2 ,
1
2
}
, N(j) denotes the nearest neighbors of the jth node, and nj the total
number of neighbors of the jth node. To ensure that the goal state is associated with a single
observation, we excluded it for the uncertainty specification from the neighborhood of all
neighboring states. The specific value of aj is inversely proportional to the size of the circle
shown in Figure 2.4b. Note that the number of different observations corresponds to the
number of different states hence i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 16}.
In this environment, to make the agent rely on the inference about the state space in
order to reach the goal, we set the initial state in the area with high observation uncertainty.
Therefore, in the initial state and depending on the initial observation, the agent’s beliefs will
be distributed over the possible starting states. Whether the agent reaches the goal state or
not strongly depends on the initial observation. Importantly, out of the policies which lead
to the goal, some lead through the states with high observation uncertainty, while others
lead to states with low observation uncertainty. An interesting question here is whether the
agent follows more often policies that lead toward low observation uncertainty states, that is,
whether the agent tends to reduce its initial uncertainty about the state space.
In the environment with state transition uncertainty, we removed the observation uncer-
tainty, but chosen actions have a state dependent chance of failing. We have defined the
state dependent transitioning probability as follows
p
(
hk = i|hk−1 = j, ut = a
)
=

bj j(a) = i
1− bj i = j,
0 otherwise
(2.41)
where bj ∈
{
1, 23 ,
1
2 ,
1
2
}
, and j(a) denotes the neighbor of node j in the direction of action
a. If j(a) points to the boundary then bj = 0 for all boundary states j. As before the specific
value of bj is inversely proportional to the size of the circle in Figure 2.4a.
There is exactly one policy which leads to the goal state with certainty. We will consider this
policy to be the optimal policy in this condition
πoptimal =
(
right, right, up, up
)
(2.42)
2.4 Results
Here we present the behavioral differences between the Bethe approximation based agent
and the mean-field approximation based agent for the two environments in the grid world.
All presented cases were obtained as an average over 1,000 runs in each environment.
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Figure 2.6: Success rates as a function of the magnitude of the prior beliefs over the goal
observation ρ
a and c show the success rates for the observation uncertainty condition, b and d show
the success rates for the state transition uncertainty condition. The top row (a,b) and the
bottom row (c,d) show the results for averaged action selection and maximum action selection,
respectively. The success rates of the Bethe agent are plotted in blue and the success rates
of the mean-field agent in green, the transparent areas display the confidence intervals of
95%.
2.4.1 Prior preferences and performance
A model parameter with a strong influence on the agent’s behavior is the prior over future
outcomes p̄ (õ) (see Equation (2.39)). This prior defines the agent’s preferences over future
observations and modulates the predicted free energy of a behavioral policy (see Equa-
tion (2.19)). To investigate the impact of the prior preferences on the performance of the
agents, we varied the value of the prior p̄ (oτ = g) = ρ between 0.5 and 0.999 and estimated
the corresponding average success rate; defined as the percentage of trials in which the
agent is at the goal location at the last time step T .
In Figure 2.6 we show the resulting success rates as a function of prior preference ρ in
different conditions and action selection methods. Several patterns are clearly visible: (i)
the success rates of agents using averaged action selection (top row of Figure 2.6) increase
strongly with an increasing ρ, while the success rates of agents using maximum selection
(bottom row) remain mostly constant and at higher levels compared to averaged selection;
(ii) In the environment with observation uncertainty (left column) the Bethe agent achieves
consistently higher success rates, independent of the action selection method; (iii) in the
environment with state transition uncertainty the success rates of the agents are closely
matched, with a slight advantage of the mean-field agent using the averaged selection for
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high prior preferences. In what follows we will explain what gives rise to this specific pattern
of performance differences between agents and action selection methods.
The influence of the prior preferences ρ on the success rates depends on the components
that define posterior beliefs over policies. The key factor which determines the value of
the conditional free energy Fπ—and therewith the posterior q (π)—is the cross entropy
−
∑
oτ
q
(
oτ |π
)
ln p̄ (oτ ). Hence, the ranking of the policies is independent on the value of
prior preference ρ, however their relative probabilities change. In other words, in the case of
maximum selection the value of ρ does not influence which policy is selected by the agent,
whereas in the case of averaged selection the relative value of different policies has an effect
on action selection. Thus an increasing ρ under averaged selection makes the agents’ behavior
more goal-directed, and thereby more successful.
2.4.2 Prediction accuracy
To pinpoint the reason for the large difference in the performance between the two agents
in the environment with observation uncertainty, we looked into the posterior beliefs over
policies evaluated in the first time step t = 1. Because the predicted probability of making
the preferred observation in the final time step q
(
oT = g|π
)
is the main contributor to the
probability q (π) of following a policy, we examined if the agents correctly predict that they
will or will not reach the goal state when evaluating policies.
To do this, we calculated the true positive and false positive classification rates. When an
agent correctly predicted reaching the goal state when evaluating one of the 6 policies which
lead to the goal, we counted this as a true positive. When the agent incorrectly predicted
reaching the goal when evaluating one of the remaining policies, we counted this as a false
positive. Figure 2.7a shows the true positive classification rate of both agents in the first time
step. The Bethe agent has a 95% true positive rate, meaning that, when evaluating a policy
that could lead to a goal, it almost always correctly predicts that the policy will be successful.
In contrast, the mean-field agent has a true positive rate below 60%, incorrectly classifying
policies as not leading to the goal state, despite them being successful policies. This low true
positive rate skews the approximate posterior q (π), so that policies which would be good to
follow have a low value, leading to erroneous behavior, and explaining the second effect of
the overall lower success rates.
In Figure 2.7b the false positive values are shown. The Bethe agent has a false positive rate
close to 0%, whereas the mean-field agent has always a false positive rate greater than zero.
In other words, the Bethe agent almost never assigns non zero values to policies that do not
lead to the goal state, whereas the mean-field agent predicts that some policies will lead to
the goal, when they do not. The false positive rate of the mean-field agent increases with
an increasing value of the prior preference over goal outcome ρ. This gives rise to the third
effect, the drop in success rates for high prior values ρ, as the agent will follow policies which
can not lead to the goal state.
These differences in performance of the two agents can be related to the sensitivity of the
gradient descent procedure (see Equation (2.25)) to the initial conditions (see Equation (2.26)).
Indeed, we observe that changing the initial conditions of the gradient descent influences the
final solutions, and hence the performance of the mean field agent. However, for different
environments, different initial conditions are required to improve the performance of the
mean-field agent. This points to an underlying issue of the mean-field approximation when
applied to sequential inference: We found that the approximate posterior over future states
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Figure 2.7: Classification of policies by the agents in the first time step t = 1
True and false positive classification rates of policies in the environment with observation
uncertainty for different values of the prior over the goal observation ρ. a percentage of
policies correctly classified as leading to the goal by the Bethe agent (blue) and mean-field
agent (green), out of policies which would lead to the goal in a deterministic environment
(true positives). b percentage of policies incorrectly classified to be leading to the goal by the
agent, out of policies which do not lead to the goal (false positives).
can converge to impossible state space configurations. Thus, the agent predicts that it will
execute an impossible state transition, i.e. jump across the grid, which causes an erroneous
evaluation of the posterior over policies and elicits unfavorable behavior.
Interestingly, the closely matched success rates and the higher success rate of the mean-
field agent in the environment with state transition uncertainty can also be related to the
prediction of impossible state transitions. Even in the environment with state transition
uncertainty, the mean-field agent accurately predicts the goal state only for the optimal policy
(the path without transition uncertainty). For other policies we again observe predictions
of impossible state transitions for the majority of policies. This erroneous inference leads
to an higher posterior value of the optimal policy q
(
πoptimal
)
, which in effect improves the
mean-field agent’s performance, as it results in higher probability of following optimal policy
when using averaged selection (Figure 2.6b). Importantly, the higher the ρ is the larger is the
penalty for policies predicted not to reach the goal state, which makes the mean-field agent
better than the Bethe agent for the largest ρ.
2.4.3 Optimal policy selection
To illustrate the differences in agents’ behavior in the two environments, we show in Figure 2.8
and Figure 2.9 the average paths followed by the agent for the prior preference fixed to
ρ = 0.999.
In the case of the environment with observation uncertainty (see Figure 2.8) we see clear
differences between the selected paths of the Bethe and mean-field agents. In contrast to
the mean-field agent, the Bethe agents consistently follows only goal reaching policies in a
fairly symmetric selected path structure. The slight bias towards policies going to the right
is not a result of the agents’ higher valuation of policies that reduce uncertainty about the
state space, but is due to the stochastic nature of the first observation and the subsequent
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difference in inference about the starting state. Indeed, we find that the initial uncertainty
about the occupied state is passed on to predictions about future states, so that the entropy
of the agents’ estimate about future states does not decrease, even when evaluating a policy
which contains an informative (low uncertainty) state (see Section 2.5).
Although the mean-field agent follows similar paths when reaching the goal state, it surpris-
ingly selects policies which lead to the left, away from the goal. These are stunning examples
of trajectories where the agent falsely predicts that some policies will lead to the goal when
they do not. The cause of this behavior is erroneous inference about the initial state in the
presence of observation uncertainty, leading to false beliefs that the goal is not reachable
from its initial state. When the agent believes that it is too far from the goal state, all policies
are treated as equally likely, as the expectation is that none of them would lead to the goal
state. This is why the agent chooses steps to the left even in maximum selection mode.
Interestingly, the false predictions of the mean-field agent (the convergence of posterior
beliefs to impossible trajectories) are the main factor driving the behavior in the environment
with observation uncertainty. Here, the agent’s overconfidence about current policies and
current states prevents it from switching to a different policy, even though the observations do
not carry sufficient information. Furthermore, the mean-field agent shows a strong preference
for policies leading through the high uncertainty regime under maximum selection. We
found the reason for this lies in reduced convergence issues for beliefs over future states
(more accurate representation of state transition paths) when policies that lead through high
uncertainty regions are evaluated. The true positive rate for these policies is higher than for
other policies leading to the goal.
In the environment with state transition uncertainty (Figure 2.9), the behavior of the two
agents is very similar. Importantly, in the case of maximum action selection both agents
correctly valued the path with least uncertainty as optimal, hence they always choose the
optimal policy. In averaged selection mode, when actions are chosen by averaging over the
values of policies, non-optimal actions have a non-zero probability of being chosen. This effect
increases with the number of policies. This causes a branching out from the optimal path
and a subsequent drop in success rate. As discussed above, avoiding uncertainty is not a
driving factor in the agent’s evaluation of policies. Rather, policies are weighted according to
the probability of reaching the goal state.
In summary, we found severe drawbacks in the mean-field agent’s planning process. When
inferring the future states for a given policy, the agent’s beliefs would converge to impossible
configurations of future states. In our formulation, both forward and backward messages
shape the beliefs about the future. Such a setup leads to multi-modal true posteriors as a
result of a divergence between the forward and backward predictions. Under the gradient
descend procedure used here (see Equation (2.25)) for the mean-field agent, its beliefs
settle around one of the modes (local optimum of the free energy). Since the value and
probability of a policy are determined by the predicted probability of reaching the goal
state, inaccurate beliefs about future states lead to inaccurate posterior beliefs over possible
policies. Depending on the environment, this anomalous inference can lead to either reduced
or increased performance of the mean-field agent.
The Bethe agent, however, in our simulations, always accurately predicted future states given
past observations, as the pairwise statistical dependencies explicitly prevent a divergence.
Furthermore, the beliefs were able to better maintain this multi-modality stemming from the
superposition of the forward and backward messages. And as the convergence of the beliefs
to the true posterior is guaranteed under the belief propagation update rules, the Bethe
agent will always optimally predict future states. A correct prediction of the probability of
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Figure 2.8: Simulation results in the environment with observation uncertainty
The left column (a, c) shows the trajectories for the Bethe agent and the right column (b, d)
the results for the mean-field agent. The cyan lines indicate the paths chosen by the agent
in successful runs. The red lines indicate paths chosen by the agents in unsuccessful runs.
Their thickness reflects the frequency with which a certain path was followed.
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Figure 2.9: Simulation results in the environment with state transition uncertainty
The left column (a, c) shows the trajectories for the Bethe agent and the right column (b, d)
the results for the mean-field agent. The two rows show the results for the two ways of action
selection and the paths are color coded as in Figure 2.8.
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reaching the goal state automatically leads to a more accurate policy evaluation as compared
to the mean-field agent.
2.5 Discussion
We revisited a specific solution of planning as inference for modelling goal-directed behavior
given by the active inference framework, where posterior beliefs about hidden states, future
observations and policies are obtained by minimizing the variational free energy. Importantly,
we provide here an alternative approach to the derivation of the key update equations of active
inference agents. In contrast to previous formulations of active inference, the agent’s behavior
aims at minimizing the expectation over the predicted free energy, instead of the expected
free energy as postulated previously (K. Friston et al., 2015; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli,
Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, &
Pezzulo, 2016). This allowed us to reveal the effects of the mean field approximation in the
face of uncertainty. In future work, we will investigate and compare behavior that results from
both formulations.
Besides the typically used mean-field approximation (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwarten-
beck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston et al., 2015) we provide a variational treatment
of planning as inference based on the Bethe approximation. In contrast to the mean-field
approximation—under which statistical independence of hidden variables is assumed—the
Bethe approximation assumes pairwise statistical dependencies between hidden variables
in the approximate posterior. To demonstrate the key differences between acting agents
based on the Bethe approximation and the mean-field approximation we have designed two
illustrative toy environments in which the agents had to perform a multi-trial goal-reaching
task while being exposed to either observation uncertainty or state transition uncertainty. We
found that assuming pairwise statistical dependence between hidden variables improves an
agent’s inference of hidden states. This leads to more accurate predictions about the future,
and consequently, evaluation of policies. These improvements resulted in more optimal
goal-directed behavior and higher success rates.
In the environment with observation uncertainty (Figure 2.5a), the state estimation was
dependent on noisy observations. This environment illustrates a condition in which goal-
directed behavior is generated under limited information about the current state of the
environment. For example, in a maze task an agent might not exactly know where it is, due to
ambiguity in the environment. Here, the Bethe agent showed consistently and dramatically
higher success rates in goal-reaching behavior due to a more robust, policy-dependent
inference of past, current, and future states and observations. We linked the low success
rates of the mean-field agent to the erroneous formation of beliefs about hidden states.
This misrepresentation of hidden states is caused by the convergence of posterior beliefs
to configurations that are impossible under any given policy. This is due to the fact that
agents infer the sequence of most probable states rather than the most probable sequence.
When dealing with inference under uncertainty, the true posterior is often a multi-modal
distribution. However, under the gradient descent procedure used here, the posterior beliefs
mostly converged to uni-modal distributions so that one of the peaks of the true multi-modal
distribution becomes enlarged, while all other peaks vanish. As a result, the agent either
misrepresents uncertainties, so that its beliefs only represent the most likely state, or the
agent predicts states which are impossible from the perspective of forward planning, but are
likely from the perspective of backward planning, i.e. going from the goal state backwards.
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Due to the over-confidence in beliefs over current states and expectations about future states
the mean-field agent cannot recover from an initial erroneous inference. This even holds
after sampling more observations and forming more accurate beliefs over hidden states. This
in turn leads to an erroneous evaluation of behavioral policies. In contrast, the Bethe agent
was able to rapidly adjust its evaluation of policies, even if it had been misled by a first, noisy
observation.
Although a possible remedy for the mean-field agent may be to adapt the initial conditions
in the gradient descent optimization procedure, these initial conditions would most likely
be, as we found for our simulations, environment- and task-specific. Another way to resolve
this issue for the mean-field agent might be to use a more sophisticated method than a
simple gradient descent. It would also be possible to base the predictions only on the forward
inference process (as done in previous work (K. Friston et al., 2015; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli,
Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, &
Pezzulo, 2016)), instead of combining forward and backward inference. While this would lead
to more accurate predictions of the future, and possibly less convergence issues, it would
strip the agent of the possibility to infer which states are on its way to the goal. We found that
the Bethe approximation provides a principled solution, as it is able to capture the temporal
structure of the environment and convergence to global optima is typically guaranteed in a
sequential decision task environment.
In the environment with state transition uncertainty (Figure 2.5b), hidden states were directly
observable, but actions were executed stochastically. Here, the effect of erroneous state
space representation on success rates of the mean-field agent was reduced, in comparison to
the environment with observation uncertainty. Both agents avoided high uncertainty regions,
illustrating that the driving factor in goal-directed behavior is the predicted probability of
reaching the goal state.
Such avoidance of high uncertainty states was not seen in the observation uncertainty condi-
tion, showing that agents do not intrinsically value informative states in our formulation using
the predictive free energy, in contrast to previous formulations of active inference (K. Friston,
FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2016; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015). Visiting a
state associated with low observation uncertainty can be interpreted as information gathering,
as the observation would be more informative about the underlying hidden state. We did not
observe this behavior in the agents, which we relate to the fact that initial uncertainty about
the state space is passed on to predictions about future states, keeping the expected entropy
of a future state high and thereby making such a state not more valuable to the agent. In
previous work on active inference (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo,
2016; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015), policy evaluation was done using a prior over policies
which was defined using the expected free energy. The expected free energy contains a term
evaluating the epistemic value (the informativeness of an action) of each policy. Using the
expected free energy, agents follow informative policies with high epistemic value, meaning
they tend to visit states with low observation uncertainty. As the epistemic value term does
not follow under the derivation presented here (see Section 2.3.4), where we derived a policy
evaluation based on the predicted free energy, it is not surprising that we do not observe
such behavior (see Appendix for details on the expected free energy).
The formulation of active inference under the mean-field ansatz has previously been put
forward as a process theory of neuronal function (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck,
& Pezzulo, 2016). Furthermore, (K. J. Friston, Parr, & de Vries, 2017) recently proposed a
neuronal connection scheme for belief propagation update rules under active inference.
However, the authors considered a modified belief propagation scheme in which the condi-
52
tional dependencies among hidden states are ignored, hence allowing them to obtain update
rules using the mean-field approximation. Under the Bethe approximation, the interpretation
in terms of neural coding does not necessarily change, and can be linked to past work on
possible implementations of belief propagation in neuronal networks. For example, (Shon &
Rao, 2005; Ott & Stoop, 2007) demonstrated an implementation of belief propagation using
a neuronal network in cases when the generative model contains only pairwise interactions
(like Bayesian graphs or Markov random fields). In this formulation, neurons are interpreted
as nodes of the graph of the generative model, and connections as conditional probabilities.
In this scheme, the intuitive idea is that the activation of neurons encodes the beliefs about
hidden variables, while the messages are transmitted by neural signal transaction. Similarly,
(Deneve, 2005) showed as a proof of principle that inference based on belief propagation
can be implemented in a network of spiking neurons. Interestingly, following this line of work,
(T. S. Lee & Mumford, 2003b; Jardri & Denève, 2013) discussed a possible link between belief
propagation in cortical networks and optical illusions and hallucinations.
A potential issue with neuronal implementation of belief propagation arises when the
generative model becomes more complex than the one used in this work. For example, it
might require interaction of more than two variables. Mathematically, the Bethe approximation
and the resulting belief propagation update equations scale well to these more complex
models. However, in this case, the mapping of conditional beliefs and messages to neuronal
architecture becomes more challenging and is subject to ongoing discussion. It might be
necessary to have an extra neuronal pool to calculate the messages (George & Hawkins, 2009;
Steimer, Maass, & Douglas, 2009).
An example of a more complex model is a hierarchical generative model (K. J. Friston,
Rosch, Parr, Price, & Bowman, 2017). Here, a mixture of approximate representations of the
posterior could be used. In this case, different levels of the hierarchy could be represented
independently in the posterior (mean-field approximation) and pairwise interactions would
only be captured within the same levels of representation (Bethe approximation). Additionally,
learning principles have recently been introduced to active inference (K. Friston, FitzGerald,
Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck,
& Pezzulo, 2016) which could easily be combined with the Bethe approximation. It would be
interesting in the future to explore whether the appropriate factorization of the posterior can
be learned over time, which could lead to an emergence of the most effective approximation
of a task environment.
In summary, we have presented a method for incorporating belief propagation within
the active inference framework using the Bethe approximation. The presented update
equations of the active inference framework complement past work (K. Friston, FitzGerald,
Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty,
& Pezzulo, 2016; K. Friston et al., 2015) and extend, in principle, the application range of active
inference to complex behavioral tasks with various sources of uncertainty.
2.6 Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SFB 940/2, Projects A9
and Z2).
53
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Relation between the predicted and expected free energy
In contrast to the variational free energy (which is a functional of a distribution over hidden
states and future observations, given observed outcomes) the expected free energy can be
expressed as the expectation over future (unobserved) outcomes, given a policy that defines
future beliefs over states (Kaplan & Friston, 2017). Alternatively we can express the expected
free energy as
Gexpectedπ =
∑
õ,h̃
p
(
õ, h̃|π
)[
ln p
(
h̃|π
)
− ln p
(
h̃|õ, π
)
− ln p̄ (õ)
]
=−
∑
õ,h̃
p
(
õ, h̃|π
)ln p
(
h̃|õ, π
)
p
(
h̃|π
) + ln p̄ (õ)

=
∑
õ,h̃
p
(
õ, h̃|π
)[
ln
p
(
õ|π
)
p̄ (õ)
− ln p
(
õ|h̃
)]
(2.43)
As an agent maintains only approximate estimates of the beliefs over future states and
outcomes we obtain the approximate form of the expected free energy for p
(
õ, h̃|π
)
≈
q
(
õ, h̃|π
)
.
Under the mean-field approximation (see Equation (2.20)) the expected free energy at
future time step τ becomes
Gexpectedπ (τ) = DKL
[
q
(
oτ |π
)
||p̄ (oτ )
]
+
∑
hτ
q
(
hτ |π
)
H
[
p
(
oτ |hτ
)]
. (2.44)
In contrast, under the Bethe approximation the expected free energy becomes
Gexpectedπ (τ) =
∑
oτ :t+1
q
(
oτ :t+1|π
)
ln
q
(
oτ |oτ−1:t+1π
)
p̄ (oτ )
+
∑
hτ
q
(
hτ |π
)
H
[
p
(
oτ |hτ
)]
, (2.45)
as under the Bethe approximation the beliefs over future outcomes do not factorize into the
product over marginals at each time step.
In this formulation, the expected free energy contains two terms: The first term encodes
the extrinsic value of a policy, as it is minimized when the agent predicts that a specific policy
will fulfill the prior expectations over future outcomes. The second term defines the expected
ambiguity, that is, expected observational uncertainty at future time steps τ . This term is
minimized when an agent visits informative states.
The expected free energy expresses a slightly different set of terms compared to the
predicted free energy. To show the similarities and differences, we can rewrite the predicted
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free energy (Equation (2.19)) as
G[q] =
∑
õ,h1:T ,π
q (õ,h1:T , π)
[
ln
q
(
õ|h, π
)
p̄ (õ)
− ln p
(
õ|h̃
)]
+
∑
õ,h1:T ,π
q (õ,h1:T , π) ln
q
(
h̃|õ,h, π
)
p
(
h̃|ht, π
) . (2.46)
In this form, the predicted free energy is similar to the expected free energy (Equation (2.43)),
and contains two pragmatic terms and a term similar in form to the information gain of the
expected free energy, albeit with an opposite sign. The expected free energy can be recovered
from the predicted free energy by imposing the constraint
∑
q
(
õ,h)1 : t, π
)
ln q
(
h̃|õ, h, π
)
=∑
q
(
õ,h)1 : t, π
)
p
(
h̃|ht, π
)
. The interpretation of the third term becomes more obvious
when the respective approximations are inserted into the predicted free energy.
Under the mean-field approximation (Equation (2.22)), the predicted free energy can be
rearranged as
Gπ (τ) =
∑
oτ ,hτ
q
(
oτ ,hτ |π
) [
ln
q
(
oτ |π
)
p̄ (oτ )
− ln p
(
oτ |hτ
)]
+
∑
oτ ,hτ ,hτ−1
q
(
oτ ,hτ |π
)
q
(
hτ−1|π
)
ln
q
(
hτ |oτ , π
)
p
(
hτ |hτ−1, π
) , (2.47)
where the third term becomes a consistency term, as it can be read as the KL divergence
between the forward message and the belief about a state conditioned on the respective
observation. Under the Bethe approximation (Equation (2.29)) the predicted free energy can
be decomposed as
Gπ (τ) =
∑
oτ
q
(
oτ ,hτ |π
) [
ln
q
(
oτ |π
)
p̄ (oτ )
− ln p
(
oτ |hτ
)]
(2.48)
+
∑
hτ ,hτ−1
q
(
oτ ,hτ ,hτ−1|π
) [
ln
q
(
hτ ,hτ−1|π
)
q
(
hτ |π
)
q
(
hτ−1|π
) + ln q (hτ |oτ , π)
p
(
hτ |hτ−1, π
)] ,
where we recover an additional term compared to the mean-field approximation. This
term corresponds to the mutual information between successive states, which defines the
complexity cost of representing statistical dependence between hidden states. The final term
in Equation (2.48) is the same as in the mean-field approximation, but it cannot be interpreted
as easily here, as the messages under the Bethe approximation have a different form.
However, under the predicted free energy all terms but the norms of the messages cancel
out (see Equation (2.36)) once the results for the approximate posterior are inserted. These
norms can be interpreted as trial-dependent surprise, encoding the discrepancy between
the forward planning and the prior expectations over future outcomes. With the predicted
free energy, independent of the decomposition, the probability of reaching the goal state is
the driving factor for agent behavior.
Importantly, simulating agent behavior using the expected rather than the predicted free
energy leads to a relative tendency to choose paths towards states with low observation
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uncertainty. When visiting these states, an observation is more informative about its underlying
hidden state. An agent thereby reduces its uncertainty about its current state. In future work
we will investigate if we can recover this information seeking behavior with the formalism
based on the predicted free energy.
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3 Balancing control: A Bayesian
interpretation of habitual and
goal-directed behavior
3.1 Abstract
In everyday life, our behavior varies on a continuum from either automatic and habitual to
deliberate and goal-directed. Recent evidence suggests that habit formation and relearning
of habits operate in a context-dependent manner: Habit formation is promoted when actions
are performed in a specific context, while breaking off habits is facilitated after a context
change. It is an open question how one can computationally model the brain’s balancing
between context-specific habits and goal-directed actions. Here, we propose a hierarchical
Bayesian approach for control of a partially observable Markov decision process that enables
conjoint learning of habit and reward structure in a context-specific manner. In this model,
habit learning corresponds to a value-free updating of priors over policies and interacts
with the value-based learning of the reward structure. Importantly, the model is solely built
on probabilistic inference, which effectively provides a simple explanation how the brain
may balance contributions of habitual and goal-directed control. We illustrated the resulting
behavior using agent-based simulated experiments, where we replicated several findings
of devaluation and extinction experiments. In addition, we show how a single parameter,
the so-called habitual tendency, can explain individual differences in habit learning and the
balancing between habitual and goal-directed control. Finally, we discuss the relevance of
the proposed model for understanding specific phenomena in substance use disorder and
the potential computational role of activity in dorsolateral and dorsomedial striatum and
infralimbic cortex, as reported in animal experiments.
3.2 Introduction
In both psychology and neuroscience, theories postulate that behavioral control can vary
along a dimension with habitual, automatic actions on one end, and goal-directed, controlled
actions on the other (Wood & Rünger, 2016). In the context of operant conditioning, habits
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have been described as retrospective and have been found to implement an automatic
tendency to repeat actions which have been rewarded in the past (Dickinson et al., 1983;
Graybiel, 2008). Habitual action selection is typically fast but is insensitive to outcomes and only
slowly adapts to a changing environment (Seger & Spiering, 2011). In contrast, goal-directed
action selection is prospective and implements planning based on a representation of action-
outcome contingencies (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994; Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Consequently,
goal-directed action selection adapts rather rapidly to a changing environment, but under a
penalty of costly and slow computations.
Habit learning can be viewed as a transition from goal-directed to habitual behavior while
a subject learns about its environment (Graybiel, 2008): In a novel environment or context,
goal-directed actions will first allow the organism to learn about its structure and rewards
and, later, to integrate this information to reliably reach a goal. With time, certain behaviors
will be reinforced, while others will not. Subsequently, habits are formed to enable faster
and computationally less costly selection of behavior which have been successful in the past.
Given enough training, behavior is thought to be dominated by stimulus-driven habits, see e.g.
(Dickinson, 1985; Seger & Spiering, 2011) for experimentally derived criteria of habit learning.
In particular, two influential criteria are the insensitivity to contingency degradation where
action-outcome associations are changed, and the insensitivity to reinforcer devaluation,
where the outcome is made undesirable (Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Here, an established habit
seems to make it difficult for an organism to change the previously reinforced habitual choice
and adapt behavior to the altered conditions in its environment. Additionally, the strength of
the habit and resulting insensitivity to changes has been found to critically depend on the
duration and reward schedule of the training phase (Yin & Knowlton, 2006).
Importantly, habit learning as well as changing existing habits is strongly associated with the
consistency of the environment while actions are performed (Wood & Rünger, 2016). When a
specific behavior is executed in a stable context, habits are learned faster, and adjustment
of behavioral patterns after changes in context is impeded (Lally et al., 2010). Conversely,
learning of habits is slower and adjustment to changes is facilitated in a changing environment
or inconsistent contexts. For example, it has been shown that learning of habits is improved
when actions are mostly performed in the same context, e.g. after breakfast (Lally et al., 2010;
Danner et al., 2008; D. T. Neal et al., 2012); while the unlearning of habits is improved after a
context change, e.g. after a move to a different city (Verplanken & Roy, 2016).
In addition, habit learning trajectories strongly vary between individuals (Dolan & Dayan,
2013; Lally et al., 2010). Recent substance use disorder (SUD) studies show differences,
between patients and controls, in learning and in the reliance on the so-called habit system,
which lead to individual habitual responding biases (Ersche et al., 2016; Lim et al., 2019; Heinz
et al., 2019). Still, it is an open question whether these different habit learning trajectories in
individuals with SUD are due to individual factors or caused by the substance use itself (Nebe
et al., 2018).
While there are findings that there are two hypothesized systems, the habitual and goal-
directed system, and how they map onto brain structures (Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Yin &
Knowlton, 2006; Everitt & Robbins, 2005), it is not clear if such a dichotomy is required for the
computational description of these processes and for a mechanistic understanding of how
habitual and goal-directed control are balanced, e.g. (Goschke, 2014). It has been argued
that goal-directed and habitual behavior can be equated to model-based and model-free
reinforcement learning (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). However, experimental evidence indicates that
model-free reinforcement learning does not capture all experimentally established properties
of habit formation (Friedel et al., 2014; Gillan et al., 2015). Rather, an alternative proposal is
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centered on the idea that habits, as stimulus-response associations, may arise from repetition
alone and are learned via a value-free mechanism (Miller et al., 2019). Another emerging
research direction, built on both experimental and computational studies, is to consider
habits as chunked action sequences, which may be modelled in a hierarchical fashion (Smith
& Graybiel, 2016; Graybiel & Grafton, 2015; Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012, 2013; Graybiel &
Grafton, 2015).
Here, we propose a hierarchical Bayesian habit-learning model based on the concept of
planning as inference (Attias, 2003a; Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012a), which we will treat with
methods of approximate inference (K. Friston et al., 2015). Critically, we regard habits as a prior
over policies (sequences of actions), see also (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck,
O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016), which enables a novel way to understand how the brain may
balance its action control between habitual and goal-direction contributions. In this model,
the prior over actions is learned according to a Bayesian value-free update rule based on a
tendency to repeat past actions. At the same time, the reward structure of the environment
is learned in a value-based and outcome-sensitive manner. This learned reward structure is
used for goal-directed action evaluation based on explicit forward planning which is computed
in a likelihood. Action selection is implemented as sampling from the posterior which is the
product of the prior and the likelihood, yielding an automatic balancing between goal-directed
and habitual behavior. Importantly, habits and outcome rules are learned in a context-specific
manner, and can be retrieved when revisiting a context. We use this hierarchical model to
explain the transition dynamics from goal-directed to habitual behavior when learning habits,
and adaptation of behavior to context changes.
In concrete terms, we propose to view balancing of behavioral control in a Bayesian way:
Behavior is sampled from a posterior which, according to Bayes’ rule, is a prior times a
likelihood. We interpret the prior as the habit, where the habitual contribution for a specific
action is higher the more this action, or sequence of actions, has been selected in the past.
The goal-directed value of an action is encoded in the likelihood, where explicit forward
planning yields the expected reward of an action. This explicit forward planning is based
on learning of outcome contingencies, which allow the agent to predict the goal-directed
value. As a result, the interpretation of how control is balanced is rather simple: Goal-directed
and habitual value are multiplied using Bayes’ rule, yielding an natural weighting of of their
contributions to control based on the respective certainties. Importantly, the habit, i.e. the
prior, and the outcome rules, and in effect the likelihood, are learned in a context-specific
manner. As a result, habits and outcome contingencies are learned for each context and can
be retrieved when re-encountering a known context.
We show that the proposed model is in principle able to capture basic properties of
classical habit learning experiments: Insensitivity to changes in action-outcome contingencies
and reinforcer devaluation, and the increase of this effect with longer training duration.
We introduce a free parameter of the model, the habitual tendency, which modulates an
individual’s habit learning speed. We also show that stochastic environments which are akin
to interval reward schedules result in an over-reliance on habitual control. Furthermore, we
illustrate that context-specific habits enable rapid adaptation after a switch to another but
already known context.
We will discuss the implications of our model and how the proposal of habits modelled
as prior over action sequences lets us reinterpret the assumed dichotomy of the habitual
and goal-directed system. In particular, we will briefly discuss the potential relevance of the
impact of misguided context inference on the arbitration between habitual and goal-directed
control in SUD and speculate on the mapping between specific model mechanisms and
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recent findings in both the dorsolateral and dorsomedial striatum and the infralimbic cortex.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 The generative process
In this work, we propose a hierarchical Bayesian model which implements context-dependent
habit learning. We will describe the proposed modelling approach in detail and in a didactic
fashion. Before we show details of the model, we describe the structure of the task environ-
ment. Our description rests on a hierarchical partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP), which is defined by the tuple (S,R,A, C, Ts, Tr, Tc), where
• S = {s1, . . . , sns} is a set of states
• R = {r1, . . . , rnr} is a set of rewards
• A = {a1, . . . , ana} is a set of actions
• C = {c1, . . . , cnc} is a set of contexts
• Ts
(
st+1|st,at
)
is a set of action-dependent state transition rules
• Tr
(
rt|st, ck
)
is a set of context-dependent reward generation rules
• Tc
(
ck+1|ck
)
is a set of context transition rules.
For a tutorial on POMDPs see (Littman, 2009). We partition the time evolution of the environ-
ment into Ne episodes of length T (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Zacks,
Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007; Butz, 2016). In the k-th episode, the environment
is in context ck ∈ C. In this episode, the first time step is t = 1. The environment starts out in
its starting state s1 ∈ S . Depending on the state and the current context, the environment
distributes a reward r1 ∈ R according to the generation rule Tr , which essentially encodes the
contingency tables for each context. Note that a no-reward is also part of the set of rewards
R. This way, the environment is set up to have a context-dependent reward distribution rule,
which may also change, when the environment transitions to a new context. Using these
transitions, we will be able to implement the training and extinction phases of a typical habit
learning environment as latent contexts in the Markov decision process.
A participant or agent, which is interacting with this environment, observes the reward and
state of the environment, and chooses an action a1. This marks the end of the first time step
t = 1 of the k-th episode. This process for a single time step is also shown in the left part of
Figure 3.1.
In the second time step t = 2 of the k-th episode, the environment updates its state to a
new state s2, in accordance with the context transition rule Ts, depending on the previous
state s1 and the chosen action a1. Given the new state and the current context, a new reward
r2 is distributed. The agent once again perceives the state and reward and chooses a new
action a2.
This process is iterated until the last time step t = T of the episode is reached. In between
the last time step of the current episode k, and the first time step of the next episode k+1, the
context is updated to a new context ck+1 in accordance with the transition rule Tc. Importantly,
the context is an abstract, hidden (latent) state, which determines the current outcome rules
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of the environment. It cannot be directly observed by the agent but only inferred from
interactions with the environment. We chose this setup because in animal experiments the
switch to the context of an extinction phase is typically not cued. Our assumption here is
that an agent represents different environments with different rules as different contexts.
As in daily life, rule changes might not be directly cued which makes it necessary to model
uncertainty about context. This is in line with recent experiments and modelling work which
demonstrated that humans and animals implicitly learn different outcome contingencies as
different contexts, even when they are not cued (Palminteri, Khamassi, Joffily, & Coricelli, 2015;
Gershman et al., 2010; Wilson, Takahashi, Schoenbaum, & Niv, 2014).
Note that this implementation effectively constitutes a hierarchical model on two different
time scales: The episodes on the lower level, where states evolve quickly, i.e. in every time
step, and the contexts on the higher level, which evolve more slowly, only every T time steps.
3.3.2 The generative model
To a participant or an artificial agent, this generative process is not directly accessible. Instead,
the agent has to maintain a representation of this process, which is called the generative
model. For the purpose of our model, we will assume that the agent knows which quantities
are involved: It knows that there are states and that the possible states it could be in are
summarized in the set S . It also knows all possible rewards in R, and all possible contexts in
C.
Furthermore, we assume that the principled structure of the environment is known to the
agent: It knows that (i) state transitions depend on the previous state and the action chosen,
(ii) reward generation depends on the current state and context, and (iii) the environment is
partitioned into episodes, where the context is stable within but may switch between episodes.
These causal relationships in the generative model are shown in Figure 3.2. Within an episode,
we assume without loss of generality that the agent does not represent single actions, but
sequences of actions (policies)
π = (a1, . . . , aT−1) ∈ {π1, . . . , πnπ} . (3.1)
where a policy consists of len (π) = T − 1 actions because actions are executed in between
time steps and an action at time step T would therefore have no effect.
Additionally we assume that the agent has the correct representation of the state transition
rules Ts. In other words, the agent knows which consequences its own actions will have.
In contrast, we assume that an agent does not know the reward probabilities associated
with each state and how they depend on the context. Instead, the agent represents those
probabilities as random variables
φ =
{
φ1,1,1, . . . , φr,s,c, . . . , φnr,ns,nc
}
(3.2)
which will have to be inferred.
Importantly, we propose that the agent learns context-dependent habits as a context-
dependent prior over policies. It represents the parameters of this prior as latent random
variables as well
θ =
{
θ1,1, . . . , θπ,c, . . . , θnπ ,nc
}
. (3.3)
Formally, we write the causal structure of the agent’s generative model as
p (s1:T , r1:T , π, θ, φ, ck) = p
(
π|θ, ck
)
p
(
θ|αk−1
)
p
(
φ|βk−1
)
p′ (ck) p
(
s1:T , r1:T |π, φ, ck
)
(3.4)
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Figure 3.1: The agent in interaction with its environment
The environment (left) is modeled as a hierarchical partially observable Markov decision
process (see Section 3.3.1). On the lower level, the time evolution of the environment is
structured into episodes of length T . Here, the states of the environment evolve dependent
on the previous state and action chosen by the agent. Given the state and the reward
generation rules, some reward or no reward is distributed in each time step t of an episode.
On the higher level, there is a slowly evolving context which determines the current rules
of the environment, namely the reward generation rules, i.e. outcome contingencies. The
agent (right) uses its generative model (see Section 3.3.2 and Figure 3.2) to represent the
dynamics of the environment, and to plan ahead and select actions. At the beginning of each
episode (t = 1), the agent infers the current context (box in the top right) based on previous
rewards and states, and retrieves the learned reward generation rules and the habits (prior
over policies) for this context. In each time step t in an episode, the agent perceives a new
state-reward pair and uses forward planning in a goal-directed fashion (the likelihood) to then
form a posterior over actions by combining the habit with the goal-directed computation
what actions should be chosen. To execute an action, the agent samples from this posterior.
This process repeats until the last time step t = T , where the agent updates its habits based
on the policy it chose for this episode, and updates its knowledge about the reward structure
based on the state-reward pairs it perceived (bottom right box). This updating is done in
a context-specific manner so that the habits and rules are updated proportionally to the
inferred probability of having been in a context during the past episode.
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Figure 3.2: A graphical model depicting conditional dependencies between variables in the
generative model
Empty circles indicate latent, unobservable variables and filled circles indicate known, observed
variables, and arrows indicate statistical dependencies, where colored arrows indicate that
these dependencies are learned by the agent. The model here is a hierarchical model, with
the contexts ck on the higher level of the hierarchy, and the episodes (black boxes) on the
lower level of the hierarchy. In the current episode k (middle box), the agent starts at in
some state s1 (blue), and receives a reward r1 (green) according to the current outcome rules
(red downward arrows). The agent’s knowledge about the current rules is represented by
the parameters φ (red). The agent then chose some action a1 in accordance with a policy π
(brown). For the next time step t = 2, the agent transitions to a new state s2 (arrow to the
right), dependent on the policy π it followed (downward arrow from π), and a new reward r2
is distributed. This process repeated until the agent reached the current time step t. Viewed
from here, all future states and rewards are unknown and, so far, unobserved variables, which
the agent will infer during its planning process and evaluate if they lead to desirable outcomes.
Based on this evaluation of the policies π and the prior over policies parameterized by θ
(lilac), the agent can now choose a new action at. On the higher level of the hierarchy, there
are the latent contexts ck (pink), which evolve more slowly (arrows to the right). They also
determine which outcome rules are currently in use (downward right tilted arrow), and which
prior over policies is being learned (downward left tilted arrow). The prior over policies is
parameterized with the parameters θ (lilac), whose influence on the policy is also subjected
to learning (lilac arrow to the right). We furthermore show the previous context ck−1 and the
next context ck+1, which encode the previous episode (left box) and the next episode (right
box), respectively.
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where
p
(
s1:T , r1:T |φ, ck
)
=
t∏
m
p
(
sm|sm−1, π
)
p
(
rm|sm, φ, ck
)
T∏
τ=t+1
p
(
sτ |sτ−1, π
)
p
(
rτ |sτ , φ, ck
)
p
(
R = 1|rτ
)
is the agent’s representation of the k-th episode, in which it is at time step t. This is an effective
partition of states and rewards into past observed states s1:t and rewards r1:t and unknown
future states st+1:T and rewards rt+1:T . The past states and rewards have been observed
and are therefore known exactly to the agent. Conversely, the future states and rewards are
unknown and are therefore latent variables which will have to be inferred. Note that this is an
exact representation of the graphical model in Figure 3.2.
We use the following distributions to define the generative model:
• The policies π are represented by a categorical distribution
p
(
π = l|θ, ck = n
)
=
∏
n,l
θ
δl,πδn,ck
l,n
where δi,j is the Dirac delta.
• The latent parameters of the prior over policies θ are distributed according to the
respective conjugate prior, a product of Dirichlet distributions
p
(
θ|α
)
=
∏
n
Dir(αk−1n ) =
∏
n
1
B
(
αk−1n
)∏
l
θ
αk−1l,n −1
l,n
.
• The so-called concentration parameters αk−1 =
{
αk−1l,n
}
are pseudo counts of the
Dirichlet distributions. They encode how often an agent has chosen a policy in a specific
context up until the previous episode k − 1, and therewith shape the prior over policies.
• The rewards rt are distributed according to a conditional categorical distribution
p
(
rt = i|st = j, φ, ck = n
)
=
∏
i,j,n
φ
δi,rt ,δj,stδn,ck
i,j,n
.
• As above, the latent parameters φ are distributed according to the product of conjugate
Dirichlet priors
p
(
φ|β
)
=
∏
j,n
Dir(βk−1j,n ) =
∏
j,n
1
B
(
βk−1j,n
)∏
i
φ
βk−1i,j,n−1
i,j,n
.
• The concentration parameters βk−1 =
{
βk−1i,j,n
}
are pseudo counts of the Dirichlet
distribution. They encode how often the agent saw a specific reward in a specific state
and context up until the previous episode k − 1. Therewith they represent the agent’s
knowledge about the reward generation rules, i.e. contingencies.
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• The states are distributed according to a conditional categorical distribution
p
(
st = j
′|st−1 = j, π = l
)
=
∏
j′,j,l
p
δj′,st ,δj,st−1 ,δl,π
j′,j,l .
We will fix the parameters pj′,j,l to the true (deterministic) state transitions Ts in the
generative process.
• The contexts are distributed according to a categorical distribution p′ (ck). We define
this as a predictive prior p′ (ck) = p
(
ck|s1:k−1, r1:k−1
)
based on observed past states
and rewards. Note that it also includes the agent’s expectation of temporal stability of
its environment. Specifically, we assume all contexts have the same temporal stability
and change equally often.
• The agent’s preference of rewards is represented by p
(
R = 1|rτ
)
, using a dummy
variable R, see (Solway & Botvinick, 2012). High values of the probability distribution
mean high preference for a particular reward, while low values mean low preference.
After having set up the generative model, we will now show how the agent, based on this
model, forms beliefs about its environment and selects actions. To describe action evaluation
and selection, we will follow the concept of planning as inference (Attias, 2003a; Botvinick &
Toussaint, 2012a) and active inference (K. Friston et al., 2015; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli,
Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016; Schwöbel et al., 2018). Critically, this means that,
apart from forming beliefs about hidden variables of the environment, actions or policies are
also treated as latent variables that can be inferred.
3.3.3 Approximate posterior
When an agent infers hidden variables of its environment, such as the context, or future
states and rewards, it needs to calculate the posterior
p
(
st+1:T , rt+1:T , π, θ, φ, ck|s1:t, r1:t
)
(3.5)
over these hidden variables using Bayesian inversion. Intuitively this means asking the ques-
tions: What context am I most likely in, given I was in these states and received those rewards?
What states will I visit in the future, and what rewards will I receive, given I have been in these
states in the past and received those rewards? What are the most likely outcome rules that
have generated rewards from states? To ensure analytical tractability and low computational
costs, we will use variational inference as an approximate Bayesian treatment of the inference
process.
Variational inference makes the inference process analytically tractable by replacing the
computation of the true posterior with a simpler approximate posterior. In our case we will
express the approximate posterior as
p
(
st+1:T , rt+1:T , π, θ, φ, ck|s1:t, r1:t
)
≈q (st+1:T , rt+1:T , π, θ, φ, ck)
= q
(
π|ck
)
q
(
θ|αk
)
q
(
φ|βk
)
q (ck) q
(
st+1:T , rt+1:T |π, ck
)
where we use belief propagation based on the Bethe approximation within a behavioral
episode
q
(
st+1:T , rt+1:T |π, ck
)
=
T∏
τ=t+1
q
(
sτ , sτ−1|π, ck
)
q
(
sτ |π, ck
) q (rτ , sτ |π, ck)
q
(
sτ |π, ck
) (3.6)
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This is well motivated because within an episode, states and rewards critically depend on
each other so it is sensible to use an approximation which captures these dependencies.
Outside of an episode, statistical dependencies may be averaged out, so that a mean-field
approximation is sufficient to approximate the posterior. Specifically, we will use forward
mean-field belief propagation, to obtain an agents beliefs based on the observed states and
rewards. The posteriors of all random variables will be distributed the same way as in the
generative model: states, rewards, policies, and context follow a categorical distribution;
while their parameters θ and φ follow a Dirichlet distribution. These come out naturally from
calculating the update equations (see Appendix).
3.3.4 Update equations
The marginal and pairwise approximate posteriors can be analytically calculated at the mini-
mum of the variational free energy, see e.g. (Bishop, 2006a; Yedidia, Freeman, & Weiss, 2003b).
These posteriors are typically called beliefs, as they encode the agent’s beliefs about the
hidden variables in its environment. We will now show the update equations resulting from
the free energy minimization. These equations implement the agent’s information processing:
how it forms beliefs about the hidden variables in its environment, how it learns, plans, and
evaluates actions. An illustration of this process is shown on the right side of Figure 3.1.
At the beginning of time step t in the k-th episode, the agent perceives the state st of its
environment, and receives a reward rt. It uses this co-occurrence of state and reward to
infer the current context and to update its beliefs about the reward generation rules. The
posterior over context is estimated as
q (ck) = p
′ (ck) exp
(
−F (ck)
)
; p′ (ck) =
∑
ck−1
p(ck|ck−1)q(ck−1) (3.7)
where p′ (ck) is a predictive probability for contexts given the beliefs previous episode and
the transition probabilities p(ck|ck−1), and F (ck) is the context-specific free energy. The free
energy term F (ck) encodes the approximate surprise of experienced rewards, states, and
the agent’s actions in different possible contexts (see Appendix). The more expected the
rewards and actions are for a context, the lower this free energy, and the higher the posterior
probability which the agent assigns to this context. As a result, an agent will infer to be in a
stable context as long as rewards and actions are as expected, while it will infer a context
change if outcomes and actions are unexpected. Note that, initially, before encountering any
context, the prior over contexts p′ (c1) cannot be set to be uniform. It needs to have a bias
towards one of the contexts, so that the agent knows to associate the experienced reward
contingencies with the respective context. Which context is assumed to come first is not
important, but we found that the agent’s (intuitive) belief that it is most likely in some context
is essential for the learning process.
The posterior beliefs about the reward probabilities are again a product of Dirichlet distri-
butions, whose parameters are updated as
q
(
φ|βk
)
=
∏
j,n
1
B
(
βkj,n
)∏
i
φ
βkijn−1
ijn
βkijn = β
k−1
ijn + q (ck = n)
t∑
m=1
δi,rmδj,sm
(3.8)
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which corresponds to updating pseudo counts βkijn. The pseudo counts help keep track of
how often the agent has seen a specific reward i in a specific state j and context n. Each time a
new reward is generated in a state, these counts are increased by q (ck). This way, the counts
are high for context with high posterior probability and corresponding observed sequence of
reward-state pairs, and low otherwise. At the beginning of a new episode, this posterior will
become the new prior, which corresponds to a learning rule in between episodes.
The agent can now use its new knowledge about the rules of its environment to plan into
the future and evaluate actions based on their expected outcomes. In order to plan ahead,
it calculates its beliefs about future states q (sτ ) and resulting future rewards q (rτ ) in the
current episode. These beliefs are calculated using belief propagation update rules (see
Appendix). If a policy π predictably leads to states which yield desirable rewards, as encoded
by the outcome preference p
(
R = 1|rτ
)
, this policy has a low policy-specific free energy (low
surprise) F
(
π|ck
)
. The posterior beliefs over policies are computed as
q
(
π|ck
)
∝ p′
(
π|ck
)
exp
(
−F
(
π|ck
))
; ln p′
(
π|ck
)
=
∫
dθq (θ) ln p
(
π|θ, ck
)
(3.9)
where the free energy corresponds to the log-likelihood in a simple Bayes equation. Im-
portantly, the log-likelihood represents the agent’s goal-directed, value-based evaluation of
actions, as it assigns them a value based on predicted future rewards. Additionally, the poste-
rior beliefs contain a prior p′
(
π|ck
)
, which assigns an a priori weight to different policies or
actions (Doshi-Velez, Wingate, Roy, & Tenenbaum, 2010; Todorov, 2009; K. Friston, FitzGerald,
Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016). In our work, this prior plays an important
role, as we propose to interpret this prior as the habit of an agent. This is well motivated,
because such a context-specific prior implements a planning-independent, i.e. value-free,
tendency to choose an action (Miller et al., 2019). The agent then samples its next action from
the posterior above, which is the product of the prior times the likelihood. Critically, this leads
to an automatic weighting, i.e. arbitration, between goal-directed control (the likelihood) and
habitual control (the prior) of the agent’s next action.
At the end of an episode, after having sampled a policy and executed the respective actions,
the agent updates its posterior beliefs about the prior over policies
q
(
θ|αk
)
=
∏
n
1
B
(
αkn
) ∏
l
θ
αkln−1
ln
αkln = α
k−1
ln + q
(
π = l|ck = n
)
q (ck = n)
(3.10)
which constitutes habit learning in our model. Here, the pseudo counts αkln are increased
when a policy is chosen in a specific context. After the episode, this posterior becomes
the new prior, in order to enable learning across episodes. Note that this implements a
tendency to repeat previous actions on one hand, but also to repeat behavior which has been
successful in the past. While the prior is independent from the goal-directed evaluation in the
likelihood, it is based on which policies were previously chosen. This in turn is influenced by
the goal-directed evaluation at the time when they were chosen. In other words, the habit and
the outcome rules are learned conjointly. This is an important point because it means that
goal-directed control and habit learning are intertwined in a specific way, see also Discussion.
The way the policy pseudo counts α0ln are initialized before the first interaction with any
context plays a critical role in how an agent learns a habit. Low initial counts α0ln = αinit = 1
(for every l, n) mean that each time a new policy is chosen in a context, the pseudo count
increases by a value between 0 and 1 (the posterior over contexts), which increased the count
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substantially. As a result, the prior over policies becomes fairly pronounced very quickly. In
contrast, a high initial count αinit = 100 means that habits are learned a lot slower, as adding
one to this value will have little influence on the prior probability of the corresponding policy.
Therefore, we will define a habitual tendency as
h =
1
αinit
∈ [0, 1] (3.11)
which we will consider a free model parameter with respect to which we will investigate
behavioral differences. A high habitual tendency close to 1 will lead to an agent being a strong
habit learner and exhibiting fast habit acquisition, while a low habitual tendency close to 0
will lead to a a weak habit learning with a low habit learning rate.
3.3.5 Simulation analyses
In this section, we will define quantities which we will use to illustrate our results. Specifically,
we will want to investigate how agents infer contexts, using the posterior over contexts q (ck),
and how agents choose actions, using the marginalized posterior over policies
q (π) =
∑
ck
q
(
π|ck
)
q (ck) (3.12)
Specifically, to replicate standard results from experimental research, we will report simula-
tions in an environment with two contexts C = {c1, c2} and two actions A = {a1, a2}. We set
episodes to length T = 2, so that actions and policies map one to one, which corresponds to a
planning depth of 1. We use such short episodes here so that an episode is equivalent to one
trial in a habit learning experiment. Nonetheless, it is possible to have longer episodes with
increased planning depth in this model, which would endow an agent with the opportunity to
learn habits as sequences of actions (see Discussion).
As we have binary random variables, for both contexts and actions we can completely
capture the posterior beliefs with a single quantity, the posterior probability of being in second
context (Qc := q (ck = c2) ∈ [0, 1]) and the posterior probability of selecting the second option
(Qa := q (π = a2) ∈ [0, 1]). The posterior probability of being in first context, or selecting first
option are obtained as 1−Qc, and 1−Qa, respectively.
In a similar vein, we also define the likelihood La (k) :=
∑
ck
q (ck) exp
(
−F
(
π = a2|ck
))
/Zc
of the second option in order to illustrate the agents goal-directed system, and the prior
Pa (k) :=
∑
ck
q (ck) p
′ (π = a2|ck) to illustrate how an agent learns habits. The environment
will be set to context 1, in a training phase, and switched to context 2 in an extinction
phase. When the context switches, the posterior probabilities Qc, and Qa should transit from
being close to zero, to being close to one, expressing changes in the posterior beliefs as a
consequence of the changes in the underlying latent variables. Hence, we assume that the
belief trajectory can be fitted with a sigmoid function
Qa(k), Qc(k) ≈ σ
(
k|γa,c
)
=
γa,c1
1 + exp
(
−γa,c2
(
k − γa,c3
)) + γa,c4 (3.13)
The motivation for this approximation of the trajectory is to determine the trial or episode
(k∗) at which posterior beliefs Qc, and Qa transit from close to 0 to close to 1. The inflection
point is specified by the parameters γc3 and γa3 , for Qc and Qa respectively. We have used the
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implementation from Python3 SciPy 1.1.0 (Virtanen et al., 2019) of nonlinear curve fitting for
this procedure.
We also define a habit strengthH to quantify the strength of habitual control under different
conditions. We define the habit strength as the delay between the actual switch in context of
the environment, and the time point at which an agent adapts their behavior. The change in
context in our experiment relates to the switch between the training and extinction phases.
The time point of adaptation can be interpreted as the trial in which the posterior over actions
flips from close to 0 to close to 1. This equates to the inclination point of the sigmoid fitted to
the posterior over actions. We define the habit strength as
H = γa3 − dtraining ∈ [1, 100] (3.14)
as the difference between the fitted inclination point γa3 and the training duration dtraining. The
extinction phase in which we will test for habitual behavior will have 100 trials. As a result, the
habit strength can be between 1 and 100, where H = 1 indicates that an agent immediately
switched its behavior in the first trial of the extinction phase and showed no habitual control,
while H = 100 means that an agent failed to adapt within the extinction phase and therewith
showed full habitual control.
We used the implementation of t-test and ANOVA provided by the Scipy 1.1.0 (Virtanen et
al., 2019) package. Similarly, we performed the linear regression the implementation of the
ordinary least squares (the OLS class) provided in the StatsModels 0.10.1 (Seabold & Perktold,
2010) package.
3.4 Results
Having derived the update equations of the proposed model, we will now use a series of
simulated experiments to show how an artificial agent controls its behavior by balancing
between habitual and goal-directed control. In these simulations, we will use environments
where agents are required to adapt their behavior to context switches. In Section 3.4.1,
we will first introduce a task which captures key features of habit learning similar to animal
experiments, specifically contingency degradation and outcome devaluation, where we test
for habitual behavior in extinction. We will present six different results:
• We let two exemplary agents perform the task under contingency degradation, show
internal properties of the model, and how agents learn habitual behavior (Section 3.4.2).
• We demonstrate how internal model parameters, like the habitual tendency h = 1αinit ,
influence the agent’s information processing, behavior, and that an increased habitual
tendency increases habit strength after contingency degradation (Section 3.4.3).
• We show that the acquired habit strength depends on training duration (Section 3.4.4).
• We show a specific advantage of contextual habit learning, namely that contextual habits
allow optimized behavior to be retrieved quickly, when an agent is revisiting a previously
experienced context (Section 3.4.5).
• We show how environmental stochasticity, e.g. highly probabilistic rewards, leads to an
over-reliance on habitual behavior and increase habit strength (Section 3.4.6).
• We introduce outcome devaluation to the task and show that agents exhibit habitual be-
havior insensitive to contingency degradation and outcome devaluation (Section 3.4.7).
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3.4.1 Habit learning task
A common way to experimentally test for habit formation in animal experiments is contingency
degradation (Yin & Knowlton, 2006; Wood & Rünger, 2016). Here, an animal is probabilistically
rewarded after performing a specific action, e.g. pressing a lever. After a training period, in
which the animal learns action-outcome associations and potentially acquires a habit, habitual
behavior is measured in an extinction period. The outcome contingencies of the environment
are changed, and the lever press does not yield a reward any longer. Conversely, the animal is
often rewarded for abstaining from pressing the lever. After this change of contingencies, the
strength of habitual control is assessed as the continuation of lever pressing, where a higher
habit strength corresponds to more presses. For moderate training durations (∼ 50− 100
trials), the animal will have formed a weak or no habit, and seizes to press the lever rather
quickly. For extensive training (∼ 500 trials), experiments show that the animal will have
formed a strong habit and will continue to press the lever for an extended period of time
(∼ 50 trials), e.g. (Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; Adams, 1982).
Additionally, for behavior to be classified experimentally as habitual, it must be insensitive
to outcome devaluation (Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Here, animals undergo a similar training as
in contingency degradation experiments. Then, outcomes are devalued by either satiating
the animals, or by associating the reinforcer with an aversive outcome. Afterwards, behavior
is again tested in extinction, where a continuing of the lever press is interpreted as evidence
for habitual behavior, see e.g. (Adams, 1982). Typically, the strength of habitual behavior
also greatly depends on the reinforcement schedule (Yin & Knowlton, 2006), which may
be a ratio schedule, where each action leads to a reward with a specific probability, or an
interval schedule, where rewards are only distributed after a certain time has elapsed. Interval
schedules lead to a greater habit strength and decreased sensitivity to changes in outcome
contingencies.
To demonstrate that the proposed model can replicate these basic features of habit learning,
we approximate the experimental setup of a habit learning experiment in a simplified way,
by using a so-called two-armed bandit task, see Figure 3.3a. This way of modelling the task
follows previous modelling studies such as (Daw et al., 2005; S. W. Lee, Shimojo, & O’Doherty,
2014) and emulates probabilistically rewarded lever presses of the animal. In the proposed
habit learning task, an artificial agent can choose to perform either action a1, i.e. press a
left lever 1, or action a2 to press a right lever 2. Each lever pays out a reward according to
the reward generation rules Tr , and these probabilities will switch after certain number of
trials, emulating a contingency change, similar to habit learning experiments (Figure 3.3b). In
many habit learning experiments, the animals do not choose between two levers, but rather
between pressing a lever or abstaining from pressing, where abstaining is a viable option
due to opportunity costs. We approximated opportunity costs of not pressing the lever by
introducing a minimally rewarded second choice (lever 2) instead, see also similar approaches
taken in previous modelling studies (Daw et al., 2005; S. W. Lee et al., 2014; Keramati, Dezfouli,
& Piray, 2011; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Chersi, 2013; Gershman, Markman, & Otto, 2014).
The habit learning task has two phases (Figure 3.3b): The first phase is the training phase
which lasts dtraining = 100 trials. We will also vary this duration in Section 3.4.4. Here, lever
1 pays out a reward with ν = 0.9 probability, and lever 2 with 1 − ν = 0.1. These reward
probabilities are kept stable during the training period and the agent learns about outcome
contingencies and might form a habit. The second phase is the extinction phase which
lasts another 100 trials. Here, outcome probabilities are switched relative to the training
phase, and are kept stable for the remainder of the experiment. After the switch of outcome
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Figure 3.3: Habit learning task
a In each trial k, the agent can choose between pressing two levers (light and dark blue
boxes, lever in black next to the box) and is awarded probabilistically. We model this task as a
two-armed bandit task. b Reward schedule over 200 trials for the two levers. In the training
phase, lever 1 yields a reward with ν = 0.9 probability, while lever 2 only yields a reward with
1− ν = 0.1 probability. After 100 trials, the reward probabilities switch. The new contingencies
are stable for another 100 trials. This second stable period emulates an extinction phase,
where we will test the agent’s habit strength by how quickly it is able to adapt its choices. c An
agent solving the task. For the agent, each trial constitutes one behavioral episode. In episode
or trial k, the agent starts out in the state (position) in front of the two levers in the first time
step t = 1 of this episode. It observes its state and that there is no reward. The agent can now
infer the context Qc based on its experience in the previous trials. It retrieves the learned
outcome contingencies and habit Pa for this context from memory. It uses its knowledge
about the reward structure to plan forward and evaluate actions based on the likelihood
La, where actions which lead more likely to a reward will have a higher likelihood encoding
the goal-directed value. The agent combines the likelihood and the prior to evaluate the
posterior over actions Qa and samples a new action at from this posterior, for example action
a1. In between episodes, this action is executed and the agent transitions to the new state,
pressing lever 1. At the beginning of the next time step t = 2, a reward may be distributed,
depending on the action and lever the agent chose. It then updates its context inference Qc
based on the perceived state-reward pair, learns the outcome rules, and updates its habit Pa.
This process repeats until the last trial k = 200. d Illustration of the sigmoid function used to
analyse the time evolution of the posterior over actions Qa (see Section 3.3.5 for details). The
a as a superscript on the parameters signifies that these are the parameters for the posterior
over actions. We define the habit strength H as the difference between the inflection point
of the posterior beliefs (γa3 ) and the trial number at which the context changed dtraining.
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contingencies, we quantify an agent’s habit strength as the number of trials before an agent
adapts its behavior and primarily presses lever 2 instead of lever 1, see section ’Simulation
analyses’ in Methods. Note that in our simulations, due to our agent setup, a trial is equivalent
to a behavioral episode for an agent, see Figure 3.3c for an exemplary episode in which the
agent interacts with the habit learning task.
This experimental setup emulates the training and extinction phases of a contingency
degradation habit learning experiment. It can be transformed into a outcome devaluation
experiment by modulating the agent’s preference for outcomes (p
(
R = 1|rt
)
, see Section 3.3.2
and Appendix) after the training phase. In order to disentangle these two effects, we will
restrict our simulated experiments to contingency degradation in most of the following
sections. In the last section, we will show habitual behavior under outcome devaluation.
Note that the two phases of the experiment (Figure 3.3b) can be viewed as a sequence
of two contexts, where in each context one of the two choices returns higher expected
reward. Importantly, the agent is initially not explicitly aware how any context is associated
with a specific set of outcome rules. Instead, the agent learns to associate the outcome
rules it first experiences with the first context. When the contingencies change, it will infer
the change and learn to associate the new rules with a second context. By design in our
experiment, this corresponds to associating contexts with preferable levers. In some habit
learning experiments, contexts are cued and habitual behavior is used in response as form
of stimulus response association, e.g. (Sage & Knowlton, 2000). In our habit learning task,
we do not use a cue to indicate the context to the agent. This is in line with typical animal
experiments where the extinction phase is not cued. Instead, the state, i.e. the position of
the agent in front of the levers is observable and takes the role of a stimulus.
3.4.2 Habit learning under contingency degradation
In this section, we illustrate, in detail, how agents based on the proposed model learn about
their environment, form beliefs, acquire habits, select actions, and balance goal-directed
and habitual control, see Methods and Figure 3.1. As the habitual tendency parameter h
has a strong influence on habit learning and action selection, we will show two exemplary
simulations of a an agent with strong (h = 1.0) and another agent with a weak (h = 0.01)
habitual tendency performing the task (Figure 3.3). In the following, we refer to these two
agents as the strong habit learner (h = 1.0) and the weak habit learner (h = 0.01). Note that,
in this section, for didactic purposes, we will describe model behavior on just single instances
of two representative agents. This is followed by more thorough simulations, where we also
quantify the uncertainty over model variables using multiple experiments for each agent.
When an agent is first put into the task environment, it has no prior knowledge about
the outcome contingencies associated with any context, and no prior preference for any
actions p′
(
a1|c1 = c1/c2
)
=
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)T
, i.e. there is no habit yet. What the agent does know,
is that action 1 means pressing lever 1, and action 2 means pressing lever 2, so that it has
an accurate representation of the state transition matrices p
(
st+1|st,at
)
. Furthermore, the
agent has a prior over contexts with a bias towards context 1 (see Methods).
In the first trial, the agent has not sampled any reward yet, so it chooses an action a1
randomly as it does not have any knowledge available to predict the outcome of actions.
According to the action chosen, the agent goes to and presses the respective lever, and
receives a reward or no reward. At the end of the trial, as this also marks the end of a
behavioral episode, the agent updates its prior Pa to increase the a priori probability to repeat
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this chosen action, and updates its knowledge about the reward structure (see Figure 3.1 and
Figure 3.3c). As the agent started with a biased prior over contexts, it associates this reward
structure with context 1. Hence, the prior bias for context 1 simply reflects agent knowledge
that it can be in only one context initially.
At the start of the second trial, the agent infers that it is most likely in context 1 (Qc), based on
its previous experience and its knowledge about the stability of the environment. It retrieves
the reward structure and the prior Pa over actions it just learned. The agent can now use
this new knowledge about outcome contingencies in the current context to evaluate the
likelihood La. In order to select an action, it calculates the posterior beliefs over actions Qa as
the product of the prior Pa, which represents habits as an automatic and value-free tendency
to repeat actions, and the likelihood La, which represents the goal-directed and value-based
evaluation of anticipated future rewards (see Eq. 3.9). The agent then samples an action
a2 from these posterior beliefs about actions, dynamically adjusting the balance between
goal-directed and habitual choices. The agent visits and presses the lever it just chose and
samples a reward. At the end of this trial and behavioral episode, the agent reevaluates its
beliefs about the context Qc, based on if the new observations still fit to its knowledge about
this context. The agent also updates its prior over actions Pa (the representation of a habit),
hence increasing the prior probability of that action being repeated. Similarly, the agent
updates its knowledge about the reward structure, based on its beliefs about the context.
This update cycle is repeated over all future trials, see Figure 3.3c and Section 3.3.4.
Figure 3.4 shows the resulting dynamics of the relevant agent variables (Qc, La, Pa, Qa, ak)
for the strong (left) and weak (right column) habit learner during all 200 trials in the habit
learning task. In the training phase, the beliefs over context Qc converge rather quickly and
after about 10 trials, the two agents are certain of being in context 1 (see Figure 3.4a). Figure
3.4b) shows the likelihood over actions La, reflecting the expected choice value, that is, the
estimated surprise in reaching a goal (observing a rewarding outcome). As the likelihood
depends on the learned knowledge about the environment, it takes both weak and strong
habit learners around 30 trials to observe enough outcomes before the likelihood converges
to a stable value. Figure 3.4c) shows the prior over actions Pa, i.e. the representation of
a habit. Here, the difference between the strong and weak habit learner is obvious: The
strong habit learner (left) forms a strong habit quickly (Pa < 0.1) after only 40 trials. This
means, the strong habit learner has a very high a priori probability 1− Pa of choosing action
1 independent of the expected rewards. Conversely, the weak habit learner updates its prior
over actions rather slowly (Pa ∈ [0.4, 0.6]). The second to last row (Figure 3.4d)) shows the
posterior over actions Qa, which is the product of the prior and the likelihood. For the weak
habit learner, the prior has little to no influence, as it is close to 0.5, so that the posterior over
actions looks similar to the likelihood. For the strong habit learner, the strong prior lets the
posterior over actions converge to values close to 1.0 within 40 trials. The agents sample their
actions from this posterior probability, which are shown in the bottom row (Figure 3.4e)). The
strong habit learner chooses the action with the higher expected reward more consistently
(94% of choices), while the weak habit learner continues to choose action 2 even late into the
training period. As a result, the weak habit learner has a significantly lower success rate (80%,
p = 0.003, two sample t-test on the chosen actions in the training phase of two agents shown
here).
In the extinction phase, after the switch in trial 100, the reward contingencies become
reversed. When continuing to press lever 1, the agents are only rewarded with a probability
of 1 − ν = 0.1. The lack of expected reward payout produces a prediction error which
increases the context-specific free energy (see Section 3.3.4). This drives the agents to quickly
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Figure 3.4: The dynamics of key internal variables of contextual habit learning agents during
the habit learning task
The left column shows the dynamics for a strong (h = 1.0) habit learner and the right column
for a weak (h = 0.01) habit learner. a The first row shows the agent’s inference, the posterior
beliefs over contexts Qa, i.e. the estimated probability of being in context 2. The pink dots
are the agents’ posterior beliefs in each trial of the task. The pink solid line is a fitted sigmoid,
where its inclination point γc3 indicates when the posterior changes from representing context
1 to context 2. The light and dark blue lines are the reward probabilities of levers 1 and 2,
respectively (see Figure 3.3). b The brown dots in the second row show the (normalized)
likelihood La over actions. The likelihood encodes the goal-directed, anticipated value of
actions, given the learned outcome contingencies. c The brown dots in the third row show
the prior over actions Pa, which encodes how likely the agent is a priori to select lever 2 and
is a representation of the agent’s habit. d The fourth row shows the posterior over actions
Qa, which is the product of the prior and the likelihood. The brown dots show the posterior
in each trial of the task, and the brown solid line shows a fitted sigmoid, whose inclination
point can be interpreted as the trial at which an agent adapts its actions (see Figure 3.3d). e
The brown dots in the bottom row show the chosen actions, which were sampled from the
posterior over actions.
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infer that the previously inferred context 1 is no longer an appropriate representation of
the environment (see Figure 3.4a). Instead, the agents switch to believing to be in a new
(second) context, and learn reward contingencies and habits for this context. The weak habit
learner infers the context switch slightly earlier than the strong habit learner, at trials 103
and 107, respectively. According to the proposed model, the agents’ context inference not
only depends on surprising outcomes but also on the agents’ own actions (see Section 3.3.4).
The strong habit learner behaves highly consistently, even after the switch, and therefore is
delayed in its context inference, relative to the weak habit learner. Note that the time point of
this switch in beliefs was measured as the inflection point of a sigmoid fitted to the beliefs
over time (a; solid line), see 3.3.5 and Figure 3.3d for a detailed explanation of how we used
the parameters of the sigmoid.
Following context inference, the agents learn the new reward contingencies (see Figure 3.4b)
and new habits (see Figure 3.4c) for context 2. Since this learning takes place after the context
inference step, the posterior over policies is updated with a delay with respect to the context
inference. As the agents sample their actions from the posterior, we can measure the trial at
which they adapt their actions to press mostly lever 2 as the inflection point of the posterior.
As with the posterior over contexts, we fitted a sigmoid (solid lines in Figure 3.4d) to calculate
the time point of action adaptation, see Section 3.3.5 and Figure 3.3d.
In the following, we will call the time point (in trials) of action adaptation after the contingency
change the habit strength, see 3.3.5. A value of 1 corresponds to the lowest possible habit
strength, while a value of 100 means that an agent completely failed to adapt its behavior. This
quantification is in line with the animal literature, where the amount of habitual behavioral
control is measured by how often animals continue to choose the previously reinforced action
after contingency degradation. As expected, the strong habit learner adapts its behavior later
than the weak habit learner, at trials 116 and 107, respectively. This means the strong habit
learner has a habit strength of 16 and the weak habit learner of 7.
The actions after the contingency switch in Figure 3.4e reflect this quantification of habit
strength. The strong habit learner continues to choose lever 1 for around 10 trials, before it
adapts and mostly consistently chooses lever 2 after 20 trials. The weak habit learner adapts
earlier, but behaves less consistently and requires a longer transition period where both
actions are chosen. However, due to the faster adaptation, in the first 15 trials after the switch,
the weak habit learner exhibits a higher performance (chooses lever 2 in 47% of trials) than
the strong habit learner (7% of trials, p = 0.012, two sample t-test on the actions in the first 15
trials after the switch).
The strong habit learner is able to recover its performance in the remainder of the extinction
phase, where the task context is once again stable. Here, it not only learns the new reward
contingencies, but a strong prior for action 2 (Figure 3.4c), so that it is again able to choose
lever 2 more consistently, relative to the weak habit learner (92% vs 78%, p = 0.01, two sample
t-test on the actions in trials 116− 200).
In summary, we found that a more pronounced prior causes as a stronger habit, as mea-
sured by the number of trial in the extinction phase before behavior is adapted. Critically, the
mechanism is that a strong prior (Figure 3.4c) increases the certainty in the agent’s posterior
over actions (Figure 3.4d) and thereby its selection of the action (Figure 3.4e) with the higher
expected reward. We found that as long as the environment is stable, the strong habit learner
chooses the more rewarding option more reliably. This is the case in the training phase until
the switch, and – after a brief adaptation period – after the switch. The strong habit learner
exhibits less optimal behavior, in terms of obtained reward and relative to the weak habit
learner, only immediately after the switch. This indicates that being a strong habit learner is
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Figure 3.5: Habit strength as a function of the habitual tendency
For values of habitual tendency between 0.01 and 1.0, we plot the time points (in trials) of
an inferred switch in context (pink solid line) and the habit strength (brown solid line). We
measure habit strength as the time point of action adaptation after the switch, see Methods.
For each habitual tendency value, we plot the median of 200 simulated runs, where the shaded
areas represent the confidence interval of 95% around the median. We found a significant
correlation between habitual tendency and habit strength (p < 0.001) and between habitual
tendency and context inference (p = 0.01). The x-axis is logarithmically scaled.
useful for an agent, as long as contexts do not switch too often.
In addition, note that the effect of an increased certainty in action selection caused by the
prior over actions is similar to a dynamic adjustment in decision temperature. Here, we did
not use a decision temperature in our decision rule, as would be usually done in modeling
noisy behavior (of participants), see Methods. Rather, we let the influence of the prior take
this role. In the proposed context-specific model, this seems well motivated as the prior is
learned conjointly with the reward contingencies, and indirectly reflects which behaviors have
been successful in the past. This means that, in the proposed model, learned habits express
themselves not only as an a priori preference for an action, but also as a dynamic adjustment
of a decision temperature.
3.4.3 Habitual tendency increases habit strength
To generalize the effect of the habitual tendency on an agent’s beliefs and behavior, we anal-
ysed agents with different values of the habitual tendency h, where we repeated simulations
for each value 200 times, see Figure 3.5. The results confirm the conclusions drawn in the
previous section: (i) All agents, independent of habitual tendency infer the context change
quickly (within the first 5 trials after the switch), where strong habit learners infer the switch
slightly later (p = 0.01, linear regression on the median values). (ii) Behavioral adaptation is
at least 5 trials delayed compared to context switch inference. We find that acquired habit
strength increases with the habitual tendency of an agent (p < 0.001, linear regression on the
median values).
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Figure 3.6: Habit strength as a function of training duration dtraining
The x-axis is scaled logarithmically. The solid line represents a strong habit learner with a
habitual tendency of h = 1.0, the dashed line a medium habit learner with h = 0.1, and the
dotted line a weak habit learner with h = 0.01. The lines show the medians estimated over
n = 200 repeated simulations for each level of the habitual tendency h. The shaded area
shows the 95% confidence interval. A habit strength of 100 means that the posterior choice
probability Qa remains smaller than .5 during the entire 100 trials of the extinction phase.
3.4.4 Training duration increases habit strength
Here, we show that our proposed model is able to capture experimental findings that acquired
habit strength depends on the amount of training a participant received. To test this, we
simulated agents in the same habit learning task as above (see Figure 3.3) but now vary the
length of the training phase dtraining before the extinction phase.
In Figure 3.6 we plot the habit strength (see Methods) for three representative agents
with different habitual tendencies (strong (h = 1.0), medium (h = 0.1), weak (h = 0.01)) as a
function of training duration. For moderate training period durations (dtraining ≤ 100 trials),
agents develop a relatively low habit strength and adapt their behavior rather quickly, within
20 trials. Although the differences are small for moderate training lengths, we find, as in
the previous section, a significant correlation between habit strength and habitual tendency
(p < 0.001, linear regression on the median values).
For longer training durations, habit strength is generally increasing. For very long training
durations, both the strong and medium habit learner fail to adapt their behavior within the
extinction period of 100 trials. The strong habit learner cannot adapt for a training duration
dtraining ≥ 1000, and the medium habit learner for a training duration greater 5000. The weak
habit learner exhibits only a slight increase in habit strength as a function of training duration.
In summary, these results stress the role of learning a prior over actions, where we interpret
a strong prior as the representation of a habit, see e.g. Figure 3.4d. The longer the training
period, the more pronounced the prior of a specific action will be, while the likelihood stabilizes
after contingencies have been learnt properly (around 40 trials). Therefore the prior’s influence
on context inference and action adaptation increases with longer training periods, so that
agents choose the previously reinforced action longer and longer in the extinction phase.
The exact training duration at which adaptation starts to be delayed and fail depends on an
agent’s individual habitual tendency, where a higher tendency leads to a fail in adaptation for
shorter training periods. This is in line with the literature on moderate and extensive training,
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where extensive training leads to increased habit strength (Seger & Spiering, 2011).
3.4.5 Retrieval of previously learned context-specific habits
So far, we have assessed how habits can be represented as a prior over policies, where
this prior is learned in a context-specific fashion. Here, we show a specific advantage of
this context-specificity: The agent can recognize a previously experienced context by the
associated contingencies and retrieve its habit (i.e., prior over actions) and learned reward
generation rules for this context (Bouton & Bolles, 1979). As the prior implements a tendency
to repeat actions, and actions were chosen according to their usefulness (i.e., likelihood
of being chosen, see Fig. 3.1), habits in the proposed model represent which behavior is
advantageous in a specific context. Therefore, recognizing the context and reusing previously
established priors corresponds to a retrieval of previously learned optimal behavior, i.e.,
habits.
In Figure 3.7, we show the design of the ’habit retrieval experiment’, which is an extension
habit learning task. As before, we first let agents experience the two contexts for 100 trials
each, and call this the learning phase of the experiment. Critically, there is an, additional
phase, the retrieval phase, where we place agents again into context 1 for 100 trials. In the first
trial of this retrieval phase, we induce maximal uncertainty about the context by setting the
agents’ prior over contexts to p (c201) = (0.5, 0.5)T . Here, we wanted to emulate a situation
where an agent knows there is a context change, but not to which context, akin to a mouse
being taken out of its home cage into the experimental setup. If we had kept the prior over
contexts as the old posterior from the last trial of the learning phase, we would induce habit
effects where agents delay adaptation for the reasons discussed in the previous sections.
The setup is similar to the experimental setup used in (Bouton & Bolles, 1979; Gershman et
al., 2010). To compare ’experienced’ agents with agents that have not learned yet context 1,
we implement ’naive’ agents, as in Section 3.4.2.
To quantify the advantage of the retrieval of previously learned context-specific behavior,
we first measured how long it takes a naive agent to converge to a stable beliefs level about
context 1 in the learning phase (Figure 3.8a). To evaluate the convergence times to a stable
knowledge for naive agents, we fit again a sigmoid to the posterior over contexts and actions
in the learning phase (as in Figure 3.4, see also Methods). We interpret the left asymptote γa,c4
of the sigmoid as the stable level of knowledge the agents eventually reach. We calculate the
convergence time as the trial in which the posterior crosses the left asymptote for the first
time. We compare this duration to how long experienced agents take to recognize the known
context 1 in the retrieval phase and reuse their previously learned behavior. To compute
convergence times for the experienced agent, we determined the first trial in the retrieval
phase where the posterior is lower than the left asymptote which was fitted for the learning
phase.
These convergence times, as a function of habitual tendency, are shown in Figure 3.8
for both the naive and the experienced agents. We discussed the initial development and
convergence of the posteriors shown in Figure 3.4 for single runs of agents in Section 3.4.2.
The results here are a quantification of these for different habitual tendencies using 200 runs
each. Naive agents (see Figure 3.8a) are able to achieve a stable level of knowledge for the
context in around 8 trials, if they have a low habitual tendency (e.g. 0.02), and in around 5
trials, if they have a high habitual tendency (1.0). As discussed above, context convergence
time are faster for higher habitual tendency, because these depend partially on the agent’s
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Figure 3.7: The habit retrieval experiment
A 300 trial experiment consisting of a learning phase (equivalent to the whole habit task, see
Figure 3.3) with 200 trials, and a new, additional habit retrieval phase with 100 trials. The light
blue line shows the probability of lever 1 paying out a reward, and the dark blue line shows
the probability of lever 2 paying out a reward. The vertical dashed line indicates the switch
from the learning to the retrieval phase. In the retrieval phase, the agent revisits context 1,
where outcome contingencies are exactly the same as in the first 100 trials of the experiment.
Figure 3.8: Convergence times of the posteriors as a function of the habitual tendency h
a Convergence times of the posterior beliefs over contexts (pink) and actions (brown) in
naive agents who visit context 1 for the first time, see main text how convergence times
were quantified. The shaded areas indicate a confidence interval of 95%. A naive agent takes
around 7 trials to converge to stable beliefs about its context. It takes around 40 trials to
converge to a stable posterior over actions, indicating the time it takes to learn a stable
representation of the action-outcome contingencies for this context. b Convergence times of
the posterior beliefs in naive agents who visit context 1 for the second time. An experienced
agent takes 1 to 2 trials to recognize it is in the known context 1. It almost instantly retrieves
its knowledge about outcome contingencies and its habit for this context, and thereby its
posterior over actions, so that the action adaptation happens maximal one trial later.
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own more consistent behavior. Action convergence times mainly depend on learning the
outcome rules and the resulting likelihood, which takes, for the naive agent, with around
40− 45 trials a lot longer than context inference. We find that these times are not influenced
by an agent’s habitual tendency.
For experienced agents, both, recognition of the known context, as well as reusing the old
outcome rules and habits, happens almost instantaneously, within first 3 trials of the retrieval
phase, see Figure 3.8b. As a consequence of these faster convergence times, experienced
agents choose the optimal lever more often in the retrieval phase than in the first half (context
1) of the learning phase (94% vs 87%, p < 0.001, two-sample t-test, averaged over all habitual
tendencies). In addition, we find that agents continue to learn outcome contingencies and
habits during the renewed exposure to context 1 (data not shown). Importantly, in terms of
behavior, for both the naive and experienced agent, the percentage of choosing the optimal
action increases with habitual tendency (naive: p = 0.001; experienced: p = 0.036; linear
regression on the median values). This finding provides another hint that being a strong
habit learner might be advantageous if one’s environment is mostly stable except for sudden
switches to already known contexts, see also Discussion.
3.4.6 Environmental stochasticity increases habit strength
In this section, we examine how environmental stochasticity, namely the probability of observ-
ing a reward, interacts with the habit learning process (DeRusso et al., 2010). We again let
artificial agents perform in the habit learning task (see Figure 3.3). We varied the probability
of receiving a reward ν in both the training and extinction phases from ν = 1.0 (completely
deterministic) to ν = 0.6 (highly stochastic, where a 0.5 probability would mean that outcomes
are purely random). In the extinction phase, lever 1 has probability ν to pay out a reward,
while lever 2 pays out a reward with a probability of 1− ν. These probabilities are reversed in
the extinction phase.
Figure 3.9 shows the habit strength, measured in the extinction phase as a function of
environmental stochasticity 1 − ν. As before, we used three agents with different habitual
tendencies (strong (h = 1.0), medium (h = 0.1), weak (h = 0.01)). In a fully deterministic
environment (1− ν = 0), all three agents have a similarly low habit strength (below 10). The
agents infer the context switch immediately (not shown) and adapt their behavior shortly
after. When the reward probability is ν = 0.9 and the stochasticity is 1 − ν = 0.1, we find
habit strengths between 7 and 15, which replicates the result shown in Figure 3.5. For
more stochastic rewards, we find that for all three agents the habit strength increases with
stochasticity, until they fail to adapt within the extinction phase. In addition, one can see that
the habit strength is higher, the higher the habitual tendency of the agent is (p < 0.03 for a
ANOVA on parameters of fitted exponential functions), and the exact amount of stochasticity
agents can handle before they fail to adapt depends on the agent’s habitual tendency.
In the model, this effect is due to two factors: First, as the environment becomes more
stochastic, it is harder for an agent to detect the switch contingencies. This delays context
inference and thereby action adaptation. Second, the likelihood encoding the goal-directed
value is less pronounced in a stochastic environment, as it maps to the decreased probability
of achieving a reward for an action. In the model, the agent samples actions from the posterior,
which is the product of the likelihood and the prior. If the likelihood is less pronounced, the
habits, as represented by the prior, will automatically gain more weight in the posterior,
leading to an increased reliance on habitual behavior in a stochastic environment. Intuitively,
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Figure 3.9: Habit strength as a function of environmental stochasticity 1− ν
The three habit learners (strong, medium, weak) develop stronger habits if the reward scheme
is more stochastic, i.e. reward probabilities ν are lower. Solid line: strong habit learner with
h = 1.0; dashed line: medium habit learner with h = 0.1; dotted line: weak habit learner with
h = 0.01. The shaded area surrounding the lines is the confidence interval of 95%. A habit
strength of 100 means that the agent does not adapt its behavior within the extinction period
of 100 trials.
this means that a decrease in goal-directed value of actions gives way to a stronger influence
of habits. Conversely, habits are also learned more slowly in more stochastic environments
because actions are not chosen as consistently because of the decreased goal-directed value.
We will come back to the important implications of these findings in the Discussion.
3.4.7 Outcome devaluation
In this final results section, we show that the proposed model can also qualitatively replicate
results from outcome devaluation studies, e.g. (Adams, 1982). We modified the habit learning
task (Figure 3.3) by introducing an outcome devaluation in the extinction phase, in addition to
the switch in outcome rules. This was done by reducing the prior preference for the reward
of lever 1 but not lever 2 in the extinction phase (for details see Appendix).
In general, we find that the outcome devaluation results in a discontinuous jump in the
likelihood, as the devalued reward means that action 1 suddenly has no more goal-directed
value (data not shown) while action 2 remains useful. Nonetheless, we can apply the same
analyses as in Section 3.4.3 to show the effect of habitual tendency on habit strength under
outcome devaluation.
Figure 3.10 shows, as a function of habitual tendency, (i) the trials numbers in the extinction
phase when agents inferred a switch in context and (ii) habit strengths. Independent of
habitual tendency (p = 0.54, linear regression), agents infer the context switch slightly earlier
than in the task without outcome devaluation (median trials 2.4 vs 3.6, p < 0.001, two-sample
t-test). As before, agents with a low habitual tendency (≤ 0.02) only develop a very weak habit
within the training phase of 100 trials (see Figure 3.4c). When the usefulness of actions now
changes due to the devaluation, these agents can instantly, at the beginning of the extinction
phase, adapt their behavior to start pressing lever 2. Agents with a higher habitual tendency
(≥ 0.1) on the other hand, learn a pronounced habit during training. As a result, these strong
habit learners show in the extinction phase after devaluation a delayed action adaptation and
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Figure 3.10: Context inference and action adaptation in the devaluation experiment
Pink line: Time points in the extinction period of when agents infer a switch in context,
as a function of the habitual tendency. Brown line: habit strength, as a function of the
habitual tendency. The x-axis is logarithmically scaled. This figure is based on the same
analysis methods as Figure 3.5, but here we analyzed the posteriors in an environment with
contingency degradation and outcome devaluation.
thereby a habit strength greater 1 (up to 4). Generally, as before, a higher habitual tendency
leads to a greater habit strength (p < 0.001, linear regression on the medians).
Clearly, we found a devaluation effect for agents with a habitual tendency h ≥ 0.1. Although
the habit strengths are fairly low, we found that if we increase the training duration to more
extensive training (≥ 500 trials), habit strength increases, so that even weak habit learners
show a habit strength greater than 1, and strong habit learners have a habit strength of up to
8 (data not shown).
While these effects are lower than in the contingency degradation experiment, these results
show that our model can in principle emulate habitual behavior in both classical experimental
designs, contingency degradation and outcome devaluation (Yin & Knowlton, 2006).
3.5 Discussion
In this paper, we proposed a Bayesian contextual habit learning model. In this model, habits
are the prior over policies, which implements an a priori and value-free bias to repeat previous
policies, while the goal-directed evaluation is represented by a likelihood, which encodes the
anticipated goal-directed value of policies. An agent who uses this model for action selection
samples actions from the posterior, which is the product of the prior times the likelihood. One
of the key results is that this rather simple procedure implements an adaptive and automatic
balancing of goal-directed and habitual control. An important ingredient for this procedure to
work is that habits and outcome rules are learned in a context-specific manner so that an agent
can learn and retrieve specific habits and outcome rules for each context it encounters. We
used a free (adjustable) parameter to model a trait-like habitual tendency h, which determines
the learning rate of the prior over policies, and thereby the acquisition speed of the habit. We
introduced a habit learning task with a training and extinction phase, and showed the basic
properties of an agent’s information processing employing the model. Using agent-based
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simulated experiments, we were able to show that our model captures important properties
of experimentally established habit learning: insensitivity to both contingency degradation
and outcome devaluation, increased habit strength both with extended training duration
and with increased environmental stochasticity, and near-instantaneous recovery of habits
when exposed to a previously experienced context. We also found that the habitual tendency
interacts with these effects: Agents with higher habitual tendencies exhibit increased habitual
contributions to control and habit strength in all of these experimental conditions.
In recent years, several approaches to computationally model goal-directed and habitual
behavior have been proposed. An often used interpretation of two distinct habitual and
goal-directed systems has been the mapping to model-free and model-based reinforcement
learning (Daw et al., 2011). Here, the model-free system implements an action evaluation
based on which actions have been rewarding in the past. The model-based system implements
goal-directed forward planning resting on a Markov decision process. Typically, these models
have to be run in parallel and require an additional arbitration unit, which evaluates both
systems and assigns a weight to each, determining the respective influence on action selection,
see e.g. (S. W. Lee et al., 2014). However, it seems an open question, whether model-free
learning can be indeed mapped to habitual control. For example, (Friedel et al., 2014) were
able to map model-based reinforcement learning to goal-directed behavior but failed to find
such a relation for habitual behavior and model-free reinforcement learning, see also (Wood
& Rünger, 2016) for a recent review about the relationship between habitual control and
model-free learning.
To resolve this issue, (Miller, Ludvig, Pezzulo, & Shenhav, 2018) proposed to map habitual
behavior to a value-free system, which implements a tendency to repeat actions. In this
view, the goal-directed system corresponds to a value-based system, which includes model-
based as well as model-free reinforcement learning, and both systems are arbitrated using an
additional arbitration unit. Our model aligns with this proposal, as we model the prior as based
on pseudo-counts which indicate how often an action has been chosen in the past. As a result,
an action will have a higher habitual weight if it has been chosen more often, implementing
a habit based on repetition of previous behavior. Goal-directed control is described based
on a Markov decision process as well, which in our model is solved using Bayesian methods,
instead of reinforcement learning. Despite these conceptual similarities with regard to the
interpretation of the nature of habitual behavior, the proposed value-free model is fairly
different from the model presented here. A key difference is that we used a hierarchical
model to implement context-dependent learning, which we found essential for reproducing
key features of habitual behavior. Furthermore, our model does not require an additional
arbitration unit with additional computational costs. Rather, in the present model, habitual
and goal-directed contributions are balanced directly using Bayes rule. In other words, we
interpret experimental evidence for habitual and goal-directed control not as evidence for a
dichotomy that competes for action control. Rather, we see action control as a probabilistic
inference problem, where two sources of information are integrated: The likelihood which
looks at the situation at hand, and the prior which is shaped by past experience.
There have been other Bayesian proposals to habit learning, particularly using active infer-
ence. (FitzGerald et al., 2014a) and (K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, &
Pezzulo, 2016) regarded habits in a similar manner to model-free learning, and implemented
them as an additional simplified policy. This approach is therefor fundamentally different
from and potentially complementary to ours. Nonetheless, we think it possible that the brain
uses both value-free as well as model-free learning processes, so that it would not be unrea-
sonable to assume that both contribute to action selection. (Maisto et al., 2019) regarded
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habits as cached values of the likelihood calculated in previous trials of the experiment. This
means that the likelihood was only calculated when first encountering a new context, and
is then kept stable and cached as long as the context does not change. These proposals of
a Bayesian treatment of habit learning are different from (and possibly complementary to)
our approach, as we view habits as a prior over actions or policies, and not related to the
likelihood (which in our model represents goal-directed control). Under extensive training
regimes, both approaches might lead to similar results. However, under limited training, when
both, goal-directed and habitual control influence behavioral control, our approach may lead
to more plausible behavior in this regime because of the balancing of the two contributions.
Furthermore, there are other proposals to view reinforcement, contingency degradation,
and outcome devaluation experiments as a context inference and rule learning problem
(Palminteri et al., 2015; Gershman et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2014). These studies view task
states as latent variables or contexts, which need to be inferred, while reward generation
rules from these states are learned, which essentially translates to a non-hierarchical, partially
observable Markov decision process. What sets our proposal apart, is that we view the
context as a latent variable on a higher level of a hierarchical model, which modulates how
rewards are generated from the same states. This allows us to describe not only actions but
sequences of actions which enables an agent to navigate a state space, where the rules might
change even within the same environment. We can thereby incorporate the assumption
that habits are based on chunked action sequences which allows us to map our model to
interesting neurophysiological findings which we discuss below. These ideas also align with
proposals such as event coding (Hommel et al., 2001) and event segmentation theory (Zacks
et al., 2007), which posit that behavior is segmented into events or episodes. Based on
these proposals, (Butz, Bilkey, Humaidan, Knott, & Otte, 2019) put forward an interesting
context and contingency learning model which implements ideas similar to our goal-directed
evaluation in a neural network model.
Typically habit experiments focus on providing evidence that animals have acquired a habit,
which are by experimental design non-functional, as the habit is measured by its suboptimality,
i.e. to perform an action even though it will not longer produce a reward. In contrast, as
we have access to the internal variables of the agent, we can observe, in addition, subtle
changes in behavior and the causes for these changes before and during extinction and
devaluation. This perspective allows us to asses the advantages of being a strong habit
learner, e.g. (Wood & Rünger, 2016): Fast and efficient action evaluation, choosing consistent
and reliable behavior, especially in uncertain conditions, an increased success rate, and
quick retrieval of previous habits in a known context which amounts to retrieving optimized
behavior. In the following, we will discuss how these advantages come about in terms of the
proposed model.
According to the model, habits are fast and efficient because the prior over policies is
retrieved from some context-specific ’prior over policies memory’ and is not evaluated in a
costly manner. Interestingly, we found that being a strong habit learner supports choosing
consistent, reliable behavior. For example, agents with higher habitual tendencies chose the
better option more reliably in our tasks. This was true as long as agents were in a stable context
where outcome rules did not change. Only in the short time after a contingency switch did
they choose the unrewarded option more often due their delayed behavioral adaptation, in
comparison to an agent with a low habitual tendency. Strikingly, precisely this effect has been
observed in a recent study, where (McKim, Bauer, & Boettiger, 2016) found that participants
with a history of substance use disorder (SUD) have a heightened ability to execute previously
learned stimulus-response associations, in comparison to controls. Assuming that a history
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of SUD is correlated with a stronger tendency to learn habits, this result directly reflects on
our finding of an increased performance for higher habitual tendencies in known contexts.
As we found in our simulated experiments, the participants with presumed higher habitual
tendency (SUD history) were also found to show a decrease in performance after a switch to
a new context, and showed signs of perseverance of behavior.
This effect of improved choice behavior was also seen when agents revisited a known
context. Here, the already learned, contextual habit enables an agent to quickly retrieve
previously acquired behavioral patterns for this context, which are presumably optimal if
the contingencies of the context did not change between the two visits. Importantly, being
a strong habit learner also helped performance in uncertain conditions: When rewarding
outcomes were highly stochastic, we found that the habit (prior over policies) has a stronger
weight on action selection and helps an agent choosing the better option more reliably.
Taken together this means that being a strong habit learner is advantageous, as long as
one’s environment is subdivided into stable phases of already known contexts, separated by
infrequent switches. Interestingly, there is evidence for such a mechanism of rapid context-
dependent habit retrieval (Bouton & Bolles, 1979; Gershman et al., 2010): Using optogenetics,
(Smith, Virkud, Deisseroth, & Graybiel, 2012) observed rapid re-instantiations of a previously
learned habit after a context change, where, similar to our simulated experiments, reward
contingencies changed. Obviously, this advantage of habits may be even increased, if agents,
as is the case in our real-life environment, were able to choose the context they are in or
switch to. While we did not implement this active component here, it would most likely lead to
agents choosing long stable contexts for which they already learned habits. These scenarios
would lead to interesting research about how agents decide to switch contexts to balance
exploration and exploitation in their environmental niche.
We identified several causes of variability in habitual control in the agent. First, as habits in
the form of a prior over actions are learned by exposure to stochastic stimuli, their contribution
is therefore dynamic and adaptive during a task. In other words, in our model, an agent never
stops adapting a habit so that habit strength varies and is context- and experience-dependent.
Secondly, we found that behavior is strongly controlled by habits in those situations when goal-
directed forward planning cannot determine a clearly best action, so that there is uncertainty
on what the best course of action is. This means that habits, when there is conflict between
different possible (goal-directed) actions, can be seen as an informed guess to select an action
and resolve the conflict rapidly. This uncertainty-weighting of control is in line with previous
findings (Daw et al., 2005; S. W. Lee et al., 2014). Thirdly, we found that one can emulate an
individual habitual tendency simply by varying the initial pseudo counts of the prior so that
the individual learning rate during habit acquisition varies, which in turn leads to variations in
delayed action adaptation and different habit strengths.
Even though there are advantages of using habits, it clearly depends on the environment
whether habits will be mostly advantageous or disadvantageous. For example, a strong habit
learner would be best placed in an environment with rare switches between already learned
contexts, see e.g. (Barnes, Kubota, Hu, Jin, & Graybiel, 2005; Gremel & Costa, 2013). Conversely,
an environment with frequent changes between contexts dissimilar from previously learned
ones would lead to decreased choice performance of a strong habit learner, in comparison
to a weak habit learner. Another possibility how the habitual control mechanism may be
detrimental to performance is if context inference is for some reason dysfunctional. For
example, with suboptimal context inference, one may expect that there is confusion between
contexts that are similar in appearance but effectively distinct. We speculate that this confusion
may express itself experimentally as an apparent decrease of top-down control by cortical
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areas (context-inference) on the striatum (habitual control), as e.g. found in (Renteria, Baltz, &
Gremel, 2018). Another interesting and experimentally relevant example of biased context
inference may be the established phenomena of Pavlovian to Instrumental Transfer (PIT),
(Garbusow et al., 2014; Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2008), where participants are biased
towards a previously encountered context by cues of that context. Note that in our model,
contexts are not cued and instead need to be implicitly inferred from the observed reward
rules of the environment, where we refer to a context as a specific set of states and their
corresponding outcome rules. Nonetheless, even without cues, retrieval of previously learned
habits was almost instantaneous, which would only be facilitated if, in addition, cues were
presented.
This mechanism may relate to addictive behavior like substance use disorders (SUD), which
are characterized by a shift from goal-directed to habitual and compulsive use. We speculate
that difficulties in context inference may help explain how addictive behavior becomes habitual:
While there is a clear difference in the outcomes between initial substance use (euphoria
or relaxation) and the outcome after a prolonged time period of use (e.g. adverse health
or social consequences), the user may not infer that these two outcomes are two different
contexts. Additionally, the use is typically associated with some stimuli or cues, like the ringing
sound of glasses, which become connected with the context and associated contingencies. As
outcomes become gradually less rewarding, the cues remain the same, and the contingencies
may not change quickly enough to be sufficiently driving a change in context inference.
Consequently, the action control of the user might not infer that prolonged use has placed
the user into a qualitatively new context, in which the initially learned habit provides for
suboptimal behavior. With suboptimal context inference in place, behavior will be strongly
biased by the already learned habit. As habits are hard to unlearn within a context, the user will
have difficulties to unlearn the habit. As uncertain probabilistic rewards shift control further to
habits, the difficulty to unlearn is further enhanced, where the reward stochasticity may result
from differences of outcomes but also from the user’s memory of the desirable outcomes
after initial substance use. It is an open question, whether people who become addicted have
a higher habitual tendency, or/and whether drugs of abuse increase an individual’s habitual
tendency. Another potential reason in the model that action control will be biased towards
habits is if the likelihood, i.e. the goal-directed evaluation, does not produce a clearly best
action, e.g. due to uncertainty about goals or a relatively low planning depth. According to
the model, limited planning capacity would translate into a less accurate and potentially less
pronounced likelihood, which leads to the habitual prior automatically gaining more weight
in the action selection. This holds while learning habits, but also when reentering a known
context.
Although we have used in our simulated experiments policies of just a single action
(len (π) = 1), the proposed model also supports behavioral episodes and policies with length
len (π) > 1, i.e. sequences of actions. Interestingly, a growing and compelling area of research
is to view habits as chunked and automatic action sequences (Graybiel & Grafton, 2015; Smith
& Graybiel, 2016), which might be embedded in a hierarchical model (Dezfouli & Balleine,
2012, 2013). This sequential view on habits rests on both neurophysiological and behavioral
evidence, see (Smith & Graybiel, 2014; Corbit, 2018) for recent reviews: In animal experiments,
both the dorsolateral striatum (DLS) and infralimbic (IF) cortex have been found to be impli-
cated in habitual control and to exhibit so-called (task-) bracketing activity, where neurons
are active at the beginning and the end of an action sequence, e.g. (Smith & Graybiel, 2013).
The computational function of this bracketing activity is yet unclear. We speculate, building
on insights from the proposed model, that this bracketing activity may be the expression of
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a context-dependent prior over policies being set at the beginning of an action sequence,
see Fig. 3.1. Setting such a prior has the advantage that the organism, during executing a
fast, but controlled action sequence, can focus only on a single or few policies whose prior
is greater than 0. This focus enables fast action control as only for these few policies the
likelihood needs to be evaluated. Critically, in the proposed model, the computation of prior
and the likelihood of policies have a clear sequential order in time; as the prior refers to
what policies in a specific context are predicted to be useful, even before the organism has
actually evaluated any policy, selecting this prior clearly has temporal precedence, as in the
proposed model, over the evaluation of the likelihood during performing the action sequence.
Precisely this temporal precedence has been observed experimentally during habit learning:
First, the beginning of the bracketing activity, e.g. in DLS, could be interpreted as a retrieval
and encoding of a prior over policies, while subsequent activity during the action sequence,
e.g. observed in dorsomedial striatum (DMS), could be an expression of the evaluation of
the likelihood over policies and the computation of a posterior over actions, i.e. once the
organism is receiving sensory input caused by executing the selected policy. Experimentally,
this DMS activity has been reported to be mostly present during rather early stages of habit
learning, and to decrease over time until a habit has been learned (Thorn, Atallah, Howe, &
Graybiel, 2010). In our model, this gradual decrease, over time, of DMS activity is reflected by
the increasing prior and posterior over policies over trials, e.g., see Figure 3.4c,d. Finally, the
bracketing activity in DLS at the end of an action sequence can be explained in the proposed
model by the updating of the prior over policies after performing the action sequence (see
Fig. 3.1), in particular the ’sharpening’ of end activity and the reduction in entropy, over trials,
as reported in (Desrochers, Amemori, & Graybiel, 2015). Findings of lesioning experiments
also fit into this picture: After habit learning, lesioning DLS led to a behavioral switch from
habits back to goal-directed action while lesioning of the DMS had no apparent effect (Yin et
al., 2004). Similarly, in another study, at an early stage of habit learning, inactivation of DMS
reduced the goal-directed response (i.e., in the model, likelihood and posterior can no longer
be computed) while inactivation of DLS was without effect (i.e., in the model no prior over
actions had be learned yet) (Corbit, Nie, & Janak, 2012). In the same study, after habit learning,
inactivation of DLS let the animals return to goal-directed behavior (i.e., in the model, the prior
over policies is now flat) while inactivation of DMS is without effect (i.e., in the model, the prior
over policies outweighs the now flat likelihood). Future studies will have to experimentally
test whether our predictions hold, and if our model indeed maps to these brain structures.
In summary, the proposed modelling approach provides the novel perspective that habitual
control relies on learned context-specific priors of policies. The resulting model provides for
a simple way to balance action control between habits and goal-directed control. As we have
discussed, experimental findings seem to support this perspective of a separation into prior
and posterior over policies. We anticipate that the present computational modelling approach
may support novel directions of research aimed at the central role of context inference as a
means to reduce the number of policies that have to be evaluated and implement fast action
control relying on the interplay between the prior and posterior over policies.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Derivations of the update equations
The variational free energy functional is defined as the Kullback-Leibler divergence between
the approximate posterior 3.6 and the joint probability distribution of the generative model
3.4. Hence, we can write the variational free energy as
F [q] =DKL
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where for clarity we omitted the parametric dependence of each distribution. The approximate
posterior is than obtained as the minimum of the free energy, defining the upper bound on
surprise (negative marginal log-likelihood).
We first write down the update equations for the beliefs over future states and rewards
within an episode, using the belief propagation message passing update rules (Pearl, 2014;
Yedidia et al., 2003b). For details on the derivation steps see our previous work (Schwöbel et
al., 2018) in which we investigated the Bethe approximation for a Bayesian treatment of a
partially observable Markov decision process. The results shown here are an adaptation for
fully observable states, which is just a special case.
q
(
rτ , sτ |π, ck
)
=
p
(
R = 1|rτ
)
p′
(
rτ |sτ , ck
)
mτ+1π
(
sτ |ck
)
mτ−1π
(
sτ |ck
)
Zπτ
q
(
rτ |π, ck
)
=
p
(
R = 1|rτ
)
mτπ
(
rτ |ck
)
Zπτ
q
(
sτ , sτ−1|π, ck
)
=
p
(
sτ |sτ−1, π
)
Zπτ,τ−1
mτ−1r (sτ−1)m
τ
r (sτ )m
τ+1
π
(
sτ |ck
)
mk−2π
(
sτ−1|ck
)
q
(
sτ |π, ck
)
=
mτ+1π
(
sτ |ck
)
mτ−1π
(
sτ |ck
)
Zπτ
(3.16)
88
using the messages
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(3.17)
where
ln p′
(
rτ |sτ , ck
)
=
∫
dφq (φ) ln p
(
rτ |sτ , φ, ck
)
(3.18)
the free energy mandated that we average out the dependency on φ.
The posterior beliefs over policies given some context are calculated as
ln q
(
π|ck
)
∝
∫
dθq (θ) ln p
(
π|θ, ck
)
+
∫
dφq (φ) ln p
(
s1:t, r1:t|π, φ, ck
)
−
∫
dφq (φ)
∑
st+1:T ,rt+1:T
q
(
st+1:T , rt+1:T |π, ck
)
ln
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(
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)
p
(
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)
∝ ln p′
(
π|ck
)
+
t∑
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ln p
(
sm|sm−1, π
)
− lnZπτ −
T∑
τ=t+1
lnZ ′′τ,π
∝ ln p′
(
π|ck
)
− F
(
π|ck
)
q
(
π|ck
)
∝p′
(
π|ck
)
exp
(
−F
(
π|ck
))
(3.19)
where p′
(
π|ck
)
is the marginalized prior over policies, and F
(
π|ck
)
is the policy-specific free
energy in a given context (see (Schwöbel et al., 2018)).
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The posterior over the parameters θ of the prior over policies can be derived as
ln q (θ) ∝ ln p (θ) +
∑
π,ck
q
(
π|ck
)
q (ck) ln p
(
π|θ, ck
)
∝ ln
 1
B (α)
∏
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θ
αk−1ln −1
ln
+∑
π,ck
q
(
π|ck
)
q (ck) ln
∏
l,n
θ
δl,πδn,ck
ln

∝ ln
∏
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θ
αk−1ln −1
ln
+∑
l,n
q
(
π = l|ck = n
)
q (ck = n) ln (θln)
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∏
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θ
q(π=l|ck=n)q(ck=n)
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
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∏
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θ
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
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1
B
(
αk
) ∏
l,n
θ
αkln−1
ln
αkln = α
k−1
ln + q
(
π = l|ck = n
)
q (ck = n)
(3.20)
and is itself again a Dirichlet distribution with updated pseudo counts αk. These are updated
by adding the posterior over policies times the posterior over context. At the end of an
episode, the pseudo count will be increased by 1 for the policy which has been followed in
the context the agent inferred to be in.
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The posterior over the parameters φ of the outcome rules can be derived as
ln q (φ) ∝ ln p (φ) +
∑
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Lastly, we want to derive the posterior over contexts
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(3.22)
with context-specific free energy F (ck). Note, that we set
p′ (ck) =
∑
ck−1
q (ck−1) p
(
ck|ck−1
)
(3.23)
As most of the posteriors described here are interdependent on each other, one has to
iterate over their updates until convergence. Practically, we only used one iteration step: We
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used the priors over θ, φ and ck to calculate the posterior over policies. Then we calculated
the posteriors over θ and φ, which were then used to calculate the posterior over contexts.
We evaluated if this procedure is equivalent to a full iteration until convergence and found
that the resulting posteriors only differed by less than 1% of their values.
3.8.2 Agent and task setup
The generative process of the habit learning task (Section 3.4.2) was set up as follows:
• An episode has length T = 2.
• There are 200 episodes so that k ∈ [1, 200]
• There are ns = 3 states S = {s1, s2, s3}, where s1 is the state where lever 1 distributes a
reward, s2 is the state where lever 2 distributes a reward, and state s3 is the starting
state in front of the two levers.
• There are nr = 3 rewards R = {r1, r2, r3}, where r1 is the reward payed out by lever 1,
r2 is the reward payed out by lever 2, and r3 is the no-reward.
• There are na = 2 actions A = {a1, a2}, where a1 leads to state s1, and a2 leads to state
s2 from any starting state.
• There are nc = 2 contexts C = {c1, c2} which amount to lever 1 or lever 2 being the
better arm, respectively.
• The state transitions are set up to be deterministic:
Ts
(
st+1|st,at = a1
)
=
1 1 10 0 0
0 0 0
 and Ts (st+1|st,at = a1) =
0 0 01 1 1
0 0 0
 so that a1
leads to state s1 from any starting state, and a2 to s2, while s3 can not be reached.
• The reward generation rules are as depicted in Figure 3.3b. Mathematically, the
reward generation in the training phase as Tr
(
rt|st, ck
)
=
 ν 0 00 1− ν 0
1− ν ν 0
 for
k ∈
[
1, dtraining
]
, where ν is the probability of lever 1 distributing a reward. In the extinc-
tion phase, the reward probabilities switch, so that Tr
(
rt|st, ck
)
=
1− ν 0 00 ν 1
ν 1− ν 0

for k ∈
[
dtraining + 1, dtraining + 100
]
• The context transitions are deterministic and happen after the training, so that Tc
(
ck+1|ck
)
=(
1 0
0 1
)
for k ∈
{
1, . . . , dtraining, dtraining + 2, . . . , dtraining + 100
}
and Tc
(
ck+1|ck
)
=
(
0 1
1 0
)
for k = dtraining + 1.
In each episode k, the agent starts at t = 1 in the state s3 in front of the levers.
The agent’s generative model is set up to reflect the generative process, or learn the
respective quantities:
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• The agent knows it starts in state s3 in each episode, so we set the prior of the starting
state as p
(
s1|s0, π
)
= p (s1) = (0, 0, 1)
T
• As we set T = 2, policies and actions map one to one, so that len (π) = 1 and nπ = 2.
This means, π1 = a1 and π2 = a2
• We assume the agent knows the state transitions instead of learning those, so that
p
(
st+1|st, π
)
= Ts
(
st+1|st,at
)
• The pseudo counts βkijn which are used to parameterize the outcome rules for reward i
and state j in context n, are initialized as β0ijn = 1 for all i, j, n
• The pseudo counts αkln which parameterize the prior over actions for policy l in context
n are initialized as α0ln = αinit = 1h using the habitual tendency h and are initialized the
same for all l, n.
• We set the agent’s representation of context transitions, i.e. temporal stability as
p
(
ck+1|ck
)
=
(
0.99 0.01
0.01 0.99
)
for k = dtraining + 1. Here, the agent assumes that both
contexts are equally stable and change once in 100 trials.
• Finally, we set the agents preference for outcomes as p
(
R = 1|rτ
)
= (0.495, 0.495, 0.01)T ,
so that the agent prefers the rewards of levers 1 and 2 equally, but dislikes the no-
reward r3. In the contingency degradation tasks, these values are kept constant. In
the outcome devaluation task (Section 3.4.7), the preference for outcomes was reset
in the extinction phase as p
(
R = 1|rτ
)
= (0.01942, 0..96117, 0.01942)T , which effectively
devalues the reward for lever 1 and keeps the ratio of desirability between reward and
no reward unchanged.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Summary
In this thesis, I derived computational hypotheses and definitions of habit learning from the
agreed upon operational definitions used in experiments. I combined three key features to
explain habit learning: that it is context dependent and of hierarchical nature, that habits
can be expressed as chunked action sequences, and that they are learned through mere
repetition, analogous to motor skill learning. Furthermore I proposed that the balancing can
be done by using Bayes’ rule, where uncertainty-based weighting of control contributions
arises from simple multiplication. Should this model hold under experimental scrutiny, the
novel mechanistic understanding would provide profound implications.
In Chapter 2, I proposed an improved inference scheme for sequential inference in the
active inference framework to solve a Markov decision process. Here, the second order Bethe
approximation was used to infer states and observations in a partially observable Markov
decision process. This allowed for the use the belief propagation algorithm to calculate
beliefs at the minimum of the variational free energy. Using a grid world as a toy setup for a
simulated agent, I could show that this improved sequential inference leads to an increase
in goal-reaching performance in environments with state transition uncertainty as well as
observation uncertainty, when compared to the mean-field approximation which had been
typically used before.
In Chapter 3, I proposed a hierarchical Bayesian model of habit learning. On the lower level
of the hierarchy, habits are interpreted as a prior over policies, i.e. sequences of actions, which
are learned based on repetition of previous behavior. Goal-directed control arises from an
explicit Bayesian evaluation of a Markov decision process in the likelihood, where the algorithm
from Chapter 2 was used. Both control signals are automatically weighted based on their
respective uncertainties through a simple multiplication in the posterior, from which actions
are sampled and executed. Interestingly, the prior constrains which policies will be evaluated
in the likelihood, so that habit learning also constrains the decision tree and the computational
cost of the goal-directed system. Additionally, the model contains a context in the higher
level of the hierarchy which determines action-outcome contingencies. As a consequence, an
agent may know that it can be in different contexts and learn action-outcome contingencies
as well as habits for specific contexts. The model has a free parameter, the habitual tendency
h, which can capture inter-individual differences in habit learning and resulting habit strength.
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Using this model for simulated agents, I showed that this habit learning mechanism replicates
the key characteristics of habit learning as discussed in Chapter 1 (see also below), and
how different habit strengths emerge from different habitual tendencies and experimental
manipulations.
4.2 Contributions
As outlined in the Introduction, the habit learning model proposed in this thesis is the first
one to capture all of the following key habit learning characteristics: (i) habitual behavior is
insensitive to outcome devaluation and contingency degradation, (ii) habit strength increased
with training duration, (iii) habits are more resource efficient than goal-directed control, (iv)
habit strength increases with decreased action-outcome contingency, and (v) habits are
context-sensitive and can be quickly recalled in a familiar environment. Additionally, the
model offers a simple way to balance control contributions.
Out of this list of features, (i) and (ii) are the most characteristic for habits, as they correspond
to the operational definitions of habits from the experimental literature. Hence, all habit
learning models originally set out to describe and model these effects. For the well cited
model-free/model-based habit learning model it has been shown however, that model-free
contributions to behavior do not predict insensitivity to outcome devaluation in humans, which
make it unlikely that the model-free interpretation of habit learning holds. This argument holds
for the plan-until-until habit model as well, which also relies on model-free learning, where
stronger habit contributions were compared to a decreased planning depth. Unfortunately,
the authors did not investigate how this changes with amount of training, so it is unclear
whether this model describes effect (ii).
Many models have investigated why habits may be inflexible, but have failed to provide
a convincing account of (iii) how habits are more resource efficient than reliance on goal-
directed control. When proposing a mechanistic account of habits, this is a very important
aspect, as the resource and time efficiency of habits is the very reason why an agent should
switch away from more accurate goal-directed control to less accurate habitual control. The
model-free/model-based model (Daw et al., 2005, 2011), the value-free/value-based (Miller
et al., 2019), as well as the Bayesian proposals based on model comparison (FitzGerald et
al., 2014a; K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, O’Doherty, & Pezzulo, 2016) all need
to evaluate the full goal-directed Markov decision process in order to obtain goal-directed
control contributions, even if they are low. This defies the purpose of habit learning and
therefore makes it improbable that these model are appropriate mechanistic explanations.
The hierarchical model (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012, 2013), the plan-until-habit model (Keramati
et al., 2016), and the Bayesian caching model (Maisto et al., 2019) provide accounts of how
habitual control improves reaction time and mental resource consumption. In the model
proposed in this thesis, weighting is done in the Bayesian way: by multiplication of the prior
and the posterior. This offers a simple and elegant way to achieve uncertainty-based control
contributions. An interesting consequence of this method is, that policies which have a prior
of zero, will always have a posterior of zero and will never be chosen. Consequently, the
prior, i.e. the habit, provides a way for an agent to learn which policies can be excluded from
goal-directed evaluation a priori. So the habit not only offers a quick way to evaluate actions
based on past experience, but also guides and constrains the goal-directed evaluation in the
likelihood. As a consequence, the habit model does fulfill its purpose of yielding a quicker
and more resource efficient way of action evaluation.
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The action-outcome contingency (iv) is defined as the spatio-temporal correlation of actions
and their consequence. It is well known, that the strength of conditioning increases with the
action-outcome contingency (Mazur, 2015; Gluck et al., 2016). For habits, which are measured
in extinction after the conditioning or training phase, the opposite holds: habit strength is
increased with decreased action-outcome contingency, in which case conditioning as well
as extinction of behavior takes longer. Experimentally, this has been mainly shown through
the use of different reinforcement schedules in animals, where schedules that have a lower
contingency, such as variable interval schedules, achieve higher habitization (Yin & Knowlton,
2006). This is an effect which is hard to reproduce with any habit learning model based on
reward history, as for example model-free/model-based model. Here, the decreased contin-
gency would decrease model-free as well as model-based control contributions. Mechanistic
descriptions based on repetition learning, as the value-free/value-based model and the one
proposed in this thesis, can account better for this effect, as the decreased contingency
decreases goal-directed control contributions, but not habitual contributions.
Lastly, the context sensitivity (v) is a habit characteristic which has been a matter for debate
with regard to modeling. None of the previous models except for the context models (Redish
et al., 2007; Gershman et al., 2010) have explicitly introduced and dealt with contexts. As a
result, habit learning models based on model-free temporal difference reinforcement learning
can only describe behavior in the extinction phase where behavior is slowly unlearned, but not
the quick recall of behavior upon entering a known context (Redish et al., 2007). As a remedy,
contexts have been proposed to be interpreted in terms of the states of the Markov decision
process (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). In these approaches, a flat model is used, where the states
encode the context, and different states lead to different outcomes, depending on the action.
Conversely, the model proposed here explicitly includes context as a separate variable at the
higher level of the hierarchical model, more akin to the context models, explicitly encoding
contexts and determining the action-outcome contingencies in each state. Concretely, this
equips an agent with the ability to learn, encode, and recall different environments as different
Markov decision processes and flexibly store and load this encoding upon leaving and entering
a familiar environment. Given the hierarchical nature of the brain, and the multitude of
contexts and environments each living agent encounters in their everyday lives, this may be a
more convincing mechanistic description of context sensitivity.
Taken together, I was able to show that a quantitative description of habit learning based
on the ideas that habits are hierarchically organized sequences of actions in a Bayesian model
and learned based on repetition, can replicate these five key characteristics of habit learning.
Unfortunately it is currently unclear if these hypotheses, which were based on animal research,
generalize to human habit learning. Nonetheless, given no satisfactory translation of animal
habit learning experiments to human experimental paradigms has yet been achieved (de Wit
et al., 2018; Friedel et al., 2014; Gillan et al., 2015), the proposed mechanistic description may
guide more successful human task development, where successful habit induction in humans
could be achieved through the components hypothesised in this model. Concretely, instead
of using single actions with high action-outcome contingencies as in outcome devaluation
tasks, future experiments could use sequences of actions with probabilistic outcomes to
induce habits. In contrast to the two-step task, habit learning could be facilitated by designing
a task such that the same action sequence reliably has the highest success rate in a specific
context, which could lead to behavioral automatization through extended training. Habits
could be probed by testing whether participants continue to execute this sequence even
after a contingency change in an extinction phase.
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4.3 Implications
Besides the potential for aiding task development, the model may help to measure habits in
a dimensional way. The current habit strength corresponds to the precision of the prior over
policies, where higher precision leads to larger control control contributions, which may be
compared to the precision of the goal-directed control contributions to a measure of relative
habit strength. When fitting the model to data, this may yield the opportunity to independently
get a measure for both control contributions as well as their relative strength. As a result,
using this model in future experiments to asses habit strength may make it possible to not only
measure if a participant relies on habits or not, as measured by failure to adapt to outcome
devaluation for example, but also to assess how much each individual relies on habits at
any moment in time, as a sort of dynamical measure of habit strength. So far, experimental
probes of habits had to rely on over training animals or human participants to induce habits.
This novel analysis technique could open the possibility to study moderate training periods,
which on one hand is easier to achieve experimentally due to taking less time, and on the
other hand may lead to larger individual differences in habit control strengths compared to
the over-trained case. As a result, probing for increased or decreased reliance on habits in
groups with mental disorders would be facilitated, see Discussion of Chapter 3.
While I do propose a computational and mechanistic explanation of habit learning, it is
not shown in this thesis how this description should map to neuronal architecture. One
important aspect of achieving a plausible mapping to neuronal architecture is how the pro-
posed Bayesian computations can be implemented into neural networks. For the sequential
inference based on the belief propagation algorithm, theoretical studies were able to show
concrete implementations of belief propagation in rate coded (Shon & Rao, 2005; Ott &
Stoop, 2007) as well as spiking neural networks (Deneve, 2005), making it plausible that this
may be implemented in the brain. For the more complex hierarchical habit learning model
the picture is not as clear. On one hand, there are neural network implementations based
on recurrent neural networks, which were able to learn action-outcome contingencies in a
context-dependent manner (Butz et al., 2019). The authors showed in simulations that an
agent can learn how to behave in different contexts and adapt its behavior upon encountering
a new context. While based on a similar graph, it is unclear if this neural network is a concrete
instance of the Bayesian processing described in this work which needs to be investigated in
the future. Additionally, the proposed model contains the habitual prior over policies, but
it is uncertain what a prior means in terms of neural networks. Some studies propose that
the spontaneous activity in a spiking neural network may correspond to a Bayesian prior
(Berkes, Orbán, Lengyel, & Fiser, 2011), where the inputs to the network correspond to the
likelihood, and the outputs to the posterior. This is a plausible interpretation of a prior, but
taking the arguments provided above together, there is currently no concrete translation
of the Bayesian habit learning model into a neural network. Nonetheless, the components
discussed above could be taken together to build a neural network translation of the Bayesian
model proposed in this thesis.
Another important aspect of achieving a plausible mapping to neuronal architecture is
whether the mechanistic account fits to the neurobiological underpinnings of habit learning,
as outlined in Section 1.2. The habit learning model contains various aspects such as learning,
storing, and loading of contextual action-outcome contingencies and habits, and how a habit
may guide and constrain the goal-directed evaluation. These aspects were also identified in
several neuronal findings regarding habit learning: the dorsomedial striatum is implicated in
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learning and evaluating action-outcome contingencies (Yin et al., 2005; E. M. Tricomi et al.,
2004), while the orbitofrontal cortex is thought to guide context-dependent retrieval of the
contingencies (Gremel & Costa, 2013; Parkes et al., 2018), and the medial prefrontal cortex
has been found to store and encode valuation signals (Daw et al., 2006; B. W. Balleine &
O’Doherty, 2010). The dorsolateral striatum is heavily implicated in habit learning (Reep et
al., 2003; Yin et al., 2004), where a task bracketing activity has been found and was shown to
correlate with behavioral automaticity (Smith & Graybiel, 2013, 2014). These findings may
correspond to the way the habitual prior guides loading and evaluation of action-outcome
contingencies at the start of a behavioral episode. For a more detailed description of the
potential mapping to the neurobiological findings on habit learning, see the Discussion in
Chapter 3.
A better mechanistic description of habit learning, as well as an improved understanding of
the corresponding neurobiology will also have strong implications for better understanding
and treating mental disorders which are thought to be correlated with a maladaptive balance
of habitual and goal-directed control, such as addition and OCD. In the habit learning model,
the habitual tendency parameter h offers a way to describe interindividual differences in
habit learning trajectories: An individual with a high habitual tendency will exhibit stronger
habitual control with less repetition of the same behavior compared to an individual with a
low habitual tendency. Additionally, the model is able to describe how different habit learning
trajectories emerge as a consequence of the individual habit tendency h, properties of the
environment, like for example its stability, as well as their interaction. In addiction for example,
addicted individuals are thought to shift from goal-directed to habitual control as they form the
addiction (Volkow & Morales, 2015; Everitt & Robbins, 2005, 2016), but these trajectories may
differ between individuals. Therefore, the model may offer a novel way to better understand
these individual trajectories, for a more detailed discussion see the Discussion section in
Chapter 3.
4.4 Interpretation
Apart form the concrete interpretations of the model in the scope of instrumental and habit
learning, the proposed model can be interpreted in the scope of broader psychological
concepts such as motivation and executive function or cognitive control. Studies in rodents in-
vestigated the influence of motivational states on instrumental learning and habits (B. Balleine,
1992; Lopez, Balleine, & Dickinson, 1992; Dickinson, Balleine, Watt, Gonzalez, & Boakes, 1995;
Dickinson & Balleine, 1994; B. W. Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010) and found that motivational
changes influence habit learning trajectories. For moderate training durations, a shift from
increased motivation during the conditioning phase, induced by hunger or thirst, to decreased
motivation in extinction, in a non-deprived state, decreases the repetition of conditioned
behavior in extinction. For extended training however, this effect vanishes. Following the
proposition by Niv, Joel, and Dayan (2006), in a computational model the motivational state
may be mapped to the utility of an outcome, which corresponds to the prior preference over
outcomes in Bayesian and active inference models. Such a shift in the utility would lead to
an increased valuation of an action in the goal-directed evaluation and thus yield a more
pronounced likelihood, while the habitual prior over actions would only change if an action
has been performed more or less frequently. As a result, the goal-directed likelihood receives
an increased weighting the posterior over actions, leading to an increased weight in action
selection, as long as it is not solely dominated by the prior, as is the case for moderate training
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durations. For extended training durations, the prior becomes so pronounced and dominant
that changes in the goal-directed evaluation have little influence in the balancing of control,
which renders behavior in extinction almost insensitive to motivational changes. This fits very
well to the experimental findings on motivation in the animal literature.
Integrating the model into broader concepts such as executive function and cognitive con-
trol (Goschke, 2014; “The Unity and Diversity of Executive Functions and Their Contributions
to Complex “Frontal Lobe” Tasks: A Latent Variable Analysis”, 2000), arguments can be made
the model captures effects such as inhibition and updating, two prominent features of higher
order cognitive function. According to the model, the prior over policies is loaded upon
receiving either a context cue or inferring the current context. While not concretely built into
the model, it is imaginable that this may happen in the cortico-basal ganglia-loop centered
on the dorsolateral striatum. Here, the loading could be done rather quickly, so that a fast
motor response can be prepared, akin to a reflex or impulse. At the same time, the current
action-outcome contingencies could be loaded into the goal-directed loop centered on the
dorsomedial striatum. The prior could then determine which policies are to be evaluated in a
goal-directed manner, so that policies which have a high a priori probability of being executed
are evaluated first. Only after some time, when sufficiently many policies have been evaluated,
would the likelihood be fully known and be able to override the impulse of following the habit,
leading to suppression or inhibition of the habitual response. In this interpretation, the initial
loading of the prior would correspond to an impulse of following the habit, while the slower
goal-directed evaluation which may override the impulse would correspond to inhibition. This
could also explain why habits are more prevalent under time pressure: If there is not enough
time to evaluate the full likelihood, an agent would need to rely on the faster, pre-loaded
prior. Furthermore, the (re-)loading of the contextual habit and action-outcome contingencies
upon receiving a contextual cue or inferring the context would correspond to updating of the
neural representation when it is warranted.
4.5 Limitations
While the model proposed seems able to explain many key properties of habit learning, it
comes with limitations that future research needs to resolve. One potential limitation is that
it is time discrete, i.e. it rests on the assumption that actions are evaluated and chosen in
discrete time steps. In many human experiments, this would not be an issue as they are often
based on trials. In the animal experiments as discussed in Section 1.1, habit induction critically
depends on the reinforcement schedule used, which can be based on intervals and exact time
points at which the reward is delivered, and behavior is measured in the form of response
rates. Both are aspects that would require a time-continuous model which is able to model
the contingency not only based on conditional probabilities, but the exact timing of the reward
distribution and lever press could be included. Consequently, the model can only indirectly
capture the properties of such reinforcement schedules via the conditional action-outcome
probabilities, but it can not directly explain why an animal would choose an increased lever
press rate. Miller et al. (2019) tried to tackle this limitation in their time-discrete model by not
only letting an agent choose which action to take, but also at which rate it wants to apply this
action. A similar approach could be used to resolve this issue in the proposed model.
Another consequence of the discrete time is that the model so far does not offer a way to
describe reaction times. This is important, as the decrease of reaction time is a known property
of increased behavioral automaticity (Seger & Spiering, 2011). Furthermore, many studies
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have shown that reaction times themselves can be indicative of the underlying cognitive
process, like e.g. in perceptual decision making (Heekeren, Marrett, & Ungerleider, 2008).
There are several interesting approaches one could choose to obtain a reaction time from
the posterior over policies: It may be that the reaction time increases with the entropy of
the posterior, i.e. reaction times may be higher the more uncertain the evaluation is. To
potentially achieve a similar effect, one may propose a specific sampling algorithm how the
agent samples actions from the posterior. A good candidate would be Hamilton Monte-Carlo
sampling (R. M. Neal, 2011), where random variables are treated as state space variables of
a dynamical system which is simulated according to Hamiltonian dynamics to achieve the
sampling. Interestingly, it has been shown that neural networks could potentially implement
this method (Aitchison & Lengyel, 2016), making this a viable approach. Another additional
factor which surely would influence reaction times is the model complexity determining the
time an agent would need to plan through the Markov decision process. Here, reaction times
should increase with the number of potential policies, the number of states, and the planning
depth.
Future work may investigate how the model can be made time continuous and incorporate
reaction times. Additionally, future experimental studies will reveal whether this model fits
habit learning behavior in animals and humans better than the previous approaches. Despite
these limitations, the model proposed in this thesis could prove useful to better understand
habit learning in a mechanistical sense, and may help to aide the development of improved
behavioral paradigms to induce habits in humans. A better understanding of habits may
have implications for mental disorders that are thought to be accompanied by a maladapted
balance between habitual and goal-directed control.
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